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POLITICAL, SOCIOLOGICAL AND MILITARY AFFAIRS

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MLYNAR DISCUSSES SITUATION IN POLAND

Rome LISTY in Czech No 1, Feb 82 pp 1-8

[Article by Zdenek Mlynar: "Possibilities and Consequences of 'Normalization' in Poland"]

[Text] Speculation on the democratization process of the social and political system in Poland has come to an end for now. The military and police machinery of the Soviet Bloc has again had the last word, as we have seen previously in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968. The fact that the principle forces of execution this time consisted of Polish military and police units rather than the Soviet, may be new but changes virtually nothing in the heart of the matter. The Polish armed contingents could undertake this role only as a dependent and subordinate component of the overall Warsaw Pact military and police machinery. If there were no Soviet divisions on Polish territory (their real role under martial law is still a mystery) and if there had been any other alternative but armed Soviet intervention, 13 December 1981 in Poland would have been impossible.

It is easy to foresee that many authors will be writing, or are already doing so, about why it all happened and how things in Poland will develop in the future. Czechoslovak readers can expect a flood of articles which will try to prove that a "normalization" policy offers the only alternative. The 16 months of fear which the Czechoslovak "normalizers" had to live through since the Gdansk Agreement, will now be compensated for via a self-assured straightening of the spine. And even the lowest type of police informant will feel a little more secure in the saddle, since the icy wind from the "temporary" concentration camps in the north will certainly reach as far as Prague, Brno and Bratislava.

Many people in Czechoslovakia will draw lessons from the events in Poland, which are in the spirit of regime goals, namely, that it is best to maintain silence and keep in step, think what one may but never engage in any opposition activity because then everything could be even much worse. The fact alone that such attitudes were unfortunately prevalent in the CSSR even before martial law and that there was almost no real understanding that the struggle in Warsaw was being waged on behalf of Prague, too, clearly shows what will henceforth be the determinant factor in the political atmosphere in Czechoslovakia--it will be fear. Such fear is not unjustified.

Regrettably, it provides no protection whatever against what the people are afraid of. People are silent and stay in step in the hope that this will salvage the small remaining enclaves of their "peaceful and bearable private life" which would be threatened by opposition activity which, in the end, will be crushed anyway. After the Polish December, however, a normalization on the "Czech pattern" will not be possible in Poland any more than eventually throughout the Soviet Bloc, including Czechoslovakia.

Neither Kadar Nor Husak

No one, not even General Jaruzelski, imagines that martial law and a military dictatorship can permanently solve the problems in Poland which have caused a deep crisis in the social and political system. Representatives of the military regime themselves today say that "reforms will continue," that the military dictatorship is only a "temporary solution." That, of course, is nothing new. The still anonymous authors of the letter which "invited" the Soviet troops to Czechoslovakia in 1968, were promising to maintain the line of the reform CPCZ Action Program and only needed aid in this direction from the interventionists. They allegedly needed it only to "normalize the situation" the same as Jaruzelski today.

When martial law is ended in Poland, it is likely that whoever is in power at that time (names make little difference) will try to find a viable solution. It is likely that a way out will be sought, directly or indirectly, in some sort of Polish version of the so-called Kadarization. The example of Hungary which, following the military intervention of 1956, in the course of the next 25 years, ended up by creating a regime which so far has been able to reduce economic, social and political tensions, and which gained a certain consensus of the population. Something like this will probably be the publicly proclaimed goal of those in power in Poland. Such visions were pursued after August 1968 by the CPCZ leadership also--first under Dubcek and later (at least initially) under Husak. I do not believe that Husak in April 1969 intended to create the type of regime he heads in 1982. He, too, probably first thought that he might become a Czechoslovak Kadar. He did not succeed in this, and as he himself liked to say, in politics it is not good intentions but results which count. Today, his regime and he himself, therefore, are what they are and it is immaterial what they would have wanted to be. Something similar surely awaits Jaruzelski and the team in charge after martial law. These people will not be like Kadar but neither will they be like Husak.

Hungary after the Soviet intervention in 1956 was not a country in economic chaos. While elements of economic disruption stemmed from the policies of Stalinist Rakoszi and his emphasis on senseless industrialization and forced collectivization of the countryside, this policy was abandoned after the intervention. The necessary balance between agriculture and industry was maintained in the Hungarian economy and economic aid from the Soviet Bloc bridged the critical phase of development. Moreover, since the early 1960s, Hungary was permitted, within the bounds of the then Soviet policy, to carry out gradual economic reforms. In the political sphere as well, the situation was propitious for so-called Kadarization. Khrushchev was vitally

interested in making sure that the Soviet intervention in Hungary not hinder but rather accelerate his course of "moderate de-Stalinization." While it is true that Soviet troops in Hungary crushed the national revolution and political opposition in the country was suppressed by terror, there was no attempt in the overall process to restore Stalinism in its previous incarnation, instead, Khrushchevism was imported into Hungary. Kadar is due credit for having been able to make use of these circumstances to create a variety of a Soviet-type regime which to this day demonstrates the "art of the possible," exploit the national shock of 1956 (and later the upheaval of 1968, and now the events of 1981) for keeping the forces striving for a change in a state of fear of radical forms of resistance, while simultaneously carrying out partial economic and political reforms which in their aggregate tend to mute social and political tensions in the country.

This would not have been possible for Husak after 1968, not only because in a negative sense he is personally different from Kadar, but also because the wind from Moscow was quite different than under Khrushchev. Soviet interventionists did not bring to Czechoslovakia Khrushchev's reformism but its negation, in other words, Brezhnev's "real socialism," a slightly adapted totalitarian system of political power, the principal aim of which was to retain Czechoslovakia in its imperialist sphere and prevent in this country the emergence of any kind of democratic "heresy." The only similarity with Hungary was in that neither country was in a state of economic disruption at the time of the Soviet intervention, on the contrary, 1968 in the CSSR was a year of economic improvement when the fruits of a previous capital investment wave, as well as certain positive results of economic reform, were being reaped. The Czechoslovak variety of "normalization" (i.e., restoration of a totalitarian system of the Soviet type) was able to rely for a period of time (roughly until 1976) on relatively good economic results and a decent standard of living. Consequently, mechanisms offered by the so-called consumer society were used to achieve political stabilization. Under these conditions, it was possible to reach a political normality characteristic of the Czechs, i.e., the people were silent, stayed in step, thought their own thoughts, and protected the limited space for a "peaceful private life."

Jaruzelski or anyone else for that matter, simply cannot emulate either the Hungarian or Czechoslovak alternative of "normalization." Economic chaos in the country is an accomplished fact. Gierek's megalomania of industrialization which was to create a "different Poland" fell apart in a manner unprecedented in Europe (with the exception of a similarly conceived line in Romania). The party and government wasted enormous capital investment resources during the past decade which, in part, never even became operational, in part, were dependent on imports of raw materials and engineering for hard currencies which simply are not there and, in part, manufactured products which could not be sold on world markets. The remaining debt is $27 billion owed in the West (for illustration, the USSR owes $11.6 billion, and the CSSR $3.4 billion). All of Polish exports are no longer capable of even covering the interest which Poland has to pay annually on this debt. Polish agriculture was led to stagnation and ruin by the regime, for it was not allowed to function as private enterprise, yet

the regime was unable to collectivize it. The conflict between town and country in Poland in the economic, political, social and cultural sense, is beyond comparison with any other central European country.

Gierek's Poland in the fall of 1980 really was a "different Poland" than ever before. It was a country where, instead of features of an advanced industrial society, there was poverty and a threat of famine. Massive strikes as early as 1976 presaged what political consequences this could have. The strike movement in the fall of 1980 was a direct result of this situation, and certainly not of any reformist ideas stemming from either "above" or "below." It was a conflict between the workers class and a social and political system which in its forms and effects was more reminiscent of the late 19th than the 20th century in Europe.

It is precisely such a situation into which the military and police machinery intends to cast the Polish people back again, maintain "peace" under such conditions, and from this starting point then conduct "normalization." The USSR and even the entire Soviet Bloc put together will not be able, through whatever economic injections, to achieve more than ease for a brief period of time the most glaring shortages of certain foodstuffs and consumer goods. To restore in the Polish economy the necessary balance and proportion between industry and agriculture and achieve economic stabilization and gradual improvement as in Hungary after 1956, is beyond the capacity of the Soviet Bloc. And to prop up "normalization" by consumer mechanisms as 13 years ago in Czechoslovakia is simply out of the question.

Thus the economic prospects alone render illusory all the talk about some sort of Kadarization of Poland. In addition to the grim outlook in the economy, there are the political conditions with which any type of "normalization"in Poland must be accompanied.

Political Blind Alley

As to what sort of political wind will be blowing from Moscow over the "normalization" in Poland, there is not the least doubt that it will not be the wind which blew in 1956 in the direction of Budapest. There will be an even worse variety of fear of the possible weakening of Moscow's hegemony than in 1968. This time it will be not merely because of Moscow's greater and historically rooted fear of Polish resistance, and because of Poland's more important place in the Soviet Bloc (second largest country, second largest army, and the country which separates the USSR from Germany). It will also be because in 1968 Moscow was not mired in Afghanistan, it did not have as many sensitive spots around the world as it has now, an economic crisis was not yet knocking at the door at home, and Johnson was not Reagan. In 1968, Moscow was able to anticipate fairly accurately what would happen and what actually did happen, namely, its offensive course would eventually lead to "detente" and Helsinki, while even certain West European statesmen would soon be wisely referring to Czechoslovakia in 1968 as a "traffic accident on the road to detente."

None of this is valid today and there is no reason to believe that Moscow will demand from the Polish regents anything less than a "normalization" without compromise or sentimentality. That, we should recall, has precisely been the thrust of Moscow's treatment of Poland ever since the fall of 1980. The inability or unwillingness of the Polish ruling team to truly and permanently reconcile itself with the fact that, after the birth of Solidarity, there was only one road without open confrontation with the Polish nation, namely, recognition of the right of the broad strata of society to monitor power and participate in political decisions, search for new acceptable methods of compromise thus, in fact, reforming the existing political system--it was this unwillingness of Polish leaders to face reality which was constantly demanded and supported from Moscow. As early as April 1981, Suslov announced in Warsaw that, in his opinion, affiliation of communists with Solidarity was incompatible with the principles of Marxism-Leninism. The threatening ultimatumlike letter from Brezhnev in June 1981, affected the preparation of the Communist Party Congress in a direction which made it impossible for the reform currents within the party leadership to prevail. In the end, apparently even Kania was unable to guarantee to Moscow that the hardliners advocating confrontation would come out on top. Consequently, and no doubt in harmony with all sorts of "Leninist principles," all power in the state, party, and the military, was concentrated in the hands of General Jaruzelski. Other pressures from Moscow included Soviet propaganda which, from the beginning, branded Solidarity a pack of counterrevolutionaries (without any differentiation between the radicals and moderates in its leadership), and continues in this vein to this day, at a time when official spokesmen of the military regime are trying to deceive the Poles and the world by claims that "self-administered" unions will, of course, have a place in Poland even after martial law.

Not even the classical Kadarization in Hungary could do without mass terror and later without a phase in which the "hard men" in the party and police played an important role. That this particular phase in the long run became a mere intermezzo, was possible because of the special circumstances already mentioned. The same, however, cannot be said about Czechoslovakia, and it would be presumptuous to explain to the Czech reader what type of people have been the most stalwart supporters of "normalization" for 13 years now in the party and other instruments of power. Who will it be under present conditions in Poland who will form the cadre of "normalizers" when martial law is lifted? Those, numbering tens of thousands, who today languish in the "temporary" detention camps? Or those who for 16 months advocated a policy of compromise, be it in the party, other institutions, or even in Solidarity? Or will it rather be those who from the very beginning favored a solution by force, by means of the military and the police? It is not really difficult to answer these questions.

It is not inconceivable, in fact, it is probable that a portion of the reform-oriented political forces will try, following the end of martial law, to salvage what can perhaps still be salvaged. It is not by chance that the first representative of the military regime sent to the West was M. Rakowski, a long-time proponent of a reform communist orientation. It is

likely that even certain members of the Solidarity leadership team will embark (under the combined impact of force, frustration and remnants of hope to salvage something) on the risky road of "continuing the reforms." However, even if Lech Walesa himself should opt for this alternative, it would not necessarily mean any more for future developments in Poland than did Dubcek's return from Moscow in 1968.

In order for reforms to really develop in a peaceful manner, the prerequisite would be not only that official political representatives be willing and able, but also that the bulk of society be willing and able to thrust such a course. Such confidence of the important strata of society in the success of gradual and orderly reforms, however, had been repeatedly severely shaken by the political leadership ever since 1956. Gomulka and Gierek had exhausted the reserves of such trust to almost nothing. Yet, it was the remaining small portion which was able to spark the events we witnessed from the fall of 1980 to 13 December 1981. These events were found unacceptable by the power elite in Poland and Moscow because, from their point of view, they were wrought with uncertainty. Consequently, they opted for armed suppression of the forces which appeared dangerous to them. There is no doubt that they were fully capable of doing this. However, to believe that after this event the pitifully miniscule amount of confidence in a dialogue with those in power (toward peaceful reform) will grow, would be political naivete and self-deception. Such an expectation is as absurd as the claim of Czechoslovak propaganda that, after August 1968, "love for the Soviet Union" among the Czechs and Slovaks was even deeper and more ardent than ever before.

The regime of General Jaruzelski certainly changed the Polish internal situation. We must realistically acknowledge that he had eliminated from the internal political scene and atmosphere the factors which made possible the development since the fall of 1980, namely, the workers self-confidence earned through their political tactics in 1956, 1970, and 1976, the national euphoria stemming from the belief that, except for the Soviet armed forces, there was no power capable of forcible suppression of the democratization process because "Polish soldiers will never fire on Polish workers," the self-confidence among Polish intellectuals active in the opposition movement who have years ago discounted mass terror as a viable option for the regime, faith in the political influence of the Polish church and Polish pope, illusions about the real role of the West (according to one opinion poll, over 35 percent of Poles believed that "in case of Soviet intervention in Poland, the West would act effectively"), etc. All this will reduce rather than increase confidence in the ability of the communist power to reform the socioeconomic system in harmony with the aspirations of the majority of Polish citizens.

By installing a military dictatorship, the communist power revealed itself as a force which is no longer willing or able to conduct a dialogue with its own people and seek political compromise because the consequences of such an approach were getting beyond its total control. As soon as this power realizes that compromise would mean relinquishing some of its control

over society, it resorts to force. It is precisely this and no other lesson which is today being lodged in the minds of Polish citizens. All the proposals of "continuing the reforms" which the party and government will surely be issuing and propagating eventually, will hardly change anything in this reality. Everyone knows that the condition of all such "future reforms" will not be a dialogue with the people and political compromise, but rather total domination by the communist power.

Metaphorically speaking, one could say that after 13 December 1981 "future reforms" in Poland mean reforms of the prison code but not the transformation of prisons into a different type of community. Admittedly, prisoners are justifiably interested in what kind of code they are living under, what the food is like, what regulations govern their cell life, what the guards are permitted to do, what the work standards are, and finally whether it is possible to watch television and what is available in the prison library. Not even the most liberal code, however, makes people behind bars yearn solely for prison privileges, they rather live for the day they will be released.

All this must be taken into serious consideration when we speculate on future reforms in contemporary Poland. Representatives of the reform-oriented forces will not be confronted with the same problems as prior to 13 December 1981, the political divisions will now be quite different. What before that date was called radicalism has now become a crime against the state (and the cause) which made martial law "necessary." What used to be moderate reformism is inevitably placed in the position of the former radicalism, and the so-called centrist trend becomes the opposite pole of officially approved positions.

Thus when martial law ends, those who before it were bearers of moderate reformism will be seen--actually without any change in their attitudes--as dangerous radicals and they will naturally be treated as such. The political power which in the name of its total control of society resorted to a military dictatorship will, following its success, hardly become a force which would unambiguously reject a repeat performance if necessary. All that which previously, when a mass resistance movement threatened, was regarded as acceptable and moderate centrist, will now be viewed as an attempt to deprive power of its victory, prevent it in the future from again "restoring order" via the military and police whenever, from its vantage point, it is deemed appropriate. At the same time, the moderate reformists will have lost the most important base of their political existence in that so-called centrism is possible in a situation where it can mediate a compromise between two extremist political currents, which under the present "transfer" of the more radical current to prison, is useless and unnecessary.

Even under the best of conditions of future development in Poland, it would, therefore, be necessary to create a new, politically different than before 13 December 1981 "moderate reformist trend." In reality, however, only that which before martial law was considered conservative and obsolete would be seen as acceptably moderate now. It is in this that we find the real

purpose of the military dictatorship, namely, to confront Polish society with a different choice than it had in the fall of 1981, and that which is now being offered is, in fact, even worse than the conditions of the past.

Reform-oriented social and political forces which under such conditions nevertheless embark on an attempt to salvage as much as possible, risk losing their political identity altogether. There is great danger that, for the sake of being tolerated by the new dictatorial power, they will finally end up by supporting it (or, more precisely, will help maintain a situation where this power retains a real capability of putting on the uniform again). They will in reality be salvaging the new power structure which will tolerate them only within the parameters which serve precisely this goal. That something like this is possible is clearly demonstrated by Czechoslovak developments in 1969-70. The current of "moderate reformism" (Strougal and company) was under such pressure that it split into two parts, of which one became politically paralyzed and the other (Strougal and company) ceased to be "moderately reformist" and survived on the political arena only in the role of supporter of the restored totalitarian dictatorship.

Facing this danger will soon be those in Poland who remain in the "revived" power structures and continue to strive for reforms, as well as those who become officials of some sort of "revived" Solidarity (or whatever name the general allow). Under the present situation, this danger cannot be disregarded even by the most powerful, relatively autonomous, ideological and political force in post-World War II Poland, the Catholic Church. In its relations to the church, the new power will no doubt be much more careful than with a new "Solidarity" and proceed with kid gloves, which may be the church's only real hope. The Catholic Church will certainly not alter its basic position and requirements, on the contrary, it might even raise the latter somewhat. However, it can be successful only if it pays the price in terms of political power. Not so much in form, which will probably remain about the same, i.e., the church will acknowledge the current situation as a necessary evil which perhaps prevented something worse, and will maintain its critical and opposition stance in the pulpit. The price it will pay, however, will in reality be as much higher than before as the degree that the military dictatorship is worse for society than was Gierek's regime.

We do not expect a situation in Poland in which the church would cease to play the important role as a spiritual and political force which it has traditionally performed. It is possible, however, that future workers strikes will no longer be held under the pope's portrait affixed to the plant gates, and that future Walesas will not consult as much with the bishops. Even this could contribute to reducing the chances of future development without bloodshed.

Whatever the future efforts for "continuance of the reform trend" may be from either "above" or "below," the fact remains that 13 December 1981 certainly did not improve the conditions for such development but rather steered all such intentions into a blind alley. Viewed in political rather than military terms, the military dictatorship in Poland was not a step which simply

"prevented civil war," as claimed by official propaganda. The situation in Poland is tantamount to that after a lost civil war. The communist power avoided such war by waging it itself against a helpless population. The forces which were defeated by the military and the police, are currently in the position of those who had lost a civil war. The fact that they did not have a chance to fire a single shot, changes nothing in the political outcome. It is precisely for this reason that the destruction of the political atmosphere and institutional forms of political life as they existed in the preceding period will be so profound that the victorious power itself cannot continue without radical changes. We can certainly expect that the communist party itself will have to undergo significant restructuring, be it through "purification" as in Czechoslovakia in 1970, or via a formally "new" party as in Hungary after 1956. The purpose of such restructuring will be to adapt the party to its role in the new situation, after a civil war lost by its critics and opponents. However, even a "new" party will still play the role for the maintenance of which martial law was declared in the first place. That, rather than a "moderate reform policy," would be its principal goal. The "new" party would carry out only those reforms which serve the old goal of maintaining itself in total control.

Therefore, while it is likely that after martial law is lifted the internal political conflicts will sharpen, it does not mean that all developmental alternatives have been exhausted by the above assessment. Basically, the internal situation will be indeed more complicated than before and there will be new problems which had not emerged before 13 December 1981. All this will in the end determine the possibilities and elbowroom for official power, as well as for the suppressed social and political forces. In concrete problems, there may even be some compromises because even a totalitarian dictatorship cannot totally reject a certain amount of social and political give and take. Such an accommodation, however, will not have the same meaning as in the past, it will not be opening the door to gradual systemic changes, but only help reduce tensions which might become dangerous to the restoration of the old system.

In history, of course, not even blind alleys provide the final answer. Nevertheless, the fact that historical development does not end in defeats and blind alleys forever, should not prompt us to reach optimistic conclusions with respect to the political realities as they appear to be for the future. One can understand the motives of those who, even in blind alleys, try to "save what can be saved;" and one can even have political sympathy for such people and feel a certain amount of solidarity with them. However, because of this sympathy, to ignore their actually limited and vitually hopeless position, would really help no one.

New Alliance of Terror and Corruption

The Polish military dictatorship claims that it has no intention of reverting to the Gierek era. As proof of this, certain members of the Political Bureau of that period have been detained. I believe that this assertion can generally be believed, since Poland today simply could not turn back the clock in this manner. Not even Husak in 1969 tried to return to the situation

of the last years of Novotny's rule which, incidentally, in Czechoslovakia today are regarded as the "good old days." Even in Czechoslovakia "normalization" created a new reality, a new combination of elements of Stalinism of the 1950s and the social corruption of the 1970s. There is no reason to believe that the 1980s in Poland will simply be a replay of the 1970s.

The main support features of stability of the Gierek regime really collapsed in the fall of 1980, and a mere return to that period could not very well guarantee the stability of the system in 1982, for which the regime will seek new and more effective support mechanisms. In my view, the broader significance of the installation of a military dictatorship in Poland lies primarily in the fact that these new stabilization mechanisms are bound to include mass political terror such as has not been seen in the Soviet Bloc since 1956. Brezhnev's "real socialism" stabilized itself in the 1970s principally on the basis of economic pressures on society, and the instruments of naked violence acted as only a supplementary (though essential) mechanism.

In Poland, however, the first country of the Soviet Bloc, the economic props of stabilization had collapsed. It is impossible to achieve even passive loyalty of the majority to the regime by predominantly economic and social factors, after the system had for years produced only poverty and threats of famine which afflicted even those who have done their job as ordered and have never participated in any protest activity. Something like that is feasible only when the passively loyal "working citizen" is decently rewarded for his role by means of social security and a bearable, guaranteed material standard of living. For the sake of brevity, we can call this the mechanism of social corruption, as opposed to the mechanism of terror.

Poland today, however, cannot merely return to a system which relies on social corruption because the new ruling clique simply cannot afford it and will not be able to in the foreseeable future. They can perhaps corrupt the ruling elite but not the "toiling masses" because there are no means for it. For some time to come, therefore, it will be necessary to seek support props to stabilize the system through a new combination of instruments in which the share of terror will inevitably rise.

During the first 3 weeks of martial law, General Jaruzelski clearly demonstrated that this is the "real socialism" Poland can indeed afford (naturally, with the fraternal help of all the Warsaw Pact countries). It appears that we will soon be witnessing an experiment in which, through a new alliance of corruption and terror, an "economic reform" is to be brought to life. According to all indications, this "reform" will be initiated while the tanks can still assist. And indeed it is quite logical. Any real economic reform under contemporary "real socialism," even one of a democratic incarnation, with elements of workers self-management and political democracy, would of necessity have to result in highly unpopular measures, such as reduction of the labor force, higher prices of many consumer goods, etc..with all the ensuing social consequences. Unpopular effects would also have to anticipated in a reform of a purely technocratic

character, such as the one apparently considered most desirable by the incumbent Polish regime. After the experiences of 1980-81, it is, therefore, logical that the rulers will try to make the reform operational while still under conditions of military dictatorship which should guarantee "clean" handling of some sensitive issues.

The enormous inflationary wave, for example, will occur under the watchful eye of the police and gun barrels of the tanks, under the ban of assembly and strikes, and under conditions of rationing where even with coupons one cannot find what the government promises. Enterprises will be accorded more independence in a situation where the principal ones are under military administration, when absenteeism is punishable in a military court, and where compulsory employment of entire categories of citizens has been decreed. The disrupted industrial production in Poland is to be "rationalized" along military lines, which reduces to a minimum the danger of any undesirable discussion of this measure by those who are to slave more rationally in this "reform" which does not provide any real prospect of better conditions than under Gierek. We can easily imagine that such a concept of "economic reform" could at a given time and to a considerable extent result in a sort of alliance of the political, military, police and economic bureaucracy, thus producing in time within the ruling elite a higher measure of consensus with respect to military and police terror, than there was at the beginning.

Certain features of a "political reform" will probably also be initiated under conditions of at least partial "national emergency." This will make it easier to construct out of the ashes of total disintegration another "leading force of society" in the form of a renamed or thoroughly "purified" party. This will be followed by the birth of "new trade unions" and many other institutions. Those who do not like it will be marched off to a military tribunal. Those who are already known not to like it will observe the "reform" from behind bars where they already spent last Christmas.

It is precisely this variety of "normalization" which seems most likely in Poland because the anticipated forms of resistance will be different here than in Czechoslovakia after 1968. Not only because the Poles have a tradition of always continuing the struggle, following the defeat of a broad-based national movement, in an imaginative, perseverant and courageous manner (Solidarity clearly was such a national movement), but also because millions of Poles will be forcibly thrown back by the new dictatorship not to the reign of Antonin Novotny as would have been the case in Czechoslovakia, but into a situation against which they had already risen once, into poverty, shortages, into a moral and political morass without hope or prospects of change. We are, therefore, justified in anticipating that in Poland there will emerge a phenomenon not seen either in 1956 Hungary or 1968 Czechoslovakia, namely, growth of a permanent movement of resistance, all the way from sabotage, through political action, to armed conflict. The incumbent Polish ruling clique is well aware of this and will take all the measures it can to prevent it or meet it.

It is difficult to predict merely on the basis of general trends what forms and intensity the Polish resistance movement will have. It will in great measure depend on concrete and changing factors. However, we can expect that the resistance will be anchored in the social strata of workers and peasants, rather than in intellectual and youth circles. Since, especially against the broad strata of the working people, social corruption on behalf of the regime can hardly be effective in the foreseeable future, the regime will be forced to perpetuate what it had begun, namely, mass violence and terror. Thus the Polish "normalization" may permanently include elements of a state of war in which violence breeds resistance and resistance more violence in perpetual reproduction. This type of "normalization" will spawn a tendency toward militarization and police suppression in the economic, social and political life of the country to a degree not experienced in the Soviet Bloc since 1956.

To expect that out of the burning wreckage left after martial law there will rise--like the fabled Phoenix--some sort of "moderate reform policy" devoid of dangerous extremes, is certainly only a product of illusion and wishful thinking. Also illusory, however, would be the expectation that the resistance movement will be the sole important sociopolitical reaction to the given state of affairs. Polish society is exhausted and weary from months (in a sense, years) of struggle whose hopes were cruelly suppressed. The restored dictatorship, equipped with new features, can expect what every "law-and-order party" in history has expected during a prolonged period of social crises and upheaval, namely, that it will have adherents among those who have given up and are, therefore, willing to adapt to anything, who no longer wish to take risks and are afraid of conditions becoming even worse. The new dictatorship can even count on a certain number of those who in political crises always invoke a "strong arm" as a desirable solution.

The clique of "normalizers" in Poland will no doubt strive in every possible way to broaden their base of support and make it more effective. As already mentioned, in the sphere of social corruption, it lacks the necessary means. But everything is relative, and in the present situation in Poland even the rationed supply system, should it eventually work well (as opposed to the present), could produce a certain willingness to conform. Moreover, the policy of "normalization" will have at its disposal certain not inconsiderable instruments in the sphere of ideological and political corruption.

Thus, for example, the slogan "we will do everything to avoid the worst" (and a variety of bugaboos can serve as "worst," such as direct Soviet intervention, restoration of martial law, hunger, etc) will surely not remain the slogan of official power alone. Without in any way suspecting the church of consent to the incumbent regime, it will nevertheless be the church which will provide effective political assistance in the acceptance of this slogan by broad strata of the population. As a political force, the Polish church is not (and cannot be) an organization directly formulating active resistance. It cannot promote open conflict with the power holders. Over the 30 years of its existence under conditions of a communist system of power, it has naturally followed a different strategy and tactics to

which it will adhere in the future as well. Seen from a short-term vantage point of balance of power, however, this will indeed serve a relative stabilization of the new dictatorship, rather than a struggle against the system. And naturally the church will not be the only political force moving in this direction. All those who embark on the road of "saving what can be saved" will be--perhaps unwittingly--going in the same direction.

Another important instrument in the field of ideological and political corruption will doubtless be Polish nationalism. Even in the worst days after 13 December 1981 one noticed how carefully even opponents of the regime handled the myth of the Polish Army as a purely "national force." At a time when the military dictatorship was already in full force, one still heard much talk about how only the police units engage in open violence, that the soldiers were actually Russians or Czechs dressed in Polish uniforms, that Jaruzelski and his generals only wished to prevent the "worst" (i.e., Soviet invasion), etc. Appeals to the national sentiments and myths of the Poles are resounding in the speeches of representatives of the new regime. In the days when the Polish Army held the entire nation hostage, when tens of thousands of people were being arrested, Polish policemen were beating Polish democrats, Polish units (be it "only" police or mixed with the military) stormed the plants occupied by workers, the church hierarchy spoke in a language appealing, above all, to the unity of interest of all Poles and beseeched Poles not to spill Polish blood. The church is certainly not a politicomilitary force and cannot be such a force. In appealing to humanitarianism and conciliation it is fulfilling its role. However, at a time when Poles were committing violence against other Poles, arresting them and even killing them (the numbers are not the issue), the church's appeal still addressed itself more to Polish nationalism than humanitarianism and the taming of the rampant abuses of force by the regime.

All this clearly demonstrates that the slogan "we are all Poles" and the main concern that "Poles not spill Polish blood" and that "non-Poles" not interfere, will afford the totalitarian dictatorship a certain room to maneuver which, without doubt, the regime will put to good use. A certain tolerance of terror because it is Polish terror, will serve well not only the Polish dictators but Moscow as well. It was there during the time of the tsar's and afterward that they learned so well to exploit all shades of nationalism to consolidate their power.

These and similar instruments of ideological and political corruption need not indicate that the role of the military and the police will become less pronounced. It only means that these instruments will make that role more acceptable to Polish society (as a lesser evil) and thus weaken resistance against the dictatorship. In order to achieve this, Moscow will probably allow the Polish "normalizers" more room for Polish nationalism than has been customary until now. This will not be easy for Moscow because the historically rooted fear there of this very same Polish nationalism is great.

There is another reason why the use of open political terror may succeed in Poland, at least temporarily. Society did not expect it and is no longer

used to it. When on the night of 21 August 1968 the CPCZ Presidium debated the party congress which was to meet in 3 weeks, the meeting was interrupted by the sound of planes and tanks and soon thereafter the participants were taken "under protection" by Soviet paratroopers right in the Central Committee conference room, it was popularly interpreted as naivete and stupidity stemming from the ideology of the reform communists. But at the Solidarity meeting in G[illegible]. there were no naive reform communists, on the contrary, the meeting had decided on confronting the regime with a general strike. Right after that decision, the participants simply returned to their homes or hotel rooms. Within a few hours they were all picked up by the police. At the same time, also aroused from peaceful slumber, thousands of other activists were arrested, and by now have had 16 [sic] months behind bars to ponder the legality and openness of opposition activity.

The contemporary mass terror in Poland has an easier job precisely because it was preceded by a long period of legality of the critical and opposition forces which had organized, acted and formed groupings quite publicly. This is what furnished a complete blueprint for the arrests. In such a situation, resistance is paralyzed much more severly than would have been the case had the police been constrained to search for the victims. Even during the strikes during the fall of 1980, the police still would not have been quite sure whom to arrest. Apart from the small groups of opposition intellectuals, the potential leaders of the popular opposition movement were still anonymous. Most of them are of the younger generations and have no police records from the years when terror was last rampant. Anonymity ended with their success of achieving legality. As a result of the recent police roundup, the Polish "masses" are less well prepared to produce from their midst capable opposition leaders and activists than if the same type of terror had been unleased in the fall of 1980.

There is, of course, no doubt that in long-range, historical terms, the restoration of a totalitarian dictatorship in Poland has little if any chance of success. This, however, does not preclude it from becoming a prescription which the ruling elites throughout the Soviet Bloc intend to use to confront the same type of problems which inevitably await them in their countries. Not only from Prague, Berlin and Moscow, but also from Bucharest, many voices are heard in resounding support for the military dictatorship in Poland. In contrast to 1968, Ceaucescu (not without good reason) is thinking of his own back yard.

Poland is an extreme case where all the support mechanisms providing relative stability for Soviet-type systems collapsed rapidly and totally. Indications of something similar are now growing in Romania. So far, in the other countries of the Soviet Bloc we see only varying indicators that the 1970s cannot be duplicated. Economic growth is stagnating or dropping, the international situation is becoming more complicated, and political stability is noticeably becoming nothing but a facade. The case of Poland evoked fear, first among the ruling elite, after 13 December 1981 this fear is meant to have an affect especially on the suppressed "masses." There is little doubt that it indeed does.

Czechoslovakia, despite the long years of a grim political system and even official admission by now of economic problems, will probably not be the first in line with respect to any public disturbances. This is also true of the GDR, Hungary and Bulgaria. It seems that the clouds are rather gathering over the Soviet Union itself. It, however, is big and heterogenous, and its population has been brainwashed in a manner of which, despite all our experiences, we have not even dreamed. For a time yet, even strikes and hunger marches of the Polish type can be effectively isolated and handled by those in power through some martial law on the local level. It will take months of speculation by Western journalists on whether there really was any shooting in this or that region, or whether there were arrests and strikes, while people in the vast reaches of the Soviet Union will even much later and by word of mouth spread conflicting reports of alleged participants which someone had heard over the BBC or the Voice of America. To imagine that the Soviet Union could experience in this day and age a crisis on a national scale as in Poland, that such an atmosphere and institutions similar to Solidarity could suddenly emerge there, would be illusory.

What unfortunately is not illusory is that the Soviet political, police, military and even economic bureaucracy will, well ahead of time, apply the lessons of the Polish example of "socialism in a general's uniform." Despite the present violent defeat of Solidarity, we can foresee that in any future efforts to change the system, there will be--after the experiences of 1980--demands in the countries of the Soviet Bloc for the establishment of independent unions in one form or another. There is no reason to believe that the Polish example will soon be forgotten. With respect to the "resolution" of the crisis, however, this is unfortunately also true for the power elites in the bloc. It is especially in the Soviet Union where the prestige and role of the armed forces have grown in the last decade and where they are very important for the Soviet image as one of the superpowers, since there is today clearly no longer any question in the Soviet Union of economic successes or political and ideological attractiveness of the system, but rather purely and simply a question of power. In a certain sense, as in Poland, there is an upsurge of terror in the Soviet Union, perhaps no longer via the police forces alone (they had their golden age under Stalin) but on the basis of militarization, the new enhanced role of the armed forces, and even on the internal political scene. With the Russians too, the army more strongly represents national pride in its linkage with "Russian greatness" than the police or even the party apparat. Moreover, the modern technological standard of the Soviet armed forces transforms their officer corps into a technocratic group, and the concept sometimes referred to as the military-industrial complex plays an important role. In case of a crisis, the "party of law and order" cannot do without an alliance with the military, which represent the greatest force in the land. The serious nationality conflicts in the USSR also favor such an approach, rather than a simple return to the police mechanisms of Stalin's times.

To date, we have seen that some of the consequences of cases of violent suppression in the Soviet Bloc--Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968--were never limited to a single country. They echoed throughout the bloc

and had serious repercussions on the international scene. There is no reason to believe that in the case of Poland in 1982 it will be any different. For this reason, I believe there is truth in what was said at the beginning of this article, namely, there is no hope that fear of future developments and belief that our tried "normalization the Czech way" is a prescription for survival, that it will protect Czechoslovakia from the effects of the Polish military dictatorship. These effects will reach us, despite preventive caution and fear that resistance would only make everything worse.

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INDRA COMMENTS ON SLOGAN 'FACE TO THE MASSES'

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[Article by Alois Indra, CPCZ Presidium member and chairman of the Federal Assembly: "Face to the People, the Only Way"]

[Text] When in the 1960s (even much earlier than their second half)--encouraged by the errors of the then party leadership--there emerged various "saviors of socialism," we also found among them self-appointed "historians of renown." They saw their messianism in the "search for truth" and the "smiting of myths and legends" (many did not even find it necessary to explain their participation in them), in other words, in the "revision" of the recent history of the Czechoslovak people, especially the CPCZ.

Under the guise of scientific research, they posed questions on the "specific Czechoslovak road to socialism" and, with godlike authority, they themselves provided the answers. Gradually up to 1967 and then quite openly in that "strange year" of 1968, they discovered the cause of all our problems in the adoption of the Soviet "model" of socialist construction, failure to respect our national, historical, cultural and economic character. It took a while, but they finally realized they no longer had to conceal their true colors and--some through innuendo, others quite brazenly--focused their assault on the victorious Febrary 1948. But they could not be satisfied with this. The inexorable logic of betrayal urged them to go farther. While they did not dare to declare the very birth of the CPCZ a mistake, they branded its Fifth Congress as the root of all evil, without realizing that they were not at all original, that this "argument" had already been used long ago in reformist propaganda and in the inventions of renegades of the communist movement. The hundreds and thousands of pages of writing (including those on which the emigres make their living to this day) which were then produced, may in a simplified manner be summarized as follows: through its acceptance of Bolshevik tenets, the CPCZ succumbed to a foreign dictate (Comintern = Moscow), failed to respect the "Czechoslovak specifics," ceased to represent the interests of Czechs and Slovaks, isolated itself from the workers class and the population, and became nothing but a sect. After the war, according to them, the CPCZ used (they prefer "misused") the USSR's victory over fascism, the liberation of our country by the Red Army, changes in the balance of forces in the world, and following foreign instructions (Stalin's, naturally) led Czechoslovakia on a road alien to the interests of our nations. From

such, pardon me, "historical analysis" the party came out as a force serving some sort of "foreign interests," without closeness to the people, without their support.

However, these revisionist "historiographers" somehow forgot to back their "scientific works" with facts, or else treated them rather disrespectfully. They concentrated their efforts on the support of political revisionism and opportunism, therefore, considered it unnecessary to respond to certain fundamental questions. How did it come about that since that "tragic" Fifth Congress, the authority of the CPCZ grew quite palpably? How is it possible that precisely in the 1930s, the workers class and the rural poor, with the support of the most progressive segments of the intellectuals, waged--under the leadership of the CPCZ--an incredibly difficult social and political struggle? How do the reformist "historians" explain that it was with this "cosmopolitan and unpatriotic" party that the masses marched against rampant fascism in defense of the republic? What "miracle" brought it about that the CPCZ became the respected and ardently supported leader in the national liberation struggle? By what means and by whom were the working people "forced" into such uncompromising support for the CPCZ in its efforts to develop a national democratic revolution and transform it into a socialist one (and this even by bourgeois democratic standards, as seen by the elections in 1946)? Why did the people in the fateful days of February 1948 stand behind the CPCZ and Klement Gottwald, and uncompromisingly against the reactionary planners of a coup?

These few questions encompass an important segment of history (roughly 1929-1948, thus 19 years). Answers to them cannot be simplified because the political and class struggle of that period was anything but simple, since not every campaign culminated in such victory. Without risking being accused of simplistic renditions, however, we can safely say--on the basis of incontrovertible evidence--that the phase for which the Fifth Congress opened the door, the phase of bolshevization, was the essential cornerstone of later CPCZ successes, all the way to February 1948. Bolshevization--meaning creative application of Leninist revolutionary theory in practice--made it possible to overcome opportunist liquidationism and sectarian tendencies, brought about activism in the party which thus became an organized revolutionary vanguard of the working class. Bolshevization made it possible to formulate a revolutionary strategy, find the correct political slogans expressing the interests and aspirations of the workers class and the working people. In its aggregate, this development then found expression in even closer ties of the party with the masses, in a purposeful awakening of their political awareness, in their readiness to participate in meaningful political action, and in effective political agitation, even in a period when against the communists and their sympathizers was poised all that the bourgeoisie had at its disposal, starting with schools, through the churches, all the way to the instruments of power, even when communists had to work underground against the German Nazis and the Slovak clericofascist lackeys. The effectiveness of CPCZ policy stemmed from the fact that it served the workers class and the people, that this policy was being implemented with their understanding and active support. We can say with Lenin that, thanks to the skillful leadership provided by the communists, millions of people became involved in politics.

For any communist party which takes its mission seriously, closeness to the working class and other working people, closeness to citizens without political affiliation, and even to the rank and file of other political parties, is a categorical imperative, the basic prerequisite for its successes. In concrete terms, this reality must be expressed in the setting of strategy and the choice of tactics, in the formulation of the political line, but unquestionably also in the everyday actions of all party organs and organizations, every party member and candidate. This applies at all times and in all situations. It is unacceptable to shun this basic requirement with which there is no compromise. Without closeness to the people, communists are no longer worthy of the name, they cease to be communists.

Following the establishment of political power by the working class, during the period of dictatorship of the proletariat, conditions and demands facing the political leadership undergo a qualitative change. Even though society is confronted with tasks never before experienced, much appears easier and not all of us realize that new problems are emerging. Gottwald warned against haughtiness, on every occasion emphasized the importance of the National Front, repeatedly urged an alliance with the people, with those who are not members of the party. The communists justifiably felt like victors and with their enthusiasm attracted others toward fulfillment of the tasks of socialist construction set forth by the Ninth Congress. Socialist industrialization and gradual collectivization of agriculture created a material and technical foundation of the new society. Peoples power and the state administration were organizationally consolidated and considerable successes were also achieved in the cultural revolution. With passing years, however, especially due to the complexity of national economic problems, there appeared certain symptoms of fading in revolutionary enthusiasm, relations between communists and nonmembers suffered rifts, and socialist democracy began to be understood in a formalist manner. It was somewhere, perhaps at the turn of the 1960s, that conditions were becoming ripe for the plans of international imperialism, it was then that the demand for ideological vigilance began to be ridiculed, and thus the doors were opened a crack for the advent of revisionism.

To "explain" the problems which we encountered in the building of socialism as "mechanical adoption of the Soviet model," is not only naive but criminal, it is the invention of the crassest anti-Sovietism and anticommunism (I plead guilty of opportunism in avoiding even stronger terminology!)

The causes of the crisis in the party and society are most vividly and aptly dealt with in the "Lessons" which were included in the Central Committee report to the 14th Congress. Basically, these events confirmed, in a negative sense of the word, the thesis which was correctly revived by Gustav Husak during 1969-71, namely that a socialist society is as good as the party, and the party as good as its leadership.

Any other assessment causes weakening of the leading role of the party, thus also its responsibility toward its own workers class and toward the international communist and workers movement. This is not at all a question of subjectively "good intentions" or of an erroneous classless interpretation of "honor" in individuals or collective organs. There can be no agreement with

abstract references to substantively and formally "correct resolutions." The only reliable yardstick is political practice, the real life of the party and society, the actual posture of party organs and organizations, as well as of each communist.

The germs of violations in the principle of ties between the party and the people (which must always be understood as ties between communists and those who are not) were noticeable in party development since February 1948. We unfortunately failed to respect Lenin's teachings in which he warned against the mire which always attaches itself to the pure revolutionary current, against the petty bourgeois satellites, against wavereres and careerists. Literally "overnight" party ranks grew by almost a million new members (even though we should remember that Gottwald introduced the first party screening, the candidacy period, and a temporary halt in acceptance of new members). Besides honest people who developed into honest communists, many parasites jumped on the bandwagon and infected the party with petty bourgeois views. And those, as we know from theory and our own experience, manifest themselves according to the situation either in the form of superradicalism and sectarian penchants, or in the opposite tendencies when former "dogmatists" abandon the party ship in troubled waters, or yet (and this is much worse!) wash their hands in the active "reformism," in other words, begin the transition to revisionist positions. Such a "transition" was demonstrated to us in the second half of the 1960s by many functionaries who flaunted their self-awarded "theoretical maturity." The logic of treason led them so far that not a few of them today offer their theoretical armament quite openly to the imperialist centrals. These people had gradually succeeded from within the party to reduce the workers to passivity, they achieved high positions because they could "speak and write," they penetrated even higher organs, and in party work promoted formalism in which they felt very much at home. What could possibly emerge from such failure to respect the Leninist style of work, from misusing the principles of democratic centralism and from suppressing intraparty democracy? Among other things, this development produced a trend to underestimate the nonparty people (without regard to, or perhaps because there was so much bombastic talk about, their role), haughtiness toward them, ordering them around, frequent exclusion of them from public life, a formalist application of the leading role of the party in the National Front and social organizations, and belittling their specific role. All put together, this meant the disruption of relations between the party and the individuals and organizations outside it. Where were the nonparty people to turn, who were they to follow, how under such conditions could one ask them to actively support party policy and participate in its implementation? Under such conditions, the time is necessarily ripe for demagogues, provocateurs, and above all, foreign enemies and their domestic servants. This is precisely a stage on which revisionists are able to raise their voice without encountering adequate resistance. It is clear that the then party leadership was responsible for this development in the party and in its stance toward the people. The petty bourgeoisie succeeded in paralyzing the party and disrupting its ties with the people because the party leadership replaced Leninist standards of party life with subjectivism, separated itself from the peoples lives, skipped stages of development in formulating policy, failed to respect the principles of the class struggle within the country and in its international context, and criminally neglected ideological vigilance.

In the development of relations between the party and the people, between communists and the others, the experiences of 1968-69 represent quite a special chapter. The revisionists, not only supported by but under direct orders from the external and internal enemies, included on their banners, among many other slogans, criticism of insufficient ties between the party and the people. It certainly sounded impressive, since (at least partially) it corresponded to the experiences of communists and other citizens in recent years. However, what happened afterward? How were the recognized weaknesses overcome? The revisionists maintained (and some of them still use this argument abroad) that it was a period of a sort of "renaissance" of the CPCZ authority, that the party and the people "reactivated themselves spontaneously," that the ties between communists and nonmembers were being strengthened in an unprecedented manner, that they were indeed "blossoming." In reality, this was a false reflection of public opinion created by the most aggressive rightwingers in the communications media, it was an outburst spurred by the petty bourgeoisie and the counterrevolutionaries. How could the party's authority grow when it was daily dragged through the slime of slander, when they spit on it, and branded it the architect of some sort of "national disaster"? Can we believe the assertion about activization among communists who were abandoned by the leadership and left to their own devices, who were watching how their endeavors, to which they had dedicated their whole lives, were being slandered, while they themselves became the target of the psychological and even physical terror of the counterrevolution? How could communists assert themselves politically when, for example, membership meetings before the special district conferences were attended by less than 35 percent of party members and candidates? Was this the much-touted "national unity" on a class base and respecting the hegemony of the workers class and the leading role of the party? In reality, it was the unity of an aggressive revisionist clique, the unity of an unleashed petty bourgeoisie and counterrevolutionary elements. It was an antisocialist unity as if taken right out of a textbook.

In assessing these experiences, we should recall the Leninist thesis that the mission of the party is to protect the people, especially the workers class, against the influence of hostile ideas, and that it is not possible to march with the masses when they are misled by reactionary leaders. In such a situation, it is the duty of the party--if it wishes to retain the name communist--to tear off ruthlessly the masks of the revisionists and counterrevolutionaries, openly expose to the workers class, the people, the harm of their policies, and unhesitatingly and by every means defend the revolutionary achievements, defend the socialist system. Such a course does not weaken but indeed strengthens the ties with the working people, it does not reduce but enhances party authority.

After April 1969, the new party leadership began applying creatively the principles of Marxist-Leninist teaching in policies and in revolutionary strategy and tactics. The renewal of Gottwald's order "face to the masses" demonstrated that relations of the party with the working people, of communists and the other citizens have again become the primary task. It was essential, however, to begin the ideological and organizational purification within the party itself through a parting of the ways with revisionists, activization of

all party organs and organizations, of all communists. It was not a simple matter, it was anything but a smooth process as it may perhaps appear from the vantage point of 12 or 13 years after the fact, especially to those who were not "under fire" and those who are getting to know this period only from textbooks and published accounts. Eternal honor is due to the great number of communists who in those difficult times actively supported the aims of the new leadership. Through convincing arguments and personal example, they helped the nonparty people and members of the other political parties to assume the correct posture following the rightist-wrought havoc, to separate the real values of socialism from the false tinsel of seemingly attractive demagogic slogans. It is precisely to the restored strength of relations between communists and the other citizens that we owe the political defeat of the rightist and antisocialist forces, the relatively rapid recovery from the crisis in the party and society, and renewed confidence in the party. This approach alone enables us to proceed in the best traditions of the party, to continue all the good works which have been created since February 1948. Good results in all spheres of life were not long in coming, as confirmed by assessments conducted by the last three party congresses.

At the 16th CPCZ Congress, Comrade Gustav Husak stated in the Central Committee report: "The leading role of the party is enhanced in terms of how well it acts as the real vanguard of the workers class and broad strata of the people, how consistently it is guided by Marxist-Leninist teaching, on what basis it unites the masses toward the building of socialism and communism, and how selflessly and effectively communists in all sectors struggle for the party's program, how they strengthen the unity of the party with the people." In several other sections of the report to the congress, it was strongly emphasized how vital it was to strengthen and intensify by all possible means the ties between communists and nonparty people, to develop the policies of the National Front, to attract all honorable people to our cause, and to revive their political dedication. All this makes very profound sense, it confirms not only the present but lasting validity of the cited requirements, and becomes in the end a binding directive for all party members and candidates.

There is no question but that many party organizations correctly understand and effectively carry out their mission in relations with nonparty people. Many communists consider explaining and defending party policy their fundamental task. In their life and work they owe nothing to the demands on members of an organized revolutionary vanguard of the workers class and the people; the party statutes represent for them a fundamental law and they have, to quote Dzerzhinski, "a clear head, ardent hearts, and clean hands" (which certainly did not and does not apply to the Chekists alone). They are the natural "leaders of the people" in the labor collectives, in their neighborhoods, they enjoy the confidence of the working people mainly because their words are clear and do not clash with their deeds. Yes, these are the prerequisites to make our agitation activity successful, to have people understand and support party policy, to see in it the expression of their interests and aspirations.

Regrettably, as also noted at the 16th CPCZ Congress, such a positive assessment does not apply to every organization and every party member. We

even find organizations whose influence on noncommunists is negligible. Some members and candidates are not active among nonparty people and demonstrate in no special way their party affiliation and the devotion and enthusiasm related to it. The causes can be found in the level of party life in the respective organizations and their ability (or more precisely, lack thereof) to correctly grasp and effectively apply the leading role of the party in their place of jurisdiction. Their activity reeks of formalism, they passively agree with higher echelon directives, pay lip service to the party, yet are unable to respond in an appropriate manner to concrete requirements of life. In such organizations, the members and candidates, so to speak, "fulfill their basic obligations," attend meetings and various levels of schooling, yet cannot be prepared for that which is most important, namely, to exert influence within the party, and to act in an activist manner in representative bodies, in the organs of the National Front and in social organizations. The life of such organizations is reminiscent of the old bourgeois "associations," where the convinced convince each other and where there is often a tendency toward sectarian exclusivity. Under their "leadership," there may flourish--without any appropriate response--the most varied abuses, erroneous political views are not opposed by anyone, workers complaints are ignored, or even suppressed, lack of exactingness is tolerated in management, indulgence reigns in cadre policy, and formalism infects even social organizations. The logical result is not only the organization's loss of authority but real harm to the party and its entire policy.

Party policy and authority is severely damaged by phenomena which may be summed up (and this is a Leninist thought!) as "communist conceit." It seems that certain individuals have forgotten the bitter experiences from the late 1960s when precisely criticism of this harmful manifestation (even though demagogically and purposely magnified) was among the most effective weapons in the rightist arsenal. People are justifiable angry when an individual, member or official of the party, acts as if he were some sort of "self-appointed rule," when he identifies the party with his person. In conflict with basic standards of party life (which include relations with nonparty people), in conflict with party statutes and congress resolutions, such individuals are placing themselves above the nonparty people and members of the other political parties, they consider them some sort of "mass" which has to submit to their command, and "material" for elections, brigades and socialist competition. Especially actionable are cases where such an individual considers his party card a key to his own career or personal privilege, often in conflict even with the law. Can such a person have any authority, can he be politically firm and demanding at work, can he convince anyone to act like a dedicated citizen? It has often been said that such willful soiling of the party's clean image is intolerable, no one must succumb to illusions that his tree would grow so tall that the party could not reach it. Naturally, such manifestations should not be generalized, they are decidedly exceptions, yet it is impossible to compromise with them, they must rather be eradicated quickly and with determination.

It would not serve us well to close our eyes to the fact that occasionally even politically weak and ideologically wavering individuals hold a party card. Sometimes it is considered trite to say, even though it is the

unvarnished truth, that building socialism is no stroll in a "rose garden," that we must confront difficulties, large and small, that along our road there are potholes and rocks. For socialism, historically speaking, is a very young social order (how long did it take for capitalism to "stabilize" in its present form, and would anyone maintain that it exists without problems, that it is the best example for the future of mankind?), the workers class and the people are learning to govern, they are pioneers in a class-divided world. It is, therefore, unthinkable to be immune to errors, mistakes and shortcomings. He who has not thought out and grasped this fundamental truth ceases to be a revolutionary optimist, has lost historical perspective, and consequently, cannot survive the pressures of the trials which we are logically subjected to. Unfortunately, some party members "desert" precisely in situations when their party affiliation commands them to stand up against incorrect attitudes, to convincingly disseminate the party truth, struggle for understanding of our policy and for its consistent implementation. We even find those who are willing to boast about their party membership only when "the sun shines." As soon as an overcast appears and (God forbid!) thunder cracks, they (pardon me) fall on their rears. Whenever it is necessary to accelerate our step, increase our effort, they succumb to moodiness, spread defeatist moods, and give up the fight. In practical terms, this means wasting considerably more energy in proving that this or another task is beyond fulfillment, then in trying to find a solution. Such a posture has a very bad effect on our nonparty fellow citizens, it confuses them, weakens their confidence in the party, and undermines their will to actively participate in the process of overcoming obstacles.

The roots of defeatism in our own ranks are again found in petty bourgeois thinking, in petty bourgeois understanding of policy and its implementation. Petty bourgeois tendencies have always been and will remain the midwife of opportunism and revisionism. In the interest of the party's authority and correct application of its leading role, thus in the interest of close ties with the people, we have the duty (theoretically and in practical terms) to struggle against all manifestations of passivity and defeatism. It is incomparably less important "how many we are" than "what we are." In practical terms this means, among other things, to meet the task of improving the caliber of party ranks in all its implications, namely, choose new candidates under fair but high criteria, and use the same criteria in the periodic checks of each member, with the aim of ridding the party of people who are unable to bear the burden of revolutionary responsibility, who do not have the qualifications to be fighting communists. In the eyes of the nonparty fellow citizens, it can only benefit the party in strengthening its ties with them.

However, it would be a gross error to understand the need for close ties between the party and the people as a directive to act in a "fawning" manner in the effort to attract to our cause "one and all, no matter what." Appeasement, concealment of unpleasant realities, irresponsible promises, and demagogy, are methods of bourgeois politicians from whom (and essentially in their services) they were taken over and "brilliantly" perfected by the rightist opportunists and revisionists. Our most effective weapon has always been and must remain the truth! Consequently, nothing will stop us from

opposing little groups or individuals who make no secret of their antisocialist views, and in cases where they break the law, we must not be "timid" in applying appropriate penalties. Ignoring the various types of "good advice" and attacks from the other side, we must proceed in this manner precisely in the interest of socialist democracy and the class interpretation of human rights.

Similarly, in the interest of truth we must openly act against those who interpret socialism in their own selfish way. They loudly demand their rights but task fulfillment goes against their grain, they act like shameless parasites in reaping the fruits of our common effort without contribution to it, they infest our life with petty bourgeois standards of the good life and the methods through which it can be attained. The more decisively we act against such people (and not only in words!), the more effectively we eliminate the causes from which such weeds sprout, the stronger the ties between the party and the workers class, the more support we will get from honorable people who are in the majority, a majority for which we care.

The ties between the party, the workers class and the people have many aspects, represent a broad complex of conditions and methods, much broader than is possible to cover in one article. It is, however, the fundamental principle which stems from Leninist teachings on the necessity of a class alliance with all potential friends of the workers class. The ability of the communist party to organize, develop, and enrich this alliance, is of key importance for the fate of the socialist revolution (which, as is known, does not end but rather begins with the installation of the dictatorship of the proletariat).

In the development of relations with nonparty people, the CPCZ has rich (regrettably, also negative) experiences, it has a place to start, something to build on, without clinging to traditional methods and overlooking new opportunities and ways. The pattern for attracting noncommunists to our cause is contained in the conclusions and implementation of the 16th CPCZ Congress, conclusions which are supported by the entire National Front and which have become the program of society as a whole. We must never allow the relations of the party with citizens without party affiliation to be understood opportunistically, their concrete forms must always reflect the content of socialist democracy, and contribute to its intensification. The more difficult the tasks--indeed, especially then--the more intensive must be our efforts to achieve correct relations with the noncommunists, to attract all honest people. We communists serve the people, we labor for their very own interests, and we can succeed only when closely identified with them, only with their active support. Therefore, for us there can be no other way but "face to the people."

9496
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'LISTY' COMMENTS ON REGIME'S RHETORIC ON ECONOMY

Rome LISTY in Czech No 1, Feb 82 pp 13-15

[Article by 'Colonius': "How to Explain It to the People"]

[Text] The fact that the socialist economy is in a precarious situation is really not particularly new. As we all know, economic difficulties have been under discussion ever since the beginning of this social system in Czechoslovakia and elsewhere. Relatively new is perhaps only that even the top political leaders have abandoned the term "difficulties" and almost exclusively refer to the situation with "grave concern." And they do this often, while in the past their task was rather to appear optimistic to reassure the masses about the future. What might also be considered new after some years, is the fact that critical and polemical articles are beginning to appear in Czechoslovakia on the pages of the specialized professional publications.

From the authoritative mouth of Jan Fojtik, we have recently heard that this growing number of pessimistic prognoses, as well as public discussion of problems ranging from macroeconomic indicators to Christmas shopping, is not an indication of weakness or even -- God forbid -- the beginning of a new reformism, but rather a "consciously set task" by means of which the public is to be prepared for the difficult future.

"Ideology must help the economy," said Fojtik and, as if by military command, there appeared a long string of articles and scientific treatises on the "characteristics of the present stage of building socialism," a "new historical dimension of the Czechoslovak economy," and a "new, higher quality in the economic policy of the communist party," etc. The Czechoslovak Union of Journalists even held an international press conference for newsmen from the CEMA countries with the aim of "giving thought to the present methods of economic propaganda and the need for its fundamental improvement."

In an attempt to decipher this avalanche of the printed word and "fish out" an indication of what it is all about, we find that the answer is relatively simple. The ineffectiveness of the CSSR economy and its problems have reached a point when, further aggravated by global economic problems, the truth can no longer be concealed, explained away, or covered up with tales of the responsibility of the lurking enemy centers and good-for-nothing hostile individuals at home who are all chipping away at the genius of the party. The national economy, with the Polish warning signals so close to home, should function more rationally and effectively, even at the cost of breaking down various taboos, such as clinging to obsolete production lines, or even permanent full employment.

Without market mechanisms and democratic procedures, the regime may possibly achieve some improvement through methods it knows best, namely, centrally directed measures and prescriptions.

For this, every single citizen must be properly manipulated so that he would not be overly shocked, pose silly questions, compare arguments, criticize, or even--again with Poland in mind--dare to reject the proposed solutions. The regime measures under preparation must therefore be "historically" justified, "objective causes" must be appended, as well as perhaps a few warnings of "dire consequences." Stated simply and clearly, the system of codes and signals must be properly adjusted and, while one needs not necessarily believe them, they are the only means of general communication. It is then given a "scientific" wrapping and repeated in various connections over and over until it all acquires a patina of fact. This is a great time for ideologists and propagandists and it merits a bit of attention. Let us then take a more revealing peek at the first fruits of their months-long labors.

Changes do not come about pellmell out of nowhere and for no reason, as the reader might perhaps think, they are rather allegedly "required" by the current stage of a socialist society. "The deeper we find ourselves in the construction stage of a developed socialist society," writes J. Korinek in TVORBA, "the more we become aware of its characteristics, substance, and scope." That surely is a beautiful formulation reminiscent of the Good Soldier Schweik's "you don't know me yet but when you know me." The word "deeper" is especially aptly chosen. It reminds us of that proverbial cart which, the more we push, the more it sinks into the mire. Having directed our attention to the fact that the concept of a developed socialist society is a Leninist one (to make sure we do not suspect later vintage), he adds a very important piece of information, namely, that the advantages and positive features of socialism do not burst forth spontaneously or at some fantastic speed "as we believed," he adds "as late as the early 1960s." Here he upsets somewhat the initial rather sober atmosphere of the whole campaign and hints at bad news rather than good. According to Korinek, "it will be a relatively long period" before the advantages of socialism "burst forth," a period dependent on this, that, and the other, such as "exhaustion of the objective laws of developed socialism, and on many international and other circumstances." While he does not say so outright, these circumstances apparently do not apply to the Russians because "the Soviet Union has already reached the stage of developed socialism (this assertion, at least presented so openly, is considered bad tactics by some other ideologues, since contemporary Soviet reality does not appear to them particularly good advertising). In any case, Korinek goes on by saying that haste will solve nothing, it will rather be necessary to keep tightening belts for a while yet. In his jargon, it goes like this: "Excessive haste in the building of developed socialism would not serve it well," because "the building of developed socialism is an objective natural historical process which cannot be subjectively accelerated." No further comment is needed on that one, all the required "scientific" terminology is there (objective, historical, process) and now we can perhaps look forward to some concrete information.

The cited stage (not a step earlier, as we have seen) "is characterized by the process of economic intensification." All the earlier shouting against extensive and for intensive economic development, be it by the defeated followers

of Sik, or those who were only misled, or even members of the healthy core, is apparently hereby disqualified as historically premature, and the present policy with its extensive traits is apparently blessed as correct, at least up to this point. Can anyone stupidly ask why we are calling for economic intensification this late and even that only verbally?

Without proper ideological preparation and propagandistic working over, it would apparently be impossible to bring to light two other important concepts which are being featured today, namely thrift and effectiveness. Just about anyone would comment that these are key concepts in any well-functioning economy and that even a capitalist cannot do without them. However, R. Kostka, editor in chief of HOSPODARSKE NOVINY, explains that "effectiveness of socialist production," must be understood "as a historically new economic category firmly linked with socialist ownership and expressing the interest of the collective owner and producer in the overall beneficial effect." Thus, we see that not all types of effectiveness are the same. J. Korinek gets even closer to the heart of things in the matter of thrift: "It is not a question of thrift in an economy which finds itself in difficult circumstances, as mendaciously claimed by enemies of socialism, but rather the thrift of real managers who are aware of the price and responsibility of liberated labor." Not even thrift is permitted to cling to the old ways, it too must be new, which is why it is discovered only now after 30 years of building socialism. Korinek is not one to avoid sensitive matters, so pay attention! He states: "Intensification of the economy is impossible without a growing participation of the workers in production management, in the important processes, as well as in control." Even this, however, must not be hasty because "without the political, organizational and ideological guidance provided by the party...there could appear anarchosyndicalist moods, as exemplified by the current developments in Poland." For this reason, there is need for economic propaganda, stated Kostka at the international seminar, "propaganda which is differentiated according to the needs of individual groups and population strata." It would be rather unwise, for example, to lecture to a worker too much on the universally valid theoretical principles of his participation in economic and political decisions, as we do with intellectuals, because the worker might suddenly take it seriously, and before we know it, we end up with an anarchosyndicalist on our hands.

Those were only a few examples which serve us as introduction to the problem of "relations between the economy and ideology," or simply "economic propaganda." We are told that only on this basis is it possible, and even then only gradually, to inform the public on specific issues and "correctly interpret party documents." Let us then take a look, now that we have been properly instructed, at some of these documents, at least the most recent ones.

The Fifth Plenum of the CPCZ Central Committee of 9 December 1981, dealt with the Report on the State Plan of Economic Development for 1982, which was presented by the chairman of the State Planning Commission, Svatopluk Potac. Mindful of Fojtik's admonition to inform (so that no one could claim that the party had concealed something) but not too much and in careful formulation, Potac's presentation is very interesting from our point of view.

while the task of the state plan for 1982 is indeed to "ensure further economic development," in another area, the task is merely to "maintain the achieved standard of living." Given the fact that all previous documents of this type promised to "raise" the standard of living, the reduction to mere "maintenance" represents, in fact, a serious warning. Moreover, while it is, above all, industry which is to ensure the bulk of national revenue, the principal focus, according to Potac, will be on "those industrial branches which...are the main source of foreign currency income," on those "based on domestic raw material resources," and even "in branches with high demand on energy, materials, and imports," there will be "partial limitations." We might add that this formulation serves as an example of how it is possible in an important document to downplay sensitive issues such as "closing of unprofitable and low-prospect production lines" to which R. Kostka referred to specifically at the international press conference. Even at the previous Central Committee plenum, i.e., the Fourth Plenum, Lubomir Strougal employed what could be considered such poor tactics that even the Western press noticed, when he said..."the high energy demand significantly affects the structure of our economy, that is, the share and developmental rate of production with high energy and material consumption. In Czechoslovakia, this is mainly metallurgy, where in the per capita production of steel we are well above the world average. It is essential to reduce energy consumption in these types of production." Let us return, however, to the characteristic formulations of Comrade Potac: "In connection with lowering capital investment construction, the tasks of the building industry are becoming more realistic." It would have been incorrect to say that the tasks in the building industry will be lower than originally anticipated. Here too, we can cite in contrast the rather careless formulations of L. Strougal when at the above-mentioned Fourth Plenum he said: "We are registering considerable nonfulfillment of tasks in the construction industry," and that "almost three-quarters of the construction enterprises are not fulfilling the plan," and he also mentioned a "lowering of assignments in the plan." It is truly amazing how much can be concealed behind Potac's terse "tasks are becoming more realistic." He also stated repeatedly that it is possible to avoid a lowering of the availability of fuels and energy which, in the opposite sense, is almost reminiscent of the loose and careless terminology in the West, such as "energy crisis." In 1982 in Czechoslovakia, there will not be a shortage of energy, on the contrary, "sources of fuels and energy will be available," even though it is necessary to add "at the level of 1980." Whispered propaganda about, for example, reduction in bus services, etc., is also obviously wrong because the truth is that "there will be a reduction in mass transit demand," which must "contribute to a significant reduction in the consumption of fuels." Another problem which is particularly sensitive in economic propaganda is reduction of the labor force where the unprofitable production lines are being abolished. R. Kostka calls it "releasing a certain number of employees for transfer to other employment." Potac prefers to stay away from this problem and refers to it only obliquely in mentioning wage-fund formation in connection with performance and number of employees, and only in passing mentions the "abolition of the system of binding determination of the number of employees in economic organizations."

We could go on and cite many other examples which demonstrate how difficult it is for the regime to explain to the citizens why, for example, we have since the 1950s been installing production lines which are highly demanding in energy

and materials and dependent on raw materials we must import (from the Soviet Union, to cite one country), and why it is only now that we discover the error of our ways, why we keep on producing items which we often cannot sell, not only abroad (perhaps not even in the Soviet Union anymore), but even here at home, why we are only now unveiling -- more than 30 years after "overthrowing capitalism" and almost 15 years after the ravages wrought by the rightist opportunists -- tasks such as thrift and effectiveness, and why such a traditionally advanced economy as ours, now with a reduced labor force, less energy and raw materials, waited until the 1980s to make the change to a more intensive economic development, why, all of a sudden, at "the stage of construction of a developed socialist society" we are threatened with an old capitalist problem, namely, partial unemployment, etc., etc. The above-mentioned Comrade Fojtik is said to have let it be known at this year's conference of ideological and propaganda specialists of the CPCZ apparat, that "if we are unable to resolve certain problems, we must at least be able to explain them." This gem is circulating in Prague and, if true, must be considered almost statesmanlike. In any event, the theme we have touched upon shows how difficult it is to explain to the people not only the economic shortcomings, difficulties and concerns, but also the intention of the regime (although controversial and unconvincing for now) to undertake something at this late date which common sense prompted long ago. Past errors (more precisely, lies) make explanations of future errors, lies, and even occasional truth, that much more difficult. The chaos of words (lies, truth, half-truth) is even today a preamble for acts which apparently will not be all that much different from those in the past.

9466
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'TRIBUNA' DEFINES ROLE OF SOCIALIST TRADE UNIONS

Prague TRIBUNA in Czech No 10, 10 Mar 82 pp 1,3

[Article by Frantisek Havlicek: "School of Management, School of Communism"; portions within slantlines published in bold face]

/Text/ The Czechoslovak trade union movement is closely approaching its 10th All-Union Congress. When campaigning before the congress, the trade unionists pondered the questions of how to keep on developing the initiative of working people in fulfilling the decisive tasks of building a developed socialist society, how to improve socialist emulation and how to accelerate scientific and technical progress. They considered possible ways of meeting the justified needs and interests of working people in harmony with the development of the national economy, deepening at the same time their socialist consciousness.

In this situation there is a necessity which comes forward as up-to-date as ever, that is, the necessity to turn to always living Lenin's ideas on the role and tasks of trade unions in socialism, on the relationship of the communist party as an avant-garde of the working class to mass organizations of this class and of other working people.

Lenin, when solving the questions of the working movement in general, and those of trade unionism in particular, adopted the aspect of historical tasks of the socialist revolution and the construction of a new order. If the trade unions lead an essentially economic class struggle under the conditions of capitalism, then after the victory of the socialist revolution their task is to build a new life, to educate millions of working people for a new discipline based on their own experiences. During the Second All-Russian Trade Union Congress, Lenin declared: "The great revolutionary change which took place in history when the proletariat seized state power means also a turning point in all the activities of trade unions. The trade unions have become the main creators of a new society, since only the million-people masses can be makers of this society. The task," he emphasized, "consists in teaching the masses to govern, and teaching them not from books, not by lectures or meetings, but from experience."

After the victory of the socialist revolution Lenin defined the principal parts of action of the trade unions as follows: to educate and organize workers in the building of socialism and communism; to take an active part in the formation and activities of the state and economic authorities, as well as in state planning; to select able organizers from the ranks of workers and small farmers, and to prepare them for their leading roles; to strive for increased work productivity and discipline; to propagate progressive production experiences; to be active in cultural and educational fields; to evoke by all means practical interest of the workers and farmers in the fulfillment of economic plans, supporting and developing their initiative and activities.

Leninist characterization of the true nature of trade union activities and their specific features in the conditions of socialism is of ever-lasting and up-to-date importance even today. The famous statement--trade unions are a school of communism--is known to hundred of millions of people. At the same time, Lenin declared trade unions to be a school of unification and solidarity, a school of defending the interests of working people, a school of management and control.

Dual Mission

Should the trade unions correctly fulfill their mission in socialism, it is necessary to see the dialectical nature of their position after the victory of the socialist revolution. Trade unions associating basically all workers and employees are /organizations of the ruling class/ having enforced its state power. Nevertheless, this power is not implemented by a mass organization including all workers, employees, and members of the intelligentsia, but by the avant-garde of the working class which alone is able to unify, educate, and organize the whole class, and with it other masses of working people. This avant-garde is able to face the /inevitable/ vacillation of the masses, as well as various backward traditions and prejudices in the working class and the masses: only the communist party is able to lead the working class politically, and with its aid the whole mass of working people. Without it the dictatorship of the proletariat cannot be put in force--as was pointed out by Lenin in a discussion on trade unions. /The dictatorship of the proletariat can be realized only by the avant-garde which has absorbed the revolutionary energy of the working class./

At the same time, Lenin demonstrated that "it is not possible to implement the state power of the working class without several 'conversations' from the avant-garde to the masses of the progressive class, and from it to the masses of working people." This is how the prerequisite bilateral connection is brought about: /from the communist party to the masses, and from the masses to the party./ Otherwise the communist party cannot lead the working class, and the latter again could not lead the masses. It is the trade unions through which the party asserts its policy and communist influence on the masses of the working class and of other working people. That is why, e.g., the 11th Congress of the Communist Party of Russia (the Bolsheviks) assigned the task, recommended by Lenin, to bring about as close

a connection as possible with nonparty members of the working class, and /to secure a solid communist line in the work of trade unions in all fields of their activities./ In this sense also, the preparations for the 10th All-Union Congress in Czechoslovakia were carried out under the slogan "Toward the 10th All-Union Congress Through Fulfilling the Conclusions of the 16th CPCZ Congress."

Even in socialism the function of the trade unions is to protect the material and cultural interests of the working class. The question is /against whom and in what way do the trade unions protect the interests of the working class in a state in which the state power is in the hands of that very class?/

Above all against the bureaucratic conception of work of the state apparatus and of economic authorities, against administrative redtape machinations, against the despotism of individual officials of both the state and economic apparatus. As a mass organization of the working class, the trade unions are not opposed to the socialist state, but they take the position of /protecting/ their working men's state, their unions, and their working men's, i.e., communist, party. They protect themselves and the state against the pest of redtapism, against the willfulness of "their own elected representatives."

In socialism, the trade unions protect the interests of the working class against the lagging of the economy, against staying behind in the field of raising production effectivity. They do it by increasing work productivity, by expanding socialist emulation, by improving the quality of production.

As long as the means of production belong to the capitalists, the trade unions, naturally, are not concerned about an increase in production for the capitalists, but about ways of protecting the workers against rising exploitation, and about deposing the state power of the bourgeoisie. That is why they lead not only an economic struggle, but gradually more and more a political one, too. However, as soon as the workers install their socialist power, they know that they work on their own and for themselves. Therefore they strive to increase productivity and improve the quality of work.

The trade unions protect the working class and its ranks against a guildlike narrowmindedness, against lagging behind, against /sloppiness./ Their task is to create a new working discipline, to mold new forms of social relations among people, new methods of enlisting people for jobs. Lenin's appeal to the workers and other working people from his work "The Proximate Tasks of Soviet Power" still holds: "Be careful in keeping exact financial records, be a frugal manager, do not loaf, do not steal, and keep the strictest discipline at your job--those are exactly the slogans which were justifiably ridiculed by revolutionary proletarians at the time when the bourgeoisie used similar talk to cover up its rule as the domination of the exploiting class. Nowadays, however, after the deposition of the bourgeoisie, they have become the closest and most significant slogans of the day."

It can be seen, then, that the trade unions are a school of management. To be sure, it is a special kind of school, because there are no teachers and no pupils in it. Nevertheless, there is a distinctive combination of that which was left from capitalism and which could not have been rejected, and that which is growing from the revolutionary avant-garde of the proletariat, from the shoots of communism. That is why Lenin called the trade unions a school of communism. The trade unions cannot be put against the communist party. Their mission is to strive for the closest possible connection of the working class with its avant-garde, having in mind the future of the working class in its struggle against the remainders of the capitalist past.

To Take an Active Part in Management

In principle it is a wrong demand, that of anarchosyndicalism, to transfer the management of the national economy to the hands of the so-called direct producers--e.g., by means of works councils. A trend of this sort leads to the shattering of economics, to a weakening of the economic and organizational function of the state as a representative of the entire working class, to disputing the leading role of the communist party in the sphere of the economy, to undermining the political and economic positions of socialism, to a loss of communist perspectives.

The growth of trade union participation in management and government, so much strived for by Lenin, does not mean substituting for the state power in the control of economics. This doctrine is theoretically incorrect and practically harmful, since the most comprehensive organization of the working class is the state socialist power. Solely this power--under the leadership of the communist party and on behalf of the working class and other working people--can control the means of production which are the property not only of a work collective (or of a certain branch), but the property of all working people.

This is the reason why the Soviet constitution imposes the following principal tasks on the all-people state: to form the material-technical base of communism, to improve socialist social relations and transform them into communist relations, to educate the man of the communist society, to raise the material and cultural standard of the working people, to ensure the safety of the country and to contribute to the strengthening of peace and development of international cooperation.

Trade unions and other social organizations, keeping in line with their tasks, /participate in the control/ of state and social affairs, as well as in solving political, economic, social and cultural questions.

When protecting the economic interests of the working class in socialism, the trade unions proceed from the basic change which has occurred after the installment of the working class's political power. V.I. Lenin pointed out that in consequence of the liquidation of the hegemony of capital "the trade unions have lost the /class/ economic struggle as a basis, however they are, and unfortunately still will be for years to come, far from

losing the /classless/ 'economic struggle' as a basis. The latter is understood as a struggle against bureaucratic abuses of the Soviet apparatus, as a protection of material and spiritual interests of the working masses by ways and means inaccessible to this apparatus."

It is evident from both theoretical and practical points of view that socialism as a new social order depends on the activity and initiative of the working people. Consequently, in a new social and state system with proper functioning of the leading role of the communist party, and with the development of mass organizations' activities there occurs the disappearance of redtape as a product of the former bourgeois system of government standing above the people and against the people.

To Be Conscious Fighters for the Interests of the Entire Society

The political and socioeconomic roots of bureaucracy were cut off by the installment of the state power of the working people, by the liquidation of capitalism and the building of socialism. Nevertheless, there are individual bureaucratic phenomena which survive in socialism, some of them even spreading. This can happen if the governing apparatus is being severed from the masses, if there is a slackening in the people's control of the apparatus of state management or that of economic enterprises. Therefore, under the conditions of building a developed socialist society there is an urgent task to improve the forms and methods of control, that is, not only the control by the state authorities, but the overall control carried out by the masses of people under the leadership of the communist party.

Being a school of management and economy, the trade unions as an organizational form of working collectives fulfill the following mutually interconnected tasks:

They participate in discussing and solving state and social affairs, in the planning of production and social development, in the preparation and placement of personnel. Further, they take part in discussing and solving questions concerning the management of enterprises and institutions, questions of how to improve working and living conditions and how to make use of means designated for the development of production, as well as for social and cultural measures and economic incentive. The trade unions engage in socialist emulation, help expand progressive methods of work and strengthen working discipline, educate their members in the spirit of the new socialist morality and take care of increasing their political consciousness, cultural standard and professional skill. This is what makes the particular nature of trade union work in socialism. The trade unions are called to solve a /dual/ task: to care for the development of the national economy and at the same time look after the enforcement of the rights of working people, minding their interests, working conditions and standard of living. Also the style of trade unionist work is determined by this dual task: above all, they have to be with working people all the time.

Connection with the masses requires the following from trade union activists: to teach the masses and be taught by them at the same time, to respect their

suggestions and critical comments (this is the reason why the URO [Central Council of Trade Unions] at its 14th Plenum charged the factory committees of the ROH [Revolutionary Trade Union Movement] with a regular followup on how the working people's comments are being settled). Further, the trade unionists have to keep increasing the political consciousness of the masses, to educate them in the spirit of the scientific world outlook, to lift those lagging behind to the level of the best ones, to care for fulfilling the material and spiritual requirements of the masses.

Meetings of trade union organizations, especially the 12th URO Plenum, contained contributions stating that an official of the ROH should be profoundly devoted to the cause of socialism, being a conscientious fighter for the interests of the whole society. He or she should acquire the knowledge necessary for executing his or her function, and should be hard-working, self-denying, sensitive toward people and their needs.

The fulfillment of the tasks imposed on the whole society by the 16th CPCZ Congress can be ensured in the field of trade union activities only by those trade unionists who are full of revolutionary enthusiasm, who have a sense for everything progressive, who act on principles, are decisive and consistent in conflicting situations and who display courage in fighting for a just and right cause.

All-union conferences, held in the period before the congress, have shown that in the past period the activities of Czechoslovak trade unions brought a series of successes and remarkable results. At the same time, there were critical comments pointing out that in some organizations the plans for trade union activities were not sufficiently tied to the solving of everyday problems with which the working collective was coping, either in the field of production, social life or job safety. This is why it is strongly required--as demonstrated by the 14th URO Plenum--that all trade union branches, especially factory committees of the ROH, should think about the standard of their mass political work and overcome a situation in which daily mass political activity is narrowed only to general political instruction divorced from real life and from the needs of the particular work room. Among other things, the insufficient down-to-earth quality and standard of mass political work are the reasons for the phenomenon that although the necessity of the effective development of the national economy is admitted by words, the real-life action in the particular work room often clashes with general declarations on the necessity of a decisive turn toward intensification of production, toward economizing, etc.

The general secretary of the CPCZ Central Committee, Comrade Gustav Husak stated in his report of the Central Committee at the 16th CPCZ Congress: "There are many working sites where we can find all sorts of abuses, sloppiness, carelessness and manifestations of redtape. There are complaints about the lack of manpower. Nonetheless, how many machines are idle during working hours due to bad organization of work and low working morale! The trade unions have a big job fighting these setbacks, as well as improving the care for working people, giving them socialist education and better working and living conditions."

Trade unions are the largest organization of working people, they are the party's support in its struggle for the fundamental interests of the working class, and of the masses of people in general. The CPCZ performs its work within trade unions in such a way that their activities, connected with those of other social organizations, lead to the building of a developed socialist society in our country. At the same time, the party supports the development of organizational independence and creative activity of the trade unions, so that they can be even more successful in fulfilling their specific tasks, their mission, so that they can be a real school of communism for the broadest masses.

9910
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ARCHBISHOP TOMASEK ON EDUCATION OF YOUNG PRIESTS

Prague KATOLICKE NOVINY in Czech No 7, 14 Feb 82 pp 1, 2

[Article by Frantisek Cardinal Tomasek: "A Word by the Archpriest"]

[Text] From the first years of his priesthood up to the last moment of his life [Archbishop Antonin Cyril] Stojan paid assiduous attention to future priests and cared for them unswervingly. His concern about them increased even more after he was installed in charge of the large Olomouc archdiocese. He was therefore extremely distressed when during the first year of his activity in that archdiocese (1921) he could ordain to priesthood no more than three graduates of theology. Moreover, they were not in good health and precisely because of their disability they had avoided military service during World War I and had been able to study.

Stojan was aware of the fact that the essential precondition for the growth of the young generation of priests is a good Christian family. For that reason, he used to put so much stress on good Christian family life and exhort parents with utmost solemnity not to hinder their sons who had decided after mature contemplation to enter the seminary. However, he urged parents just as emphatically that they must never and in no way press their son if he himself did not show any inclination for priesthood. He always demanded complete freedom of choice, of which Stojan's former acolyte from Drazovice left us a convincing testimony. His mother had urged him to enter the seminary; for moral support she turned to the spiritual administrator. However, Stojan sided with the student and patiently explained to the boy's mother over and over again that she must stop insisting, because the boy wished to become a teacher. Stojan told the mother not to stand in her son's way because even as a teacher the boy would be able to accomplish much good. Indeed, the student did become a good teacher and later a school superintendent, and all his life he was grateful to Stojan for his support. It often happens that some priests founder in their life because they lack genuine inner calling for their noble mission. For the welfare of the church and of the believers, the number of priests is not as important as their quality, their saintliness. Thus, the saying is true: "Only a saintly priest can bring up pious people...." After all, although he was very much concerned about the number of theology students and although he loved the theologians very much, in one respect he would not compromise. Whenever he realized that the seminarian lacked the qualities necessary for his ordination, he disregarded any human considerations and recognized only God's consideration.

Stojan not only spoke of the greatness, demands and merits of priesthood, he also wrote about them in his pastoral letters and in the press. Moreover, he repeatedly explained to parents that they should not look at priesthood from a material point of view. He reminded them that it is a call to spiritual heroism and to a lifelong sacrifice. Precisely because of that selfless sacrifice young people gain the understanding as well as the courage to follow in the footsteps of Jesus Christ. He impressed upon the students that they could do most good as priests. He would repeat that statement with deep conviction based on the experience of his own life. Although Stojan was untiring in trying to call to priesthood, in some cases he subjected the choice of that vocation to the most sober-minded scrutiny.

Archbishop Stojan was absolutely unambiguous and frank about the issue of celibacy. At the end of World War I, in 1918, an anticelibacy movement developed among certain groups of clergy, leading, as known, to a schism. At that time, some priests, even very dedicated ones, requested Archbishop Stojan that he convey to [Pope] Benedict XV their plea to make celibacy voluntary. Stojan complied and presented their petition in Rome. The pope declared very seriously and with determination that he could not grant their request.

His successors also adopted the same position. Pope John XXIII was of the same opinion, although nobody can accuse him of being tough. Even people standing far from our church respect him for his profoundly humane character and inimitable kindness. I recall how during the [Vatican] Council somebody asked the Holy Father about this particular issue. The pope turned very serious and said: "I realize that the issue of celibacy has driven some priests to tragic ends. Nobody can tell what pain I personally suffer because of that. I just could take a pen in my hand and my signature alone could change this church tradition upon request. Nevertheless, I cannot take that enormous responsibility upon myself. The welfare of the souls and the welfare of our church are far more important."

Archbishop Stojan continued his address to theology students: "For that reason I tell you the facts as they are. If any of you believe that he may not be able to keep and fulfill his pledge of celibacy in the spirit of our church, he must make his decision and promptly leave the seminary. We shall help him in his studies so that he may find a dignified position in some other occupation." At that time not one student left the seminary.

As a priest Stojan was frequently whipped, crowned with thorns and stoned by his own people. He was driven out of meetings where he was supposed to speak; in his defense he joked bitterly about the hostile audiences. In one town someone said to him: "Mr Representative, for you it is easy to take trips all over the world. You have no wife and no children. I have eight children. How can I afford to travel the way you do?" Stojan responded: "You have eight children. Be grateful to God that they are healthy and bright. They are proof that you love your wife." Then Stojan turned to the whole audience and added jokingly: "You should be glad that we do not marry. We would pick the prettiest girls, and what would you be left with?"

One of the theology students was experiencing an inner crisis at the very time when he was to be tonsured by the Archbishop and thus, ordained to

priesthood. He recalls his inner turmoil as he followed his colleagues to the archbishop's chapel where Archbishop Stojan, at that time already in poor health, was waiting for them. The sacred rite began. "As I see you before me, I think: My God, how can I accept these young men into priesthood in these difficult times? But then I remember the words of Our Lord Jesus that not even a sparrow can fall off the roof against the will of our Heavenly Father, and I am confident that neither have you come here without the will of God. Therefore, it will be my pleasure to give you the tonsure." His words about God's Providence affected that theologian so profoundly that as the archbishop was cutting his hair, he expressed his decision and determination in the words of the Psalm: "The Lord is the portion of my inheritance! O God, Thou shalt recompense me for what I will renounce for the sake of my love for Thee."

One of the last messages by Archbishop Stojan before his death on 3 August 1923 was addressed to the students of theology who were meeting for a conference on Mount Velehrad. For many years (from 1891 through 1922 he served as their executive chairman) Stojan used to be the moving spirit of those meetings; now he was on his deathbed. On his way to Velehrad, spiritual administrator Dr Frantisek Cinek stopped by in the Archbishop's residence. He was told that the Archbishop was fully conscious. On the sultry, hot summer day the patient lay prostrate on his bed behind drawn curtains. When he noticed his visitor, his face lit up, "Your Grace, I am on my way to Velehrad for the meeting of theologians. Do you wish to send the students a message?" Tears welled in the eyes of the sufferer. He began sobbing bitterly. The spiritual administrator wanted to leave for fear that the excitement might harm the sick man, but the patient stopped him and said with convulsive words, interrupted by weeping: "Never again shall I see Velehrad... Tell the theologians that I beg them--as Saint Cyril on his deathbed asked his brother--that they never abandon our good people..."

The message of the dying servant of God, Archbishop Antonin Cyril Stojan, and his whole life still serve our ranks as a living and urgent challenge.

9904
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BENKE REASSURES PARTY ON POLITICAL, ECONOMIC ISSUES

Budapest TARSADALMI SZEMLE in Hungarian No 2 Feb 82 pp 3-16

[Article by Valeria Benke, member of Politburo, editor-in-chief of TARSADALMI SZEMLE: "Social Policy, Reality and the Concept of Socialism"]

[Text] Last year, Hungary was a frequently discussed subject in the columns of the world press; our local papers, radio and television went to great length in assessing the lessons from the revival of our party and from the MSZMP's 25 years of activities.

The sincere respect of our friends and their interest in our experiences has gratified us. Even our enemies have not been able to deny the success of our policies, and our fair opponents have accepted it as fact. Never before did our country enjoy the kind of international reputation that our socialist Hungary enjoys today.

Just as our socialist achievements and accomplishments have served as a solid foundation of our national pride, we find this same feeling expressed in our dissatisfaction with everything that warrants criticism and is an obstacle to progress under our present conditions. There are many experiences from which our people can learn; having national self-awareness requires that these two sides of reality be equally taken into account, for only in this manner can our national consciousness be placed on a firm basis.

If we were to characterize our domestic situation, despite our various problems and difficulties, the atmosphere in our country is relaxed. This does not contradict the fact that--as we have seen for the past year or two already--concerns and doubts exist and we are faced with increased criticism and debate.

The concerns stem mainly from the dangerous international developments taking place around us. During the past few years, imperialist attempts at military superiority have intensified. Exploiting the painful crisis that has gripped socialist Poland and using the various steps to overcome that crisis as a pretext, they are aimed at discrediting the peace efforts of the Soviet Union and at bringing about a return to the cold war.

Doubts--which also have something to do with these external circumstances--arise in connection with questions such as: Will we be able to preserve our

standard of living? How will we continue to maintain full employment? Our present and past social practices, our plans and programs have all been the subject of criticism.

Criticism and debate are necessary and even essential when it comes to finding better solutions. However, they also play an indispensable role in handling and, if feasible, reconciling differences of interests as they arise.

A broad range of subjects, depending on their subject or nature, is more narrowly or more widely debated. These include prices; the 5-day workweek; housing problems; job-related questions, of which the most hotly debated issues are the wage conditions and management methods of large-scale enterprises and the way they compare with the opportunities offered by small-scale businesses. Also connected with this subject is the spirited criticism that demands greater recognition for white-collar creative work; i.e., which calls our attention to various intellectual needs.

In addition to the criticism directed at present practices in settlement-development, public administration, enterprise management and personnel selection, we have also witnessed the rise of some reform ideas that are aimed at the very concept of our system of political institutions. For the most part, these have been abstract ideas detached from social practice and our specific conditions, with an ideal concept of democracy as their starting point.

Among other things, our political bodies, professional circles and other forms have been discussing questions such as: How do we achieve more favorable growth rates? What would be a more effective direction for our industrial policy? How do we establish conditions to facilitate better the process of technological development and renewal? How do we find alternatives with a more favorable effect on our development?

There have been widespread debates concerning the problems of housing management and educational reform. In the case of the latter, the central committee decisions under preparation are based on contributions by researchers involved in the publication of critical-analytical writings and by people who have participated in the debates of political and professional bodies.

Discussing these kinds of questions is necessary. These debates can promote social clearsightedness, correct decisions and the development of proper value judgements, as long as they do not become one-sided. Due to complexity, it is imperative that we take into account certain mutually limiting factors and effects. This is not inconsistent with the idea that, while in working out questions of detail, or even in interpreting them for society, the role of the professional approach and specialized forums may be greater, the p... r a synthesis is in politics, in the area of collision and reconciliat... between conflicting interests. This latter has a political character even if it occurs on specialized forums.

If, for example, the question arises whether our income policy should be focused on raising low incomes or on providing appropriate compensation for good technical or other types of performance, the positions of our specialized forums may be in conflict, but our policy must always be ready to make a decision.

Consequently, while in accordance with their mandate, our individual professional and corporate organs may--as mouthpieces for voicing the demands of our various social strata--represent one-sided demands, our policy must always keep the balance of society in mind when making a decision. Obviously, both positions must be presented before public opinion, but in television, radio and newspaper editorials we must also be aware of what is being tuned into public opinion. This is quite a task, not only for our editors but also for the leading bodies of our social organizations.

While, in general, criticisms of our real problems and mistakes have been constructive, illusions also find their way into them. Sometimes the effects of unrealistic standards, volunteer ideas (and occasionally, bourgeois and new-rightist ideologies) tend to predominate. In trying to assess the truth, validity and possible effects of various positions, it might be helpful to examine to what extent they provide a socialist criticism of earlier distortions and present mistakes and to what degree they represent a bourgeois criticism of socialism.

It is necessary, therefore, for us to engage in polemics, to represent clearly Marxist approaches in exchanges of ideas--and to stand up for the correct policy. Above all, we need mutual openness and patient reasoning.

In our search for new avenues and effective means of change, what we have found time after time is that these new ideas and forms are in conflict not only with the practice that they intend to correct but on certain points even with the earlier concept of socialism. These theoretical and practical efforts also help to bring to light the correlation between the driving forces and values of socialism, which, we find, are more complex than had been thought. Time and again, we have been faced with the problem--in searching for and weighing alternative decisions, and possible course of action--of trying to establish the perimeters within which we can search for socialist solutions that would equally accelerate our social and economic development.

Another question that arises today is whether socialist ideals, values such as equalization, public spirit and culture are not falling victims--even if only temporarily--to the goals dictated by our economic problems or to our new efforts aimed at overcoming our shortages and balance troubles. We have to ask ourselves repeatedly whether the steps we are taking to solve our social problems are moving us toward the socialist future.

Finally, we must ask how all of this is reflected in the consciousness: What does it mean in terms of the validity of the concept of socialism, the uncertainties surrounding it, and its reaction to the changes of reality?

In this paper, I will attempt to identify the various areas where, and the extent to which, our social policy--as an instrument of orientation that takes into account the main relationships--is able and compelled to consider the existing interrelationships between the various values and driving forces of socialism in order to ensure the preservation of the social balance.

Socialism is a system that, in the final analysis, promotes social equalization both in the structural areas, i.e., those having to do with the division of labor and income distribution, and in the spheres of life style and culture. Equalization this way can only be attained by taking a road of contradictions; the task of our policy is to try to maintain the necessary movement and balance among inherently contradictory elements and tendencies. Our social policy aimed at reducing income differences among families, for example, is just one of several ways of achieving this. The primary source of social policy, and the real basis of all development, however, is growing labor productivity and improving production results, the main moving force behind it being distribution according to differences in performance. At the same time, this gives rise to inequalities. These differences should not be viewed as long-term goals; they are merely indispensable means for helping us to near those goals. As far as our families' living conditions are concerned, however, we have been striving, even at the present level of our socialist development, to reduce these differences, knowing that this cannot be achieved even in the extended future.

If we look at the question of income distribution in terms of socialist criteria, we must first examine what the income ratios are and on what those differences are based. A couple of years ago, for example, the question arose whether we have societywide poverty. Another question we have been hearing in the past few months is: Who in fact is at a disadvantage, the workers or the intelligentsia? We have detailed and specific answers to these questions. For more than 20 years, the Central Statistical Office has been recording the development of the income situation and living standard of our classes, social strata and various categories of families.

To demonstrate the way our income conditions have developed during the past two decades, let me present a few figures. In 1962, 55 percent of our population lived below the 800-forint per-capita income level. Of these, 5.5. million people, 2.1 million lived on between 400 and 600 forints, and 1 million on under 400 firints, which was about subsistence level. The in-between category, i.e., those living on per-capita incomes between 1,000 and 1,400 forints, represented around 20 percent of the population. At the time, Hungary's productive capacity could only allow this kind of living standard. There were some recommendations even then, which called for a change in the conditions of distribution. Detailed studies showed that, at the other end of the spectrum, the then-high 2,500-forint per-capita income group--from which something could have been taken--constituted merely 0.5 percent of the population, amounting to only 50,000 people.

By 1977, this picture changed. Taking also into account the effects of consumer price changes, we find that only 3.4 percent of the population belonged to the below-1,000-forint per-capita income category. Since then, their proportion has dropped even more. At the same time, in 1977, half the population had per-capita incomes over 2,200 forints per month, while in 1962, only 3.5 percent were earning that much. By the end of the 1970s, 11.6 percent of our worker families and 28 percent of our white-collar families belonged to the high-income group above the 2,200- to 3,200-forint category. These two sets of data clearly demonstrate the enormous changes in this area.

It would be appropriate to consider why--not merely because of our improved social policy but also as a result of our socialism-building policy. It has resulted from a policy that set before society a program for the development of the forces of production, a program that society has successfully implemented. Two key steps in this success--which at the same time have also brought a rapid reduction in regional disproportions--have been the development of the producers cooperatives and the industrialization of the countryside. As a result of their combined effect, rural Hungary has prospered. It has prospered not because some other system of distribution was introduced but because its work productivity and knowledge increased. The resources generated have allowed the sociopolitical income segment to grow more rapidly than work incomes, to 3.8 times its old level.

Between 1960 and 1980, real incomes increased 2.2 times. The gap between our various classes and social strata has become increasingly narrow both with respect to income conditions and standard of living. Worker and peasant incomes are virtually equal, while white-collar incomes are 47 percent above average. Breaking it down even further, we find that the skilled-worker categories and the white-collar average have become closely comparable. However, neither our white-collar workers' increased income averages nor the significantly higher living standard of the majority of our families means that we have no problems or material deficiencies in this area. This holds especially true for families with children. We must continue to find new ways of ensuring that they do not fall further behind. We must never forget that, in accordance with our principles and long-range programs, we must increase our social contributions to ensure the needs of our children.

Some incomes are occasionally referred to as "unjustifiably high earnings"; some of them indeed fit that description. Of these, the ones that can be legally prosecuted, should be prosecuted. In most cases, however, the reason for these high incomes is because our production and service branches fail to meet realistic demands. If, however, we succeed in creating a channel that would better facilitate work to satisfy social needs, by remedying our existing deficiencies and disproportions we could eliminate the conditions leading to abuse, and ensure that only those who do better and more profitable work receive higher incomes.

On the other end of the picture is the group of people whose income level is at a disadvantage. In addition to a low income, other factors considered by sociology among the criteria of a disadvantageous position include low education, poor housing conditions and others. The number of people whose per-capita monthly income is below 1,700 forints is approximately 1 million. The majority are elderly, single, retired people and families with three or more children.

One of the requirements of a socialist social policy, which stem from the very nature of the social system, is to reduce gradually the accumulation of disadvantages on one end of society, while at the same time curtailing the accumulation of advantages on the other; in other words, to control, and in the long-run stop, their regeneration. The most conspicuous of these have already disappeared during socialist transformation. Nevertheless, disadvantages continue to regenerate, and this cannot be eliminated by sociopolitical means alone.

Rather than regarding the present trend among our various classes and social strata to approach one another as unhealthy, we consider that process as socialist. Within the individual strata, however, we find increasing inequality developing, and our sociological studies have proven that this is attributable not so much to differences of income but to differences in the size of our families.[1] Our experiences have shown that the starting situation of a family also plays an important role in this. With wages, the inequalities are based mainly on assignment and age; while these are perhaps justified, there is reason for criticism on the part of our young intellectuals and workers. What we need to do, therefore, is to carry out some necessary improvements at our various places of work to ensure that the existing mechanical-formal criteria are increasingly replaced by actual performance as the primary basis of income. Even if this temporarily leads to the creation of income differences, we must keep in mind that this is the only way to expand the sources from which we expect to increase the income of others--i.e., of the entire enterprise collective and of the other occupational branches--and eventually to reduce even further the present family-social inequalities.

Of the basic conditions of human and family existence, one of the most important is housing. Today this is the cause of the greatest social tensions, even though the availability of housing has greatly improved. As a result of the real tensions created by the housing situation, plenty of debate has been going on, while our comrades and public opinion as a whole are rightly and justifiably anxious to learn more about possible solutions and prospects.

For decades now, one of the most important questions facing us--since proper housing is everybody's basic necessity--is how great a role our socialist state should assume in trying to satisfy housing needs and to what extent it should shift the burdens involved to the families. To put it differently, what, and how broad, is the sphere within which the state has a sociopolitical obligation to provide housing? Who is, and who is not, entitled to this? What are the obligations and possibilities of our socialist state in regulating the commodity character of privately owned homes and the market conditions that it entails? In the various phases of our socialist development, these questions received different answers. The housing situation is influenced by several social and economic factors; whatever answer we give today can only come after a thorough examination of the situation.

Actually, the settlement-development debate that has been going on in our various government organs for several years, is at the same time also a debate about housing. Opinions have been filled with criticism and mixed emotions crystallized around the claim that city overcrowding stems from our neglect and even reduction of small settlements and that this has led to the rise of excess demands for housing there, despite the fact that our villages could accommodate larger populations. Still another point along these same lines that has reached epidemic proportions is the criticism that we have been hearing about the dreariness of residential settlements, the size of their housing units and their faulty internal design. Numerous comments have concerned the unequal chances for obtaining housing, which seem to be based on the conclusion that our intelligentsia and youth are at a disadvantage.

Overall, these debates have given rise to many well-justified and correct arguments, but occasionally we also hear some exaggerated statements, hasty conclusions and demands that exceed all reasonable limits. These would include the kind, for example, failing to take into account the fact that the housing conditions we inherited were below the levels of Western and Northern Europe and that our nation's productive capacity still has not reached those levels.

What is the housing situation in Hungary? No one can deny that we have a housing shortage. How serious is it? What measure do we use to determine the extent of that shortage, or the degree to which we have succeeded in satisfying our housing needs? Although we do not have any precise answers to the questions, we can begin responding to them by examining the number of families without homes of their own and the degree of overcrowding in our existing housing. The quality of these units and the obsolescence of our apartment buildings are also important criteria. If we compare the number of Hungarian families with the number of available homes, we receive the following picture. Altogether, we have 3.7 million families and so-called broken family units. This is what our 3.6 million registered--that is, 3.4 million occupied homes--must accommodate. What does the Sixth Five-Year Plan aim to solve? Presently, 390,000 new housing units are being built, while another 80,000 to 100,000 await renovation, hopefully to become fully usable. Between 120,000 to 130,000 will be torn down, and we expect to receive some 200,000 new demands due to changing family circumstances. If we take this into account, together with some additional shortages stemming from obsolescence, we can clearly see that, during the Sixth Five-Year Plan, many realistic demands must be unsatisfied.

During the past two decades, the accelerated rate of our housing construction--considered large-scale even by European standards--has resulted both in the quantity and quality of housing.[2] As a result, overcrowded conditions have eased considerably. While, in 1960, there were 250 people for 100 rooms, by 1980, the proportion of two- or more room homes rose about 70 percent. To put it differently, while, in 1980, the number of families per 100 housing units was 108, by the time the Sixth Five-Year Plan is completed, this figure will drop to 103. These data do not include any information as to the extent of cohabitation by several generations, but it is clear that its rapid decline has contributed to the growth of absolute and relative housing shortages.

Our large cities suffer from tension-causing housing shortages, while our villages have some unoccupied homes. Let us not forget, however, that in these latter not only is the quality of homes worse, but they are also more crowded. In our mid-size and small towns, the balance is beginning to reach the point of being as favorable as it will ever be. In Budapest, the number of families and family units without a home of their own is the greatest; also here, the number of persons per home is lowest.

Our housing data clear up one point of debate; from the point of view of housing availability, the intelligentsia is not at a disadvantage. A greater percentage of them have their own home; 43 percent of our white-collar workers live in rented apartments, compared to 25 percent of our worker families; many of our white-collar families live in higher-convenience apartments with several rooms. Based on the present point system of housing allocation, young people

are indeed at a disadvantage, for it considers the number of children as the most important factor of eligibility. In the case of those still without children, the per-capita share of even their already low starting income exceeds the level at which they would be eligible to request housing.

Let us return to one of the important questions of debate stated earlier: Who, to what extent, according to what considerations and using what mechanism should bear the burden of housing construction and maintenance? In 1970, we answered this question by pointing out that providing housing was the joint task of the state and our families. It was decided that rents must cover maintenance costs. At the same time, at least for the high-convenience class apartments, there was a quite substantial (threefold) rent increase, which we could virtually offset by individual compensation and by tying its implementation to wage increases (over an almost 7-year period). Since then, with the increase of prices, the value of rents has also dropped. Hence, their contribution to defraying the costs of housing maintenance has declined. There has also been a change in the proportion of rents compared to real wages. With the rent increase, they constituted 6 to 8 percent of the family income; today, they are once again at 3 to 4 percent.

The principle behind the policies of that time was that state assistance in the procurement of housing should be based on the family's social-income situation. We have been unable to live up to this principle consistently, among other things because assistance has been too closely connected with various forms of construction. Presently, 75 percent of our families live in privately owned homes, which means that they have assumed certain financial obligations both in the construction and maintenance of their homes. Compared to this, renting is highly advantageous. The differences in family incomes are not as great as the ones created in housing costs. While, from the point of view of our families' standard of living there are several strata that, in light of their social situation, justifiably enjoy this advantage, some family categories do not. Interestingly, 67 percent of our vacation-home owners come from apartment renters.[3]

Abetted by the housing shortage, apartment renting has opened the way for a variety of abuses. For example, since for all practical purposes these apartments may be inherited and sold, they can be easily turned from a socially justified benefit into an instrument to acquire material advantages. The lack of interest on the part of our maintenance organizations, and to a certain extent also on the part of our families, has had a variety of negative effects. As a result, the safeguarding, maintenance and rational utilization of state-owned residential buildings had been less than adequate; we are sorry that prevalent conditions have not developed as expected under socialism.

The problems listed here (plus several others that I will not have a chance to discuss) have brought to a head the concept, discussed and increasingly strongly advocated in the present debate over housing management, that housing provisions should be placed on a strictly market-controlled basis. This view is supported by two arguments. One, under our socialist conditions, other human needs--such as food and clothing supplies--are also being met through commodity forms. Why shouldn't housing be handled the same way? The other argument is that, in the case of privately owned homes, market conditions are already asserting themselves.

several economists and sociologists have studied our housing conditions.[4] By uncovering many important facts and interrelationships, they have been instrumental in helping us analyze and better understand this problem area. Unfortunately, most of them have not helped to facilitate social judgments by failing to point out some really important conditions and social consequences. Primarily, they failed to point out that our "free" market conditions are quite restricted. They would be "free" only if we had vacant homes and the legally instituted right of notice. However, undermining personal security would hardly receive or deserve any social support, not even if some negative effects were to arise, arguably stemming from the restricted character of our market movements, that would tend to offset this security. Another consequence that should be considered is that, if we allowed rents to be determined freely by market conditions, even if we include possible social assistance, this would cause lower-income families with children to move from their allocated apartments into cheaper and therefore smaller and lower quality homes, not because their needs have lessened but because their wallets have shrunk.

The irregularities surrounding housing allocations, the inequality-promoting character of the existing forms of distribution, the lack of concern on the part of our families and maintenance organizations have caused considerable social damage and loss. Certainly the solution to our housing problems lies not with those who expect things to be given to them on a golden platter but with people who are willing to work hard and live austerely in order to save for a home. For this reason, we are justified in trying to shape our construction, credit and legal conditions in such a way that we increase their chances, opportunities and incentives to build or to expand and modernize their homes. Another reason why we must change our legal and financial conditions is to help make apartment exchanges easier.

Many disapprove of how our development policy has been concentrating on quantitative housing shortages--and there is indeed some merit to this view--but these so-called quantitative housing shortages still exist in Hungary. This will, for a long time, limit our possibilities of ending the monopoly position of the construction industry, even if eventually we will win acceptance for the justly voiced demand that, instead of using them to subsidize the construction enterprises, state resources earmarked for housing construction be spent on assisting builder families.

Today, therefore, we could give the following--very simplified--answer to the question of how the burdens of housing should be borne and what mechanisms should be used in the process. In order to find a faster and healthier solution to the problem of housing management, we should try to strengthen the interest elements over the distributional forms. Social assistance in home-buying and housing maintenance should be based primarily on the number of children (dependents), which decisively affects the situation of a family. This is what the level of state-provided rent subsidies--and the extent of construction assistance--should be adjusted to. This latter should be gradually expanded to our villages and eventually also to home-building.

Here the train of thought about the housing debate shifts to the problem of settlement development. It is in society's interest that we ensure the establishment of conditions that do not hamper but rather promote the development of our

villages--conditions, on the basis of which the councils can also mobilize the local population's own resources and labor in the form of some much needed communal development. Another legitimate consideration--as the good examples of our charming provincial towns have proven--is that by making town and village development sufficiently open, and by allowing some sensible democratic principles to assert themselves, we could avoid a lot of mistakes and could help to enrich our settlements with several positive features. For this to be possible, the councils must be allowed to make some independent decisions regarding the important questions of settlement development and more comprehensive housing management. This infers the strengthening of the economic basis of self-government and would also mean a step forward in the development of socialist democracy.

At the 12th Party Congress, we made a commitment to the preservation of our standard of living. By this we meant that we would be able--through better performance and more efficient work than before--to maintain our present level of consumption. At the same time, our forecasts also call for improving conditions in housing, our childcare institutions, education, culture and other elements of the infrastructure, as well as in transportation and commerce.

One of the guarantees built into the Sixth Five-Year Plan to ensure the preservation of our standard of living in the present Hungarian economy is a lower investment quota. Compared to the previous 75:25 ratio, under the present plan, 82 percent will go to consumption and 18 percent to stockpiling. At the same time, there will be no reduction in the share earmarked for improving conditions in housing, in community life, in childcare institutions and in other areas. Another decision connected with our standard-of-living policy is that, in order to offset the effects of unavoidable price increases, we will try regularly to adjust the income of small pensioners and large families (in the case of below-the-average pensions, by raising them 100 forints a month every year and by increasing the allowance to large families).

This is the socialist solution to sharing costs, although it is not "the" solution. That solution lies in our program of economic development. Just as a reminder, let me reiterate some of the important features of the Sixth Five-Year Plan. One, our most important task is to improve our balance. Another is that, although we planned on a moderate rate of development, we did not intend this to mean general restraint; instead, we will try to increase our productive capacity and improve our international competitiveness by accelerating the development of our more profitable branches and activities.

What are our chances of turning this plan into reality? Let me just point out a couple of facts. Although the figures differ from branch to branch, on the average, the Hungarian national economy uses about 20 to 25 percent more materials and energy to produce one unit than the more highly developed European countries and, unfortunately, considerably more labor. This latter also throws a (partly) different light on the manpower shortage, which, in many places, has caused some agonizing economic problems. The time it takes to realize our investments has been a great burden on us. If we could reduce this time by 20 percent--in most cases, this means only a few months--that would, already in this 5-year plan, noticeably increase the value of our realized investments.

Maintaining a rational level of stockpiles would help to release even more significant economic resources. Naturally, the way to do this is not through some kind of action designed to reduce stockpiles artificially; instead, the solution lies in improving the division of labor and cooperation among our enterprises and, subsequently, in solving certain highly complex economic-organization related tasks.

In view of these factors--i.e., our excessive use of material and energy, higher labor ratio, our investment time and stockpile management--we can say that we have here a reserve that could serve as the basis for improving the performance of our economy. Unfortunately, we have had quite a difficult time trying to mobilize these resources.

In order to increase the productive capacity of our entire economy, we must--because it is possible--make better use of our enterprise funds and of the material and intellectual resources of our enterprises and our scientific, planning, research and development institutions. On the one hand, there has been considerable discontent and, we must admit, in many cases justifiable criticism on the part of our technical intelligentsia, our economists and the researchers of various branches of science, concerning enterprise and institutional conditions that fail to make use of our available intellectual resources, or in other ways hamper and restrict their full utilization. On the other hand, through their criticism of inefficient work organization, our workers have been telling us for years about the negative effects that the deficiencies of intrafactory management and intraenterprise cooperation have had on performance.

Even if the technical and organizational experts involved in enterprise management have failed to notice or mention the main reason, our economic analyses--and, based on them, our basic economic-political principles and practical economic management efforts--already start from the assumption that the economic pressure is still not strong enough to compel us to mobilize these resources or to make better use of our material and intellectual resources. It seems that our socialist society's commitment to provide security and protection for our workers' collectives and citizens is much more strongly asserted than our most important basic principle of distribution: "Everybody according to his work...."

The best measure of a policy's effectiveness is the extent to which it is able to convert existing tensions into a driving force, into active energy. The economic pressures placed on our enterprises, together with the use of incentives and a joint and rational utilization of our possibilities, may eventually enable us to turn these existing tensions into active energy. This holds true not only for our national but also for our local policies.

Unfortunately, a process aimed at improving economic management also requires the use of some bitter medicine. While this may lead to tensions, given the proper conditions, this can be turned into a driving force. One such development has been changing our price system, which has brought with it a generally rising tendency in the price level, which has also affected consumer prices. One of the constantly recurring questions we hear is: How long and by how much more can prices continue to rise? This will depend on the size of our expenditures. Not only are the external, so-called "rippling," effects reflected in

these price increases but also the size of our domestic expenditures. More bitter medicine is the revised regulations and organizational changes introduced in our ministries, trusts and large-scale enterprises. But--and even more importantly--organizational changes within our large-scale enterprises aimed at helping corporate interests to assert themselves more effectively are both necessary and unavoidable. The internal management and accounting system of our state enterprises determines whether these corporate forms will have a favorable or a distorting effect on economic management, on the work of managers and working collectives and on the way this latter is evaluated and individually remunerated. Incidentally, finding a solution to this problem is also essential with small businesses.

Naturally, it is also imperative that we find an economic management solution that would clarify how great a value is produced (or realized on the market), by what enterprise and at what cost. Better organization, greater independence and the responsibility that goes with it are closely connected with the accounting method used to express the value of the actual product. Without these, there is no objective basis for deciding who is a good and who is a poor manager, or which engineer, technical expert, economist, foreman, or worker does valuable and which less valuable work. In those areas where the real value of the collectives' performance is kept unclear, what we are in fact doing is allowing the creation of an "objective" basis for subjectivism.

Today, one of the important conditions for ensuring the development of our socialist democracy's and society's socialist characteristics is greater clearsightedness that enhances the lucidity of our collective relations. I do not, however, intend to spread damaging platitudes. No economic automatism could replace a good value judgement or eliminate the need for making a personal commitment to conflict resolution. The role of the collectives is just as decisive as it is important for our economic facts and achievements to be presented clearly.

Only the strength of the collective is capable of gradually improving our economic decisions, our performance evaluation, our system of remuneration and even the selection of our managers at various levels, while at the same time promoting the day-to-day assertion of our workers' democratic rights and their participation in decisionmaking and in the supervision of their implementation. It is, of course, not easy to assert the role of the collectives, especially where the economic bases do not provide any guidance in the evaluation of performances. This is the situation in education, health care and other similar fields. Nevertheless, the development of our collectives' power of judgment and debating ability continues to be essential in all areas. This may be one, or perhaps the most, effective weapon against subjectivism and unprincipledness. Taking part in this is the most valuable contribution of party work to the improvement of work conditions.

To return to a question in the introduction, under the present circumstances, the good performance of our technicians, economists and scientific researchers should be given greater financial recognition by our enterprises and institutions. I am referring to those technical and economic experts employed by our enterprises, who hold organizing and managing positions. The greatest value

that people in this group who perform their job well can give to society is an assurance that, as a result of their work, the labor of their workers and subordinates will be more valuable. Let us not forget that it is not the diploma itself for which we should be paying; university degrees and trade certificates are merely proofs of training and say nothing about the person's aptitude or his ability to carry out his tasks successfully.

As clear and simple as these ideas are, it is just as difficult to implement them. Our existing economic conditions do not make it any easier to meet these requirements, but this is also because the handling of conflicts on the local and personal level is not one of the stronger aspects of our social practice. Participation by the technical experts themselves is required to establish the corporate conditions necessary to ensure the kind of creative opportunities so important to them and to guarantee them remuneration reflecting their performance.

What this task requires of our political bodies, including our party and trade union organs, is that they provide the political and moral support necessary to ensure the success of these (never tension- or conflict-free) undertakings. As part of this support, in those areas where the value of the produced output is verifiably great, they should push, within their respective enterprises and institutions, for higher income levels more commensurate with that result.

Preserving the social balance does not mean that we must equalize even those things that need not be equalized. We must not try to offset the situation of our efficiently producing enterprises with the position of those operating at a loss, or the situation of people doing a good job with the position of those who just like to "take it easy." This also makes it more difficult to find solutions to our economic problems and upsets our system of human values.

It is this kind of balance-seeking, interest-reconciling and, at the same time, conflict- and tension-managing and solving activity to which I refer when I talk about the concept of political synthesis.

One of the questions that has come up repeatedly during the past few years is: What is going to happen to our socialist ideas as a result of our changing economic conditions and methods? Will they lead us to lose sight of our socialist perspectives? In trying to find the answers to our future and to the questions of our socialist development, we also must examine how well our concept of socialism--which plays an important guiding, attitude-forming and even mobilizing role--is suited for allowing necessary transformations.

What are some of the ideas that in earlier everyday thinking were considered characteristic features of socialism? They included things such as stable and generally low prices; inexpensive foodstuffs, rents, public services and transportation. Our own agitation is not entirely without blame in this either. We have not talked as much about the security that socialism provides in the form of full employment (something that even the richest capitalist countries have found to be an unsolvable problem). Even less emphasis has been placed--even though large numbers of families have been affected by it--on the question of social mobility; i.e., on the individual and collective possibilities, ways and forms of status change and upward social advancement. The literary and artistic

manifestations of this, and its reinforcement by these forms of consciousness, have fallen short of what the facts warrant.

This concept of awareness, however, has certain constant elements, most of which have been accepted by everyday thinking and which--having endured the tests of history--have had a continuous effect. These include the power of the working class; the alliance of all laboring classes and strata; and the system's commitment to social justice and development, which it promotes in living conditions, training and education. One of its important elements is an effort to provide education and training that will guarantee people a job (unlike the capitalist societies, which are unable to ensure this and which, due to their nature, do not even wish to do so). The idea of distribution according to work, the provision of social assistance to supplement family incomes and the observation of human rights--such as the right to enjoy a secure life, to work, to be educated and, last but not least, to live in peace--have become accepted values as has the fact that our main guarantee of thier assertion is not that they have been declared, but that they stem from the very nature and development tendencies of our society. These elements of our concept of socialism have not faltered; some are still gaining strength and require further strengthening.

In the wake of the socialist changes that have occurred, our public consciousness; our political, public-opinion forming work aimed at shaping public consciousness; and our socialist policy together have built several new elements into the concept of socialism and have helped to strengthen some previously less well-pronounced. Some of these--either because of political distortions or because conditions were not ripe enough--were not or were only vaguely present. Interest and socialist democracy were only two such elements.

Since 1956, we have recognized the importance of interest; since 1957, we have been increasingly trying to assert its role, although not completely without mistakes and resistance. This has become inseparable from our notion of socialist democracy and from our political practice stemming from it. According to this notion, the functions of socialist democracy include exploring individual and group interests, promoting their expression, reconciling various interests and arriving at compromises, so that, based on a common interest, we can achieve the kind of cooperation required to accomplish our common goals and tasks; they also include the right of the collectives to reconcile and assert their interests with those of the public.

Since 1968, based on the rules of socialist commodity and financial conditions, we have been trying--although with considerable difficulty--to assert more consciously the role of prices and costs. Recently, we have had to get accustomed to concepts such as market orientation, competitiveness, foreign exchange rates, risks, market losses and similar terms. Naturally, we can also find some elements among our commodity and price conditions in conflict with our socialist principles or--by virtue of their effect on the consciousness--traverse our socialist way of thinking, our way of life and mentality. We must learn to cope with these sensibly. The economic laws cannot be circumvented. Their partially negative effects on the consciousness cannot be eliminated either, although here again we are not completely helpless. Our historic lesson is to get to know them as well as possible and to learn to deal with them according to the goals of our society.

Not all new problems stem exclusively from the--for us--new economic requirements of this intensive phase of development; some have been created by the maneuvers of imperialist policies. These also must be faced; together with the socialist countries we must try to overcome them.

Although it did not come about in the more developed, richer countries, socialism has proven that it can provide greater security and equality for the members of society than even the richest capitalist country. It was able to provide protection against the drastic effects of the price explosion, but this has also had its price. Under these kinds of circumstances, structural changes and shifts to new technologies take longer in the socialist societies than in the capitalist countries, where, although often at the price of destroying everything that gets in the way, these steps take less time to implement. We must make our society more receptive to necessary economic, technical and scientific changes and to the periodic need for renewal through theoretical conceptualization and practical implementation. This must be done in a way that will enable it to distinguish between necessary change and harmful and disturbing instability.

Stability and protection--enjoyed by institutions and individuals alike--are socialist values. We can never abandon the social need to feel assured that even our more significant structural transformations will not affect full employment or our workers' and families' security of existence. It is, however, also a mistake to extend this protection to the point where we also end up "protecting" poor products, disorganized work and weak management. We are yet to learn to ensure a rational level of stability and protection for our economic units, while at the same time exposing them, to a certain desirable degree, to economic necessities, market pressures, responsibility and consequences of their own management. Now is the time for us to come up with methods that will enable us to differentiate between losses of various origins in economic life and that can be handled in a way that will serve the interests of society.

The synthesizing (task-stressing and relationship-monitoring) character of our sociopolitical efforts provides the solid bases for making certain that our concept of socialism remains unchanged in those areas where there are some specific permanent conditions and objective socialist regularities behind its individual elements. In order to win acceptance for its effects, the policy determining the course of our development must always take painstaking care to ensure that the changed conditions and their effects on the social consciousness are asserted without creating a shock. Just as it is dangerous to have a rigid practice and a static image connected with it--as frequently proven whenever dogmatism has gotten out of hand--it is similarly dangerous to have sudden changes that can shake people's existing ideas, values and beliefs in everything that represents socialism.

Efforts aimed at sociopolitical consistency can ensure the continued existence and influence of a constantly developing socialist society concept, which in turn can aid in the balanced--although, as this discussion has shown, never contradiction-free--process of social activities.

In order to prevent these necessary changes from causing unnecessary confusion in our society, we must find a way to ensure not only a proper degree of openness

but also a sense of stability in our public opinion, which is absolutely necessary for enduring the hardships of change. This presents a considerable task for our policies, our means of mass communication as well as for our entire intellectual life. In the various spheres of intellectual life, the new questions of science, technology and culture have been raised. As a result of the development of our socialist democracy, these questions have also been dealing with some social problems; hence, they have a great and growing role in public life. This requires an even greater degree of responsibility on their part in presenting the debates heard before our various forums to the public, and they must always keep in mind that occasionally these may also be instruments used to assert someone's interest. Just as we have had to learn that our officeholders' social commitments have not nullified their particular interest obligations.

In one way or another, every factor of consciousness-shaping is responsible for the ideas that their effects strengthen or weaken in the minds of the people. They are also responsible for the extent to which they promote receptiveness toward necessary change and strengthen the basic values of socialism and faith in their development possibilities.

Hence, we must take another look at several aspects of the relationship between our socialist ideals and our new economic conditions. Our ideals and realities do not have to clash. Our ideals--since they themselves have developed according to reality--have been, and will continue to be, able to guide us in shaping our realities; namely, in our efforts to establish the socialist forms of the division of labor and cooperation, to work out a collective method of social guidance and to provide a socialist, humane opportunity and substance for the development and well-being of the individual.

More than 20 years ago, I participated in a conversation with scientists in which Comrade Kadar said the following: Our scientist friends should always strive for the ideal but should never lose sight of the realities. This idea may be a very important rule to follow in our policies, our personal role in public life, our thinking and our behavior in general.

When in the wake of a great crisis, the MSZMP was able to give the realization of our communist ideas and socialist ideals another start, we chose a policy that was consciously aware of the many difficulties facing us, among them also the fact that the conditions of our economy and the personal willingness and mentality of our people had not been developing according to our best expectations. Consequently, we decided to take into account certain negative factors and difficulties, which in many ways have required us to take roads that may seem slower and more roundabout. Reality has shown that this has not prevented us from moving forward.

If we continue to preserve our well-established and still firm political stability and understanding, we will be able to find the proper solution to all the new and long-existing problems facing us.

FOOTNOTES

1. Zsuzsa Ferge, "The income situation of families with children," VALOSAG No 8, 1980.

2. See Barnabas Barta, Gyorgy Vukovics, "The development and characteristics of the housing situation," TARSADALMI SZEMLE No 4, 1981.

3. Mrs. Istvan Hoffmann, "Popular savings, the home and real estate property," SZEKI 1981.

4. See, for example, Zsuzsa Daniel, "Income distribution, housing allocation and social inequality," VALOSAG No 2, 1981; Janos David, "The sources and conditions of private housing construction," VALOSAG No 10, 1980; the main conclusions of the studies conducted by a team of experts headed by Ferenc Kozma: "Our housing policy in terms of our social and economic policy as a whole," TARSADALMI SZEMLE No 1, 1982; Lajos Bokros, Gyorgy Suranyi, "The program of a transition: the possibilities and limitations of the reform of our housing management system," VALOSAG No 12, 1981.

9379
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IMPACT OF ECONOMIC SITUATION ON MILITARY SECTOR NOTED

Warsaw ZOLNIERZ WOLNOSCI in Polish 3 Feb 82 p 5

[Article by 2d Lt Tadeusz Pieklo: "Aggressiveness, Initiative, Resourcefulness: The Military Economy Under New Conditions"]

[Text] The present situation is very difficult for the entire Polish economy. The deep crisis, through which our country is living, appears most clearly in the area of production. The shortages of processed goods and articles for everyday use are plain to see on store counters and shelves. The serious shortages occurring on the market also impact on the quality and level of the military economy.

Martial law, introducing greater discipline, restored peace in our country, and quieted the social turmoil, ferment, and strikes, which were ruining the economy. At the same time, social discipline increased, and plants, factories, and enterprises began to operate at a normal rate.

Supply problems, as well as raw material and energy problems, have not diminished, however, because these problems may not be reduced on a day to day basis. Under these conditions, however, efforts related to economic reform are being initiated. The extensive rebuilding of the country's economic structures will variously make an impression on the military economy. Many unknown factors remain in the area of military cooperative apartment construction. For the last several years, poorer and poorer results have been achieved in this sector, e.g., in 1979, 72 percent of the planned area was completed, in 1980, only 21 percent, and in 1981, essentially zero.

In general, the situation with apartments at many military bases has worsened in recent years as a result of the general crisis in construction. These are harsh realities which may not be taken lightly. What is needed is a program of aggressive action in which such widely discussed and publicized possibilities for the development of private construction may be only one and not at all the most important element. After all it is obvious that the overwhelming majority of career soldiers will simply not be able to afford the funding of a single-family house, even under the most favorable credit conditions.

These and many other matters connected with supplying the army, during martial law, and also with the economic tasks of the army this year, were discussed at

a meeting of the quartermaster cadre of the armed forces in Warsaw, with particular attention given to the construction tasks of the first quarter. The meeting of the chiefs of the services and quartermasters of the military districts and branches of the Armed Forces was chaired by the chief quartermaster of the Polish Army and vice minister of the National Defense--Lt Gen Miecyslaw Obiedzinski.

During the meeting, the supply situation of the army, under conditions of martial law, was carefully analyzed and evaluated. The tasks in this area were outlined, and the operations of individual quartermaster sections, such as quartering and construction services, health, transportation, food, clothing, POL [petroleum, oil, lubricants], military trade, as well as vacations and tourist services, in the country's new and changing economic conditions, were considered.

The need to quickly and completely replenish material supplies was treated as a task of particular importance. Problems of investment and renovation, especially at the military bases where the fulfillment of social and living needs has been the lowest, were taken up. In this regard, the need to develop the network of military preschools and nurseries was emphasized particularly. Much attention was given to improving military trade and developing the services, and also to the urgent need to intensify military agriculture. Promising achievements and prospects in this area were presented.

The group of tasks related to price increases was also discussed. The need was stated for further improving economical management of heating fuel and other energy sources, and especially coal, which is and will continue to be the vital impetus of the Polish economy, as the economy emerges from the crisis.

In speaking of economic reform, the need to increase knowledge of these matters by, for example, organizing short-term courses for the cadre, as well as for the workers of military production and service plants, was stressed. In the first year of the reform, the army, as well as enterprises of the national economy, will change over to a system of quarterly planning in economic activity.

All of the economic actions undertaken by the quartermaster services in 1982 will serve to maintain a high standard of living for soldiers and the army's good combat condition. Under conditions of material and financial limitations, high requirements in relation to all soldiers will be absolutely necessary, and especially of those who jointly determine the health and wholesome development of soldiers, i.e. workers in kitchens, cafeterias, mess halls, clubs, as well as personnel in nursery schools and preschools so that the attained level of their performance of duties will not decline.

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RESULTS OF STUDIES ON ADJUSTMENT TO MILITARY SERVICE REPORTED

Warsaw WOJSKO LUDOWE in Polish No 2, Feb 82 pp 63-65

[Article by Lt Col Wladyslaw Pertko and Reserve Lt Col Jan Podowski: "Adjustment of Servicemen to Conditions of Military Service"]

[Text] Adaptation as defined by J. Cendrowski is "a process of ceaseless cognition and learning of the basic activities required of the serviceman, the mastery of specific skills and capabilities. It is a process of gradual adjustment of one's behavior and demeanor to the requirements of military life. It also means a rational--consonant with personal needs and the needs of military life--adjustment of mutual relations among fellow servicemen and the rendering of services for the good of the collective as well as an exact adjustment to the daily schedule and the requirements of regulations and provisions. It also means the endeavor to become familiar with and service properly technical tools and the allotted equipment and arms so as to utilize them optimally while fulfilling a task. Finally, adaptation also means an effective surmounting of difficulties in military life and training."*

Thus a satisfactory adaptation to military service is a basic prerequisite for the proper functioning of servicemen under conditions of military life. It is known, however, that, for various reasons, certain servicemen encounter problems in adapting themselves to military service. Sometimes these problems grow to obstacles that completely impede this process.

Failure to adjust to the requirements of military life may, and does, lead to more serious consequences. To avoid such situations, the writers attempt, on the basis of research, to identify certain factors influencing the adaptation of servicemen to the conditions of military service.

The period of gradual adjustment of the relations between the individual and his new environment is of special interest to psychology. The problem of adaptation has been the subject of extensive research and numerous publications. However, it deserves recurrent--and thorough--investigation, if only to evaluate

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*J. Cendrowski, "Wybrane zagadnienia psychologii wojskowej" [Selected problems of military psychology], Warsaw, 1967, p. 24.

the results of educational procedures and the practiced forms and methods for selecting individuals for definite military specialties in accordance with their individual predisposition. Also important are answers to the questions of how much and to what extent our youths can adapt themselves to the conditions of military service and what should be done to streamline the process of adaptation and eliminate effectively any existing irregularities in it.

Owing to sociopolitical, educational, and cultural changes, the views, outlook and convictions of servicemen change and will continue to change; this also affects their performance of tasks relating to military service. This should be always borne in mind by commanders and educators.

In writing this article, we utilized materials from the course of experimental studies performed at the Psychology Laboratory of the Silesian Military District. The following research tools were used:

-- self-evaluation questionnaire;

-- evaluation questionnaire by the serviceman's superior;

-- supplementary poll;

-- interview with subjects and their superiors;

-- analysis of documents, record of awards and punishments, health record, lecture journal.

Research by the writers was intended to obtain answers to the following questions:

-- Have the conscripts been assigned to specialized military training in accordance with their liking, interests, qualifications and predispositions?

-- Has military service contributed to the deepening of civilian interests in the subjects?

-- Have the subjects felt fear and anxiety of military service? What were the causes and difficulties of adaptation to the conditions of military service?

-- Have their views and attitudes changed in comparison with their previous civilian life? How? What has influenced this?

-- What personality traits did they develop the most while in the army?

-- What achievements were made by the subjects during their military service and what did they gain personally?

-- What educational and psychological measures should be taken for a rapid and conflict-free adaptation of conscripts to new conditions?

In addition, in order to have a standard of comparison, the writers based themselves on the work by Eugeniusz Olczyk and Czeslaw Staciwa, "Mlodzierz a wojsko" [The youth and the army] (MON [Ministry of National Defense] Publishing House, 1970). More than 10 years separate us from the publication of that work and it appears worth showing what changes have since taken place in the process of the adaptation of servicemen to conditions of military service.

The study was carried out on a group of individuals in the preconscription period, which subsequently was a control group from the standpoint of psychology throughout their entire period (1-1/2 years) of military service. The findings thus represent the summation of several research cycles rather than one-time findings.

The investigated servicemen were of the following origin: peasants, 20 percent; workers, 76 percent; the intelligentsia, 4 percent. Their educational backgrounds were as follows: elementary school, 18 percent, trade school, 80 percent; secondary education, 2 percent.

The question of whether they were assigned to military specialties consonant with their liking, interests, qualifications and predisposition, was answered affirmatively by 80 percent and negatively by 20.

The second question was: Has military service contributed to increasing civilian interests of the subjects and have they had any interests prior to their conscription into the army and during their military service? The findings were: prior to conscription: yes, 96 percent; no, 4 percent; during military service, yes, 98 percent; no, 2 percent. Seventeen percent of those polled acknowledged that their interests deepened while performing military service. Is this much or little? It appears that, in view of the possibilities and conditions provided in the army, this percentage could have been somewhat greater. This is not the principal topic of our study, but it appears worth stressing.

The question of whether the subjects felt fear and anxiety prior to their conscription for military service was answered affirmatively by 17 percent, with the remaining 83 percent feeling no fear.

Comparison with the findings of E. Olczyk and E. Staciwa, who obtained 20 and 80 percent, respectively, leads us to the conclusion that, in this respect, the situation is nearly the same as more than 10 years ago.

The sources of tension and anxiety in the period prior to conscription remain the same. They are fairly extensively described by the aforementioned investigators on page 73 of their work. However, these fears can be eliminated or at least minimized. This requires appropriate training of conscripts.

Young people look for information about life in the army, most often obtaining it from friends or acquaintances. In this way, they often meet with disappointment. They receive incomplete or distorted information. The "informers" simply sometimes frighten their friends in order to gain their admiration and recognition. Considering this, does the abundant information in this respect provided by the press, radio, television and other media completely fulfill its role? In

the light of our findings, an unequivocal answer is difficult. It appears that the need of young people for information about the army should be more completely satisfied than previously during the preconscription period. This information should transmit--starting in the school and continuing with the youth organizations and mass media--the true picture of military life.

Our studies show that 33 percent of the youth had adaptation problems. E. Olczyk and C. Staciwa specify this indicator at 47 percent. These difficulties were surmounted by 9 percent of servicemen during the first month of service, 10 percent during the second, 5 percent during the third, 3 percent during the fourth and 4 percent during the fifth.

For 30 percent with difficulties in adapting to the conditions of military life, the process of adaptation was completed in the fifth month of military service. But there still remain the 4 percent who failed to adapt after 1-1/2 years of military service. The causes of maladaptation are, as a rule, the influence of the civilian milieu, poor scholastic progress, conflicts with the law, and alcoholism.

Nine percent of the investigated conscripts did not mentally withstand the labors of military service and were discharged with reservist status, owing to disturbances of emotional equilibrium.

The principal factors hindering a young man's adaptation to military life are, according to E. Olczyk and C. Staciwa:

-- rigor-imposed restraints--54.5 percent;

-- new habits--40.3 percent;

-- unfamiliarity with military regulations--31.3 percent;

-- homesickness and longing for one's nearest and dearest--31 percent;

-- new environment--29.6 percent;

-- unsuccessful relations with immediate superiors--24.3 percent;

-- difficulty in mastering training material--12.1 percent;

-- relations among servicemen--7.6 percent;

-- the conviction that one cannot cope with the requirements--6.7 percent;*

Our studies, on the other hand, reveal the distribution of these factors as follows:

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*This finding is not summed up because the subjects could point to several causes. This also applies to subsequent comparisons.

-- new habits--60 percent;

-- new environment--33 percent;

-- unfamiliarity with military regulations--26 percent;

-- relations reigning among servicemen--23.3 percent;

-- homesickness and longing for one's nearest and dearest--16 percent;

-- rigor-imposed restraints--13 percent;

-- difficulty in mastering training material--3.3 percent;

-- unsuccessful relations with superiors--6.3 percent.

Compared with the findings of E. Olczyk and W. Staciwa, new habits and new environment are the most important factors hindering adaptation.

The changes in the relative importance of these factors stem from sociopolitical, cultural and educational changes. The conscripts display, moreover, an improved level of general knowledge, which facilitates adaptation. Of major importance also are the improved level of knowledge and better training of the professional military cadre, its approach to young servicemen, the generally good relations between superiors and subordinates and vice versa, the higher level of professional and general culture of the cadre, and the improved and better training facilities.

A still greater sensitization of educators and the entire professional cadre to the factors causing increased difficulties of adaptation would certainly contribute to minimizing this phenomenon.

Of the factors mentioned, one is particularly essential. This concerns the relations prevailing among servicemen. Informal relations of dependence among soldiers differing in age are, according to the findings, adverse to the introduction of youthful servicemen into the new environment. These relations cause problems in familiarization with military regulations and new habits.

We conclude from these findings that the situation regarding relations among servicemen is the same as before. What should be done to alter this situation? The older servicemen should be better prepared, or rather better and more broadly prepared, to help in the adaptation of the younger servicemen, as being done, for example, through the formation of adaptation teams within units of the Pomeranian Military District.

Generally speaking, our youths encounter no special problems in adapting themselves to new conditions. For example, consider that the question, "Are you satisfied that you have been conscripted to perform military service?" has been answered affirmatively by 58 percent of those polled and negatively by 16 percent. Of the remainder, 15 percent claimed that it did not matter to them either way; 11 percent did not answer the question. Thus, we see that only 16

percent clearly expressed dissatisfaction at being conscripted for military service. Here are the findings of E. Olczyk and C. Staciwa: yes, 48.2 percent; no, 26 percent; it does not matter to me, 22 percent; no answer, 2.9 percent.

This comparison indicates that, year after year, the young people entering our military service are increasingly more mature and responsible. This is also confirmed by the answers obtained to the question, "Have your attitudes, views and convictions changed in comparison with civilian life?" An affirmative answer was given by 63 percent of the subjects and a negative answer by 37 percent.

The changes in attitude, as explained by the subjects, were caused by the work of the commanders, 8 percent; disciplinary practice, 20 percent; training, 13 percent; environment, 20 percent; the work of party and youth organizations, 15 percent; no answer, 24 percent. The fairly high percentage of those giving no answer should be attributed to the unwillingness of some subjects to express their opinion.

To the next question, "What personality traits did you develop to most in the army?" we received the following answers:

-- resistance to discomfort--83 percent;

-- endurance in pursuing goals--36 percent;

-- accuracy of work--33 percent;

-- ability to live in the collective--30 percent;

-- greater discipline--20 percent;

-- truthful speaking--13 percent.

By contrast, the findings of Olczyk and Staciwa were:

-- reisstance to discomfort--44 percent;

-- greater discipline--37.7 percent;

-- accuracy of work--23 percent;

-- ability to live in the collective--22.2 percent;

-- endurance in pursuing goals--19 percent;

-- truthful speaking--14.2 percent.

It follows that young people have become more resistant to discomforts and more persistent in pursuing goals. To obtain a still clearer picture of the traits evolving in the subjects, an additional question was introduced: "Did you have conflicts in the army?" in civilian life?" Thirty-three percent of the respondents had conflicts in the army and 40 percent, in civilian life. Sixty and 60 percent, correspondingly, had no conflicts.

The causes and background of the conflicts were as follows:

-- insubordination toward parents and, in the army, toward superiors;

-- conflicts at place of work and [in the army] within the unit;

-- conflicts with friends in civilian life and with fellow servicemen in the army;

-- conflicts with siblings in civilian life and with fellow servicemen in the army;

-- conflicts against a social background in civilian life and in the army;

-- conflicts with teachers at school and superiors in the army;

-- participation in brawls in civilian life and lack of discipline in the army.

On the basis of this comparison and the interviews conducted, it can be stated that relatively permanent personality traits of the subjects are the cause of the conflicts that they experience in civilian life and in the army. The educational measures applied and the altered conditions of life have not fundamentally influenced a change in their behavior.

What educational and psychological measures should then be applied to assure a rapid and conflict-free adaptation of conscripts to new conditions? It is worth, first of all, to present the opinions of the subjects themselves, who pointed out that the attitudes of older soldiers toward younger ones should be radically changed (31.3 percent); living conditions and especially food--this concerns not quantity but greater variety of meals--should be improved (28.3 percent); there should be greater leisure time and cultural entertainment should be provided more often (24 percent); the period of military service should be shortened (10 percent); and the improper attitude of the professional cadre (especially of noncommissioned officers in the basic service) toward servicemen should be changed (6.3 percent).

Isolated comments also were noted concerning the need for a more varied tactical training, the unjust blaming of drivers for breakdowns of combat vehicles that occurred through no fault of their own, and the provision of a broader variety of premises and equipment for leisure-time use.

We are convinced that familiarity with these findings can markedly contribute to a shortening of the adaptation period; that is, to a better adjustment of young servicemen to the conditions of military service.

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CSO: 2600/448

COMMANDER, MILITARY POLITICAL ACADEMY, REVIEWS ITS ACHIEVEMENTS

Highlights of Activities

Warsaw RZECZPOSPOLITA in Polish 3 Feb 82 p 4

[Interview with Maj Gen Wladyslaw Polanski, commander, Military Political Academy, by Franciszek Januszkiewicz; date and place not given]

> [Text] "During the 30 years of its existence, our school has trained a great many political officers with high professional qualifications. They include 33 graduates with doctor habilitatus degrees, 347 graduates with doctoral degrees and 3,500 graduates with master's degrees. Nearly 9,000 political officers have completed various types of postgraduate work and long-term and short-term courses. This input of the academy into the development of the armed forces has been greatly esteemed by state authorities, who expressed their appreciation in the awarding of the Order of the Banner of Labor First Class by the Council of State of the PRL [Polish People's Republic] in 1971."

[Question] I have quoted a fragment from a long article written by you, Citizen General, which appeared in December 1981 in the monthly WOJSKO LUDOWE under the title "On the 30th Anniversary of the Military Political Academy." The quote testifies to the significant educational output of the academy. What were its beginnings?

[Answer] The academy opened in March 1951 as a higher military school for training the cadre of political officers and for aiding the ideological-upbringing activity of the military through academic endeavors. The early years of the 1950's were characterized by a growing atmosphere of cold war in the political-military sphere, climaxing in the armed confrontation of the United States with the young community of socialist states. The expression of this confrontation was the Korean War. Thus, the establishment of the Military Political Academy at that time was of great significance to the armed forces. It was a period of the revolutionary transformation of our country. The functions of the state and economic apparatus changed; social and ideological-political life underwent deep changes. The officers of the Polish military had to keep pace with these new processes. Without a doubt,

they needed in-depth, comprehensive humanistic and social training with a decided socialist ideological orientation based on Marxist-Leninist scientific methodology.

[Question] Citizen General, you have been the head of the academy for 10 years. How does it fit into the picture of higher military schooling? Whom does it train?

[Answer] The Polish military prepares officers in 11 military officers' schools, which train specialists in various military specializations in a 4-year cycle. The graduates of these schools attain the first rank of an officer--second lieutenant--and the professional title of engineer in the given professional-military specialization. Moreover, we train officers in five military academies. Three of these train secondary school graduates. They are the Military Technical Academy [WAT] on Warsaw, the Higher Naval School [WSMW] in Gdynia and the Military Medical Academy [WAM] in Lodz. On the other hand, the General Staff Academy [ASG] in Rembertow and the Military Political Academy [WAP] train graduates of 4-year higher officers' schools exclusively in a 3-year program of study. Studies at the academies conclude with an officer's promotion and the professional rank of master engineer (WAT and WSMW), medical doctor and master of pharmacy (WAM) and master of a given specialization (WAP and ASG).

[Question] Then 7 years of study is necessary at WAP before one is able to obtain a master's degree, while one receives this degree after 4 or 5 years in civilian schools. Is this reasonable?

[Answer] That is not quite accurate. An officer studying at WAP obtains his master's degree after 9 or 10 years of study. After studying for 4 years at the WSO [Higher Officers' School], he enters compulsory service in a military unit in leadership positions. Having gained the appropriate experience and having distinguished himself by his achievements in the service, he may then apply for the 3-year program of academic studies at WAP.

Is this a long time? Yes, I encounter this opinion quite often. However, WAP graduates not only obtain a master's degree in a specific field of specialization but at the same time become qualified in various ways to perform difficult professional duties in the military and beyond as well. A graduate of our academy attains the general military qualifications indispensable for a senior-ranking officer and moreover gains extensive political and pedagogical training. Every officer who graduates from WAP will be an educator of soldiers, a political advisor of officers, an organizer of sociopolitical life in military units and a social activist in civilian communities. He completes the entire master's program in his chosen field.

[Question] In what specializations does the WAP offer programs?

[Answer] One may obtain a master's degree at WAP in four specializations: pedagogy, political science, history and political economics. In these specializations, the academy may grant the scholarly degrees of doctor and doctor habilitatus. Thus, it is in the full sense of the word a humanistic-social school with full scholarly and pedagogical authorization.

[Question] The scholarly, moral and pedagogical level of the cadre attests to and essentially determines the quality of training. Who teaches at WAP?

[Answer] Our point of departure is the thesis of V. I. Lenin, who said that the real character and direction of a school are determined not by the good intentions of those who are studying, not by the study programs themselves, but by the team of instructors, which lends the school its ideological bent. Our school is a humanistic-social academy and a party institution. In order to offer good training it must be concerned about the high scholarly level of the cadre of academic teachers. At WAP 11 professors, 17 docent doctors habilitatus, 5 docent doctors and 74 doctors work. They all are officers. Moreover, we make use of constant cooperation with civilian teachers. Over a dozen of these are employed at WAP--from professors to doctors. We do not isolate ourselves within our own military circle. We profess the principle of the constant, dynamic flow of scientific thought between the military and civilian communities. Consequently, we organize joint scholarly and pedagogical seminars and conferences and we maintain constant scholarly cooperation with 62 scholarly institutions within Poland and with the military academies of Warsaw Pact states.

However, we do not only take--we give. Civilian scholarly workers earn the academic degrees of doctor and doctor habilitatus at WAP. We treat this as our duty to Polish scholarship. Our scholarly workers also work in several civilian schools, and not only in Warsaw, at PAN [Polish Academy of Sciences] and in scientific institutes.

We have one fatherland and one body of scholarship. We resolve scholarly and educational problems jointly with civilian schools, for the mutual good of all.

[Question] What political and ideological-moral values does WAP form in its graduates, and through them in the entire People's Polish Army [WP]?

[Answer] Commitment to ideology and principles in the implementation of the party program are unchanging qualities of a WP political officer, emanating from faith in the rightness of the program of socialist development of our fatherland. Patriotism is a fundamental trait of the WP and its officer corps. A significant part of this corps was trained at WAP, which honors the academy but also imposes upon it an especially great responsibility.

The basic characteristics of a political officer have always included, and continue to include, concern over the formation of the proper atmosphere in the community, sensitivity to human affairs, high personal culture, the union of word and deed, a sympathetic attitude to his surroundings and respect for human worth in every circumstance.

Today, when the armed forces has taken upon itself the obligation--along with all Poles motivated by good will--of leading our fatherland from its deepest moral and socioeconomic crisis since World War II, WAP alumni pass the test of reliability and efficiency in various positions in the military and outside it.

I am firmly convinced that they shall pass this test with honor for the glory of the fatherland.

Comments on Thirtieth Anniversary

Warsaw WOJSKO LUDOWE in Polish No 12, Dec 81 pp 36-41

[Article by Maj Gen Wladyslaw Polanski]

[Text] The date of 22 March 1981 marked the 30th anniversary of the creation of the Military Political Academy. A Senj law creating the academy conferred the rights and duties of a higher military school upon the new school. The legislators intended to create a new center for the training and improvement of cadres of political officers and at the same time a scientific research center providing theoretical support for ideological-educational activity in the armed forces. Several months later a decree by the chairman of the Council of Ministers gave the new school the name of Feliks Dzierzynski, eminent activist of the Polish and Russian workers' movement, close associate of Vladimir Lenin and one of the cocreators of the soviet state. This had the character of a symbol indicating the ideological direction of the new school.

The creation of an academic party-military school at the threshold of the 1950's was a manifestation of the concern of the state political leadership over increasing the defense potential of the country. The international situation, abounding in threats, necessitated this. The primary source of these threats was the American cold war policy, which led to numerous inflammatory situations. The sudden polarization of political-military forces occurred, the aggressive NATO pact arose and armed confrontation finally took place between the United States and the socialist camp in the Korean War.

International tension was the basic reason for the expansion of the Polish military. This was possible thanks to the implementation of a 6-year plan changing the face of our country from agricultural to industrial-agricultural. Military manpower time nearly doubled, along with the basic modernization of military armaments and technical equipment. New tasks in increasing defense potential required basic changes in the system of training officer's cadres, and likewise political officers. The Military Political Academy was created to implement this goal. The predecessors of the academy, the Central School for Political-Educative Officers in Lodz and the Higher School for Political-Educative Officers in Rembertow, could not fulfill these tasks under the new conditions.

The new school continued their work. It was founded upon the same ideological and educational assumptions but it implemented them under changed social conditions. It continued their goals, principles and methods of training but substantially enriched their contents. The fact that the school used the material and cadre base of its predecessors likewise facilitated its start.

The 30-year history of the Military Political Academy may be divided into three phases of development. These are marked by distinct structural

features and organizational changes in the school and in study programs. These were not instantaneous processes; they occurred gradually, thus expressing and helping to concretize the transformations in the sociopolitical training of the military within the framework of improving higher military schooling as a whole, as well as higher humanistic schooling in the country. The source and the causal force behind the process of improving higher schooling were the revolutionary transformations that our country was undergoing. These ushered in the necessity for substantial changes in the operation of state institutions, in the system of ideological-educational work and in the status and social functions of learning. Therefore, an analysis of the history of our school cannot be separated from the development of the sociopolitical situation of our country. We must note the basic tendencies underlying these transformations, together with the countradictions and failures which occurred in them.

If we adopt the conventional periods of the history of the academy, the first period falls between 1951 and 1957. This was the period of the creation of the programmatic and organizational framework of a single-faculty higher school, of the amassing of the indispensable learning experiences and of the completion and training of the scholarly teaching cadre.

The second period encompasses the years 1958 to 1977. The profile of studies took shape and a three-faculty school structure with specializations in pedagogy, history and economics was consolidated. A sort of symbiosis of study programs and teaching methods used by higher schooling occurred on the basis of the experience of the stormily developing military schooling. At the same time, this was the period of the maturation of the research-scholarly cadre.

The third period, since 1977, began with the reorganization of master's studies designated for the graduates of higher officers' schools. The study program was shortened to 3 years, the basic restructuring of programs of study took place and significant organizational changes were made.

As known, the scholarly-teaching cadre is a basic element of the activity of every school, a decisive factor in terms of its intellectual-ideological personality, its achievements and its authority. V. Lenin said that the real character and direction of a school are determined not by the good intentions of those who are studying, not by the study programs themselves but by the team of instructors, which lends the school its ideological bent. In light of this, let us define the characteristics of the phases of development of our academy during the 30 years of its existence.

The School and its Academic Workers

The scholarly-teaching cadres, who work together to determine the contents and directions of training and education and ensure the effective operation of the school, have developed and matured along with the school. The problem of cadre selection for the new scholarly institution was most difficult, as the leadership of the GZP [Main Political Directorate] of the WP [Polish Army] was aware. The armed forces had an officer's cadre with a wealth of

combat experience from war, from the class struggles of the interwar period and from the period of political and armed battles over the consolidation of the people's authority in the country. However, it was not a cadre, with few exceptions, with the proper theoretical training and preparation, capable of undertaking teaching-educational and scholarly work on the level of an academic institution. Nor was its commitment to work in a school employing civilian scholars possible, mainly because study programs differed significantly from university programs. For this reason, during the first period of the academy, emphasis was placed on the ideological-moral qualifications of cadres, their life experience and their military and social experience.

Thus, the major sources of recruitment for the teaching cadre became the Higher School for Political Officers in Lodz, which was expanded when the academy was created, and the General Staff Academy, in operation since 1974. Since 1954, graduates of the academy's own 3-year programs of academic studies gradually reinforced the academy's teaching cadre. The best of these remained at the academy in positions of instructors. A considerable number of these candidates for scholarly positions at the academy simultaneously began master's studies and then doctoral studies at such institutions as Warsaw University, the Main School of Planning and Statistics, the PAN Institute of History and other academic centers. Many people continue to work at the academy profitably and effectively, holding leadership positions. These include Colonel Gchocki, Colonel Sobczak, Colonel Grabowski, Colonel Pirko, Colonel Michalik, Colonel Borgosz, Colonel Leczyk and many others.

Under the conditions of the time, the cadre's efforts concentrated on improving the teaching process and the programs of study from the experiential viewpoint and on satisfying the needs of party-political work in the armed forces. During this period the teaching foundations of military-social scientific disciplines gradually took shape; their full development took place during the following years. In conjunction with the teaching needs of the institution, during the first period of its existence, 154 articles and 25 duplicated lectures were published. The methodology of ideological-political training in the armed forces, of contemporary history and of current problems of party policy dominated in these publications.

Clearly the academy's achievements were still meager. However, they were of great significance for the further development of military schooling, since this was a period when the assumptions and directions of training were elaborated. From its beginning, our school has imparted important, comprehensive assistance to this field of schooling.

It is no exaggeration that the teaching cadre of the academy has always been characterized on the one hand by its ambitious aim of raising the level of its academic qualifications and on the other by its constant contact with the political and ideological-upbringing practice of the armed forces and the entire country. These are the traits that we wish to instill today in young academy faculty as well. These characteristics have had a great influence on the directions and the results of the teaching and research work of the school; they have also enabled its work to give considerable support to military practice and to bear fruit here. For example, let us mention the

active participation of the scholarly cadre as lecturers or as overall supervisors of ideological-upbringing work in units. The academy has also maintained lively contact with the work forces of large plants in Warsaw, as well as with many rural centers within the Warsaw and Bialystok Voivodships. For many years, have cooperated closely with the work force of the Stalowa Wola Works, as well as with the Scientific-Production Center of Light Aircraft of the PZL [Polish Aviation Plants] in Warsaw. This cooperation is profitable for both sides. Our cadre actively takes part in many political campaigns, such as propaganda campaigns associated with party congresses and, more precisely, in all events of a political and ideological nature.

The second period of the academy's existence, after October 1956, was ushered in with a heated discussion within the school community over the organizational structure and study profile. The program of studies had to be adapted to the needs of the changing organization and technical equipping of the military and the growing requirements of ideological-upbringing work among soldiers, whose general preparation, cultural level and social maturity had grown considerably. Consequently, the need arose and became manifested for giving academic studies a direction that would provide genuine theoretical knowledge in political and military history, military pedagogy, psychology, sociology, as well as general tactics and operational arts but above all would acquaint students with the theory and methodology of party-political work. Consequently, this was a period of the creation of new academic disciplines needed by the military and defining the character of the school. It was also necessary to train the skills for applying the knowledge acquired in educational practice in units.

The reorganization of studies carried out in 1957 introduced a uniform 5-year, and then 4-year program of study at the master's level, implemented in two faculties: pedagogical and historical. In 1961, the Military Institute arose at WAP and existed a few years. During this period correspondence study programs were organized, postgraduate studies were broadened and short-term courses for the political apparatus of the military were developed extensively. In 1966, the Economic-Military Faculty was opened. A year later, the Social Research Center arose. Before long this was transformed into the Social Research Institute, fulfilling the extremely vital functions in research and expertise serving decisionmaking of the GZP and the leadership of the ministry. In 1970, the Military Economic Institute was opened at the Faculty of Economic Sciences. Its activity concentrated around problems of efficiency of the military economy and defense planning. Thus, during this period the organizational structure of the school took shape. With certain modifications, this basic structure remains.

New program solutions and new academic disciplines have required greater dependence upon civilian academic employees in teaching and scholarly research. Considerable help in this field has been rendered to the academy by Warsaw University which has commissioned many academic workers to serve in our school, assuming positions as deans or department heads. With gratitude we recall the names of professors who are no longer living: Wolinski, Serbat, Paslerbinski and Krzeski.

The following professors have rendered, and in many cases continue to render, great assistance to the academy: Legowicz, Bazylow, Szczepanski, Nowacki, Wiatr, Okon, Szczerba. They have contributed genuine knowledge to our academic community and continue to do so, helping to raise the level of teaching and inspiring subjects of scientific research. Bolstering the school community with such a large body of civilian academicians has had a considerable influence on advancing the process of raising the scholarly didactic qualifications of the cadre. It has likewise created conditions for the academy's earning the right to confer doctoral degrees in history, pedagogy and psychology and, since 1966, doctor habilitatus degrees in historical sciences and military training.

The Teaching-Educational Process and Research Efforts

As a result of these achievements, conditions were created at the academy for undertaking broadly conceived scholarly research. In 1967, a 3-year plan for such activity arose. In 1980, the implementation of a second 5-year plan of scholarly research was completed. The major directions of research concerned problems of the personality of the political officer, the effectiveness of ideological-upbringing work, the effect of historical experiences on the process of shaping the socialist consciousness of the nation, the character of the contemporary ideological struggle, selected questions of Polish history and the international workers' movement, World War II and the history of the People's Polish Army.

A well-integrated system of scholarly research was developed at the academy. Questions of the needs of ideological-upbringing practice in the military, the teaching process at the academy and higher officers' schools and, finally, raising the level of qualifications of the academic cadre, are in the foreground. The subject of the efforts made in 1972 toward doctoral studies, both on campus and by correspondence, has likewise been researched. These endeavors have stepped up the process of the earning of academic qualifications by the teaching cadre of higher officers' schools.

Today, the academic achievements of WAP employees are published in numerous publications, both domestic and foreign. They are presented at national and international scholarly symposiums and conferences. The names of the representatives of our professorial staff are well known and highly regarded in Polish scholarship; they enjoy respect and command authority in the armed forces.

A large group of academy employees actively participates in the work of the councils of numerous research institutes, PAN committees and schools and in the publication of scholarly journals. We maintain close and constant contact with 62 Polish academic institutions. We also cooperate closely with the military academies of the socialist countries of the Warsaw Pact. We exchange teaching experiences, we organize joint scholarly conferences, we undertake joint research, we exchange research assistants to our mutual advantage and we strive toward temporary instructor exchanges.

We esteem especially the cooperation and assistance provided us from the beginning of our academy's existence by the Lenin Military Political

Academy in Moscow. This was, especially at the beginning, comprehensive assistance regarding the cadre and programs. Later in the development of WAP, this cooperation was expressed the exchange of teaching and academic experiences, as well as by the systematic visits of student delegations studying on their campus.

During the 30 years of the academy's existence, the academic cadre has gained in strength. Currently it includes 11 professors, 17 docent doctors habilitatus, 5 docent doctors and 74 doctors. It is a military cadre that earned its academic qualifications at the academy, a cadre that makes use of a wealth of military experience, is ideologically seasoned and identifies with the academy and the calling of political officer; it is a cadre with high ideological-moral and theoretical qualifications. But since we do not wish to retire into our own military shell, the academy employs over a dozen professors and doctors habilitatus, civilian academic employees, on a permanent basis. This is of tremendous significance for our profiting from the teaching experience gained in civilian schooling, it enriches academic work at the academy and it provides intellectual stimulation toward improving all spheres of operation of our school.

Our Students

The reform of study programs carried out in 1977 opens the third period of the academy's development. After 25 years of experience, the academy entered its mature period. Now candidates for study are graduates of higher officers' schools, primarily in political science. The 3-year program of master's studies is conducted in three faculties: pedagogical science; political science, which grew from the former history faculty with a specialization in the area of historical and political science; and economic science. These faculties train future political officers, military economists and specialists in the field of defense planning. Thus, today the academy possesses three directions of on-campus study, encompassing six specializations.

The program of studies includes subjects indispensable for the work of every political officer, as well as requirements for the master's degree in the particular specializations: pedagogy, political science, history and political economy. Approximately 65 percent of the hours in the plan of studies in particular faculties are designed to increase military-pedagogical qualifications and the practical skill of directing party-political work in units. In this way, regardless of the direction of study, the educational process shapes the homogeneous silhouette of the political officer.

The new generation of students, graduates of higher officers' schools, differs considerably from the academy students of former years. From 1951 to 1956, the vast majority were political officers with a great deal of life and military experience. They came with essentially the same credentials as the academic cadre of the school. Most had participated in war; they had taken part in struggles to liberate the country, serving in regular units or in partisan units. Many had entered the military through the so-called party recruitment undertaken through the initiative of the PPR [Polish

Workers' Party] in 1944. They likewise included graduates of SKOR [Reserve Officer Cadet School?] called into professional military service. Despite certain weaknesses in their general preparation for undertaking studies, they brought to their work at the school attitudes of party commitment, sincere interest in learning and a sense of ideological-moral fellowship between students and instructors. Many graduates of those years now occupy leadership positions in the military party-political apparatus.

During the second period, particularly from 1958 to 1967, graduates of the Political Officers' School in Lodz predominated at WAP. These were officers who most often had volunteered for military service and made the choice of a military profession from a sense of conviction. Before entering the military, a considerable number of them had actively worked in the ranks of the ZMW [Rural Youth Union] or the ZMP [Polish Youth Union]. After completing their studies, these students applied themselves well to ideological-educative work in military units; they became sterling leaders of soldiers' groups and tried and tested directors of ideological-educative work. Today they make up the nucleus of the senior cadre of military political officers.

Since 1967, officers in active service retrained for the political apparatus have begun to predominate among students. Quite often, these have been comrades selected for positions of party committee secretaries in military units. After a stint of several years in party work, they found their life's calling in it. Their preparation was based primarily on self-education; hence in their studies they had certain difficulties in the mastery and systematizing of the broad issues of social knowledge. However, they were sincerely interested in learning.

The new generation of students has a broader and more fundamental socio-historical and political preparation, to which 46 percent of their total class time has been devoted during WSO [Higher Officers' School]. These are officers with inquiring minds, intellectual competency and broad social and cultural interests. Generally, they are well prepared practically for their profession, partly because of the year of practical experience that they receive as platoon commanders following their 3rd year of studies, which is combined with their acting as temporary deputy company commanders for political affairs. Before they embark on their studies, they have at least 2 years of experience as political instructors for battalions or deputy commanders for political affairs. Thus, they are political officers by choice, by conviction and by preparation. Their relative youth and their good military and theoretical preparation place them in good stead for undertaking studies, for deepening their socioprofessional knowledge and for earning the qualifications of political officer.

The Personality of the Political Officer

In the development of our school, there was the gradual development of the foundations for formulating the goal of training and educating the graduate as a model personality, corresponding to the social conditions of the political officer's work. This model is expressed in such documents as the model postulated for an officer of our military, the principles and procedure of cadre operation and the principles of ethics of an [LWP] People's Polish

Army soldier. Although the personality model of the political officer is constructed as an ideal, it is a projection of the stipulated personality traits, not an optimal creation. On the one hand, it takes into consideration the real attitudes of the average group of officers and their personality traits as they are presented now and as they have accumulated and developed in the course of the 30-year history of the military. On the other hand, it includes synthetic knowledge concerning the role of the political officer in our army and the associated tasks, whose dependable fulfillment requires specific qualifications, particularly ideological and moral qualifications.

As known, an outstanding individual who completely corresponds to the ideal does not exist. Despite this, the ideal plays a practical role. It represents a basis for evaluating people, it encourages self-evaluation and the perfecting of one's actions and it is at once a source and an instrument of education--which is specially important for party-military schools.

Although every stage of social development--including in the armed forces--makes new demands on the political officer, enriching his personality model with new qualities, a constant feature of the political officer's personality during the entire history of LNP has been, and continues to be, the commitment to ideology and principle in the implementation of the party program, emanating from faith in the theoretical veracity and the moral rectitude of the socialist ideology. In the current sociopolitical situation of our country, which is unusually complex and full of tension, the properties of the style and operational methods of the political officer include their high marks for skill in maintaining direct and constant contact with the military community and their frank, sincere unhesitating discussion of all the social and political problems plaguing this community. Objectivity, rationalism and high qualifications are the properties that increase respect for the political officer, build his authority and build confidence in him. Today those officers are highly appreciated who, adhering to principles, objectively, without bombast and phraseology, without being argumentative, present the rights of the party and the people's government, patiently and calmly know how to explain the complexity of the political situation in the country and, against this background, the role and tasks of our armed forces.

A necessary condition for such an operational style for the political officer is basic Marxist-Leninist knowledge, the skill to use this knowledge in daily work as well as the execution of a critical analysis of social phenomena and the anticipation of developmental trends.

The engineering fundamental qualities of the political officer include concern over the formation of the proper atmosphere in the community, sensitivity to human affairs, high personal culture, the unity of word and deed, a sympathetic attitude to his surroundings and respect for human worth in every circumstance.

We consider the formation of these values in the education to be an important, basic goal of the training and education of students. Educational results in this direction require not only the selection of the appropriate contents and teaching methods; this goal may be attained only in an atmosphere of mutual

trust and respect of teachers and students. This partnership assumes the active participation of students; it demands their independent intellectual efforts and the teacher's individualized approach to them. This means creating study conditions to enable each student to work, making maximum use of his intellectual potential.

The methodological basis of molding the personality of the political officer during his studies is the unity of teaching, training and scholarly research. In this dialectical unity, we treat training as the most important element. It lends this process an ideological direction and represents the main source of student activism. Not only does teaching serve cognitive goals but it supports and enriches the contents of training. Learning tasks conducted by the cadre and, to a lesser extent, by students in academic circles teach independent thought, train intellectual curiosity and are a theoretical check of the level of preparation for work in units.

The entire wealth of forms of party work cultivated at the school has the purpose of strengthening the unity of teaching, training and scholarly research by setting high moral requirements for party members, ideological commitment and a sense of duty and responsibility for the state and continued development of the academy as well.

During the 30 years of its existence, our school has trained a great many political officers with high professional qualifications. They include 33 graduates with doctor habilitatus degrees, 347 graduates with doctoral degrees and 3,500 graduates with master's degrees. Nearly 9,000 political officers have completed various types of postgraduate work and long-term and short-term courses. This input of the academy into the development of the armed forces has been greatly esteemed by state authorities, who expressed their appreciation in the awarding of the Order of the Banner of Labor First Class by the Council of State of the PRL in 1971.

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On the 30th anniversary of WAP, in March 1981 we held a ceremonial meeting of the academy's academic council. The purpose of this meeting was neither the formal recognition of the anniversary nor the creation of circumstances for boasting of the school's achievements. Sensing the worth of what we have created with our joint efforts over the 30 years and our own potential, we are well aware of the many weaknesses of our work and the numerous limitations in the development of the school. Above all, we are aware of the needs of the military and society and our academic, political and ideological tasks emanating from these needs. The strength indispensable for fulfilling these tasks will be born of the recollection of the road that we have traveled and of the joint achievements of the school, just as familiarity with the progressive tradition of the nation and its military and the conviction of the rightness of the socialist social program enhance this strength.

Our anniversary has come at a particularly difficult and trying period in the life of the country. The continuing sociopolitical situation is the

subject of deep concern at our school. We observe the events taking place with alarm. Since the beginning, however, we have been able to distinguish between the forces of the socialist process of renewal and the forces that ride the righteous wave of workers' protest against corruption in social life, aspiring to implement their own, essentially antisocialist, goals. Our military and, together with it, our school arose thanks to the party and under its leadership. It maintains close fellowship with it and is imbued with a sense of responsibility to serve the cause of the nation, socialism and the party faithfully and steadfastly. We are facing numerous threats endangering our national security. For this reason, we consider it our duty to take the offensive against the ideological diversion of Western centers as well as to repel the attacks of antisocialist forces menacing the basic assumptions of our system and its fundamental political and ideological principles. We are on the side of all who combine their desire for the socialist renewal of the fatherland with an absolute dismissal of forces interested in creating anarchy and instability in social life, in fomenting tension and sowing unrest and in negating the past achievements of People's Poland.

A political struggle is being waged in our country. It is decisive and requires knowledge, fortitude, courage and political skill. It demands a tremendous mobilization of attitudes. The real values of people are revealed in this struggle. Socialism must emerge stronger from this battle. The problems confronting socialist renewal must be overcome in accordance with the principles of law-abidingness and socialist democracy. No one may be permitted to disrupt this process.

We have confirmed our ideological-moral maturity and our faithfulness to the party many times in the 30-year history of our school. Today we are likewise ready to execute every sort of task required of us in defense of socialism.

KIELCE VOIVODSHIP PARTY PLENUM HELD

Plenum Agenda

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 18 Jan 82 pp 1, 3

[Text] Last Saturday, a plenary session of the PZPR Voivodship Committee in Kielce took place, devoted to a discussion of the tasks of the voivodship party organization in the present socio-political situation. The deliberations took place in the presence of Prof Marian Orzechowski, secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, and Kazimierz Matwiejuk, plenipotentiary of the PZPR Central Committee in the Kielce Voivodship, as well as members of WKR and WKKP Presidiums, first secretaries of local and plant party echelons and heads of regional centers for party work.

In his inaugural address, the first secretary of the Kielce Voivodship PZPR Committee, Maciej Lubczynski, declared that under the current martial law what counts most is the duration and effectiveness of the work of every party member. We should do everything to assure the rapid implementation of the just proposals and resolutions adopted at present and at the previous plenary meetings. Following 13 December of last year the voivodship-level party echelon has not ceased directing the work of party organizations and setting tasks in the course of regional meetings and deliberations of the aktiv. Today's plenum should revise the scope of these tasks and determine the ways of implementing them fully and as rapidly as possible.

Organizational matters were discussed by the secretary of the PZPR Voivodship Committee [WK], Marian Surma, who presented information on the self-declared attitudes of the members of voivodship party authorities. Following a brief discussion on the proposal of the executive board of the PZPR KW, the plenum relieved two members of the PZPR KW of their functions. Membership of the KW Commission for Political Work in Youth Milieus was changed and the Commission for Women's Affairs was appointed.

The PZPR KW plenum unanimously appointed Jaroslaw Motyka, director of the Faculty of Agriculture, Food Economy and Forestry at UW [Kielce Voivodship Office] to the vacancy on the executive board and to the post of secretary for social and agricultural affairs at the Voivodship Committee. (A brief biography of Comrade Motyka is published elsewhere in this issue.)

During the program, a report of the executive board of the PZPR KW on "Tasks of the Voivodship Party Organization in the Present Sociopolitical Situation" was presented by the secretary of the party KW, Marian Surma.

Eighteen participants in the plenum took part in the discussions. It was concluded with a speech by the secretary of the PZPR Central Committee, Marian Orzechowski.

After listening to the discussions, the Kielce PZPR KW unanimously adopted a resolution outlining the specific tasks facing the party echelons and organizations of the Kielce area in the current sociopolitical situation.

After the deliberations, the first secretary of the PZPR KW, Maciej Lubczynski, pointed to the need for all party members to identify themselves with its program and objectives. "It is important for us to listen to the voice of the workers and carry out their directives and expectations. After all, we in our party are the advance guard of the working class. While solemnly celebrating the upcoming 37th anniversary of the liberation of our cities and countryside, we should dwell in our thoughts on the program and accomplishments of our predecessor, the Polish Workers Party. We should utilize its experience and achievements in the present difficult period of restoring to the party its forcefulness of action, political authority and position within the working class and the entire society."

Executive Board Report

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 18 Jan 82 p 3

[Text] The sociopolitical and economic situation of this country following August 1980 and the steady growth of the factors deepening the crisis so tangibly felt by the entire society led to a grave threat to the state late last year.

The efforts of the authorities to alleviate the consequences of the crisis proved ineffective owing to the uncompromising actions of forces hostile to socialism. The structures and organs of the state were ceasing to function, the national economy was collapsing and the living conditions of the population were becoming increasingly difficult.

Internal division within the nation was growing as a result of the incessant stoking of hatred of the authorities, provocation of conflicts, and the organization of all kinds of protest actions and strikes as well as appeals for physical violence against party members and elimination of the party from labor establishments.

At the manufacturing plants, including those in the Kielce area, interpersonal relations steadily worsened, the process of weakening the authority of the management personnel and technical supervisors deepened, discipline grew loose and labor productivity declined. Tensions and conflicts in other milieus also grew, especially at Kielce schools, where they ultimately manifested themselves in a strike by part of the students and the teaching cadre. In the Kielce countryside private farmers began to renege on their contracts to sell agricultural produce to the state.

This was accompanied by an escalation of actions by the Independent Self-Governing Trade Union (NSZZ) Solidarity, especially by its extremist activists who intended to intensify social tensions and weaken the economy and authority of the state. They consistently continued hostile propaganda actions. At some labor establishments, perfidious plans for physical violence against the party were even prepared, as reflected in the intentions to form groups armed with sticks, helmets, sharp-edged weapons, etc., ironically termed "workers' militia."

Martial Law as the Supreme Necessity

In face of the growing threat of the loss of statehood, confrontation and bloodshed, and after the authorities had exhausted all possibilities for national agreement, the decree of 12 December 1981 of the Council of State introduced martial law in the country. The first moves by the Military Council of National Salvation [WRON] established 13 December, including the internment of a group of the most dangerous individuals, effectively foiled the implementation of adventurist plans.

As throughout the entire country, the people of our voivodship at first responded with great anxiety to the declaration of martial law, expressing particular fears that events might lead to a national disaster, as well as hopes that the authorities would not abandon initiated reforms and the process of renewal. Gradually, though, people began to realize the justice of such radical measures with the object of normalizing the situation in the country.

This is evidenced by the fact that in the Kielce Voivodship during this period there have not been any major incidents, except sporadic attempts to foment confusion (e.g., at the foundry in Charsznica and at KZWP). An actual strike was organized only at two departments of the M. NOWOTKO Steel Plant in Ostrowiec, by several radical Solidarity activists. In an already difficult situation on 14 December, the conflict was resolved solely by political methods, without force.

More than a month has passed since the introduction of martial law. We observe in all milieus an increase in social and work discipline, an improved implementation of plan tasks, and greater operativeness of managerial and supervisory cadres. The performance of trade and supply services has improved despite continuing difficulties. Negative phenomena such as violations of law, speculation, waste of public property, crime and parasitism are being combatted with increasing effectiveness. The public has responded with gratification to the introduction of the decree of the [universal] duty of work by the Council of Ministers.

The Party Is Regaining Strength

The voivodship party organization is slowly beginning to regain its strength and aggressiveness. A uniform front of action and support for party authorities could be created in our voivodship, which undoubtedly facilitated tackling new tasks. For their efforts so far and for their truly communist attitude, we address to these comrades our ardent acknowledgment and gratitude.

In many party organizations, we observe increased activity of the executive boards. The KZ's [factory committee] and OOP's [department party organizations] of the party evaluated the sociopolitical situation in their plants and, on this basis,

adopted targets for the current work of POP [basic party organizations] and OOP. Tasks for individual party members are assigned in an inadequate manner.

Various initiatives are being undertaken to enhance the importance and authority of OOP and party-organization secretaries in the milieus of their operation. For example, at the Iskra FLT [Roller Bearings Factory] the KZ secretariat conducted talks from this standpoint with all production department heads and OOP secretaries to specify tasks for administrative and political guidance. At the [party] organizations of the larger labor establishments, the frequency and attendance at meetings improved markedly. However, this process is still too slow and does not extend to all party members, especially in rural organizations, from which we receive alarming messages that some of them have major problems in organizing party meetings.

Action is underway to purge the party of persons who are vacillating, deficient in ideology or have been susceptible to the antiparty propaganda of Solidarity. The process of attitude-declaration by party-authority members at all levels who belong to NSZZ Solidarity is ending.

From 13 December 1981 through 9 January 1982, the following took place within the Kielce Voivodship party organizations:

--583 persons have been deleted from the PZPR membership roster, with the largest proportion, 126, associated with the strike at the M. NOWOTKO Plant;

--132 persons have been expelled from the party, including 99 from the M. NOWOTKO Plant;

--107 party reprimands and reminders were administered, of which most--84--were in Ostrowiec;

--9 party organizations have been disbanded;

--169 party membership cards have been surrendered, with most--50--in Kielce, followed by 13 in Ostrowiec, 9 in Sitkowka-Nowiny and 8 in Skarzysko.

Since the purge has not been completed, conclusions should be drawn in an especially deliberate manner regarding workers but strictly regarding the managerial and supervisory cadres, etc.

The executive boards of party echelons at all levels and KZ are reviewing and evaluating managerial and party cadres and, in justified instances, drawing appropriate conclusions. For example, the general directors of the Malogoszcz Cement Plant, the Kielce Paper Products Plant and the Kielce PRELBUD have been instantly recalled through an emergency procedure, as has been the director for commercial affairs at the NOWINY ZCW [Cement-Limestone Works]. Others to be recalled were four gmina heads, nine chairmen and directors of the Voivodship Union of Agricultural Circles and Organizations [WZKOiR]; eight chairmen, deputy chairmen and directors of the Voivodship Union of Agricultural Cooperatives [WZSR]; three chairmen of agricultural producer cooperatives; three chairmen of housing construction cooperatives; and the head of the State Social Assistance Home for Adults.

in a situation more difficult than ever, the party must rebuild its authority and regain the trust of the broad masses of the public, especially the working class. This requires that the party regain cohesiveness, unity and militancy while at the same time eliminating any symptoms of internal weakening and ideological vacillation.

Everyday activities require tight discipline and flexibility assuring the full implementation of party tasks. It is up to us how we will utilize the interim period of martial law to rebuild normal functioning of the party and effectiveness and operation of action of all its echelons and basic organizations. Activities should be so organized that the work force, working people of all milieus, would feel that the party is needed, that it deals with their life problems and that it is their party.

Party Members to Provide Example at Work

A crucial task ensuing from the difficult economic situation is to intensify actions to increase production, especially to meet the needs of the market and agriculture. Inspiration and persuasion alone are not enough to achieve this goal. Every party member should provide an example through model fulfillment of working duties. The personal commitment of party members should manifest itself not only at their places of work and at party meetings. They should worthily represent the party in any situation and demonstrate readiness to participate actively in the solution of difficult problems.

In connection with economic reform and the possibility of all kinds of complications and tensions during the initial period of reform, the party organizations should inspire and activize the operations of plant economic reform teams, especially in such fields as the range and cost of production, employment and price issues, organization, labor productivity, etc.

A task of primary importance to party echelons and organizations in rural communities is to contribute to the most rapid possible completion of the organization of social welfare commissions at labor establishments. The suspension of trade union activities should not be allowed to affect the state of social services for the work force adversely.

In the current activities of the party echelons and organizations in rural communities, a basic task is to contribute to an efficient and full implementation of the regulations ensuing from the martial law decree of the Council of State and the appeal of WRON to Polish farmers. This should result in the complete fulfillment by farmers of their obligation to deliver farm produce in accordance with procurement contracts and to enter new contracts for deliveries soon. In the publicity campaign conducted jointly with ZSL [United Peasant Party] as well as in talks with individual farmers, emphasis should be placed on pointing to the community of interests of agricultural producers with the interests of society as a whole, as well as to the economic interrelationship and independence of town and country, cities and villages.

In the whole of political work in the villages, priority is given to strengthening the party's forces. Some rural party organizations have recently been inactive and have not held any meetings for several months. Within such organizations

the party members should be verified [for loyalty] as soon as possible and the normal functioning of POP should be resumed, also as soon as possible. In justified cases, the possibility of disbanding a given organization and transferring its members to another should also be considered. It is becoming necessary for party organizations to achieve greater influence on the socioeconomic life of rural communities. In ideological-educational activities, attention should be paid to creating a climate of support by rural inhabitants for the organs of the authorities and for the decisions that they take.

The party should place under its special care the ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] and ZMW [Union of Rural Youth] youth organizations. Their social and work initiatives and cultural activities should be supported, and greater commitment to solving the current problems of the rural milieu should be demonstrated.

Larceny and Disorganization Should Not be Tolerated

Within all party elements it is necessary to continue morale-building and monitoring activities so as to combat resolutely and effectively negative social phenomena, especially waste of property, mismanagement, speculation and the underground economy. Wherever necessary, party organizations should initiate the formation of civil defense detachments to support the activities of the army and militia in maintaining law and order.

There is a need for continuing current evaluation of the political attitude and operating efficiency of the management cadres at enterprises, institutions and territorial economic administration agencies and to propose on this basis changes in justified cases. We should resolutely put an end to any informal agreements and cronyism as well as combat conformist attitudes, special privileges and private interests. At the same time it is necessary to tackle the problem of training a management-cadre reserve that would be ready as needed to replace the current managers immediately.

In the whole of the party's activities, ideological, propaganda and information work is of unusually great importance. If it is to produce the expected results, the party aktiv must strengthen their ties with the large numbers of persons directly at working posts--both with party members and with non-party members. Only thus is it possible to shape healthy attitudes of people and to eliminate from their consciousness lying slogans and a distorted image of the party and authorities as well as of the nation's development prospects. Special emphasis must be placed on pointing to the guarantees that, despite the restrictions it imposes, the state of martial law provides for continuing the socialist line of renewal, socioeconomic reforms and democratization of the country's life.

In the course of everyday party work, the broadest possible public should be made aware of the gravity of the situation and legal obligations ensuing from the state of martial law, as well as of the fact that the rapid restoration of tranquility, stabilization of the economy and shortening of the martial law period hinge on the attitude of all citizens.

For a Greater Civic Consciousness and Political Culture

All party echelons and plant committees must intensify training and propaganda work on adapting programs to actual needs. In view of the complex political situation in the cultural, scientific and educational communities, there is a need to devote special attention to the work of the party organizations active in these communities. The chief emphasis should be placed on winning the members of these communities over to the party's policy and activities, shaping an appropriate political atmosphere and assuring the proper functioning of regular and higher schools and educational institutions. The verification of the attitudes of teachers and lecturers at higher schools and of the effectiveness of performance of party committees within the cultural and educational communities should be completed as soon as possible.

The activities of party organizations in the journalistic community also should be more aggressive. It is necessary to infer the proper conclusions from the recent verification of attitudes of individual members of that community. We must be certain that editorial staffs consist of persons who accept the program and policy of the party, do not support opposition political programs and take an unequivocal position against political adversaries.

It is an unusually important task to intensify political-educational work with the youth. Plant and community party organizations should extend their political activities to young people who do not belong to any association and recruit the most valuable individuals for membership in socialist youth unions. We should contribute to the strengthening of the ideological and political unity of the youth movement and the development of cooperation among youth organizations. The ZSMP should be supported in its efforts to broaden its influence on young workers, and especially on those attending schools attached to labor establishments.

The school party committees should devote special attention to ideological-educational work with the youth. The party's influence on women's and veterans' organizations and creative, economic and technical associations should be systematically expanded. Cooperation with the allied political parties--the United Peasants Party and the Democratic Party--in implementing common political, social and economic goals of consolidating all forces to surmount the crisis should be heightened.

To ensure fulfillment of the tasks facing the party, an important role is played by party commissions under party echelons. Their current morale-building and monitoring activities should be markedly intensified and extended to various domains of public life.

An essential role in organizing party work within local government agencies is to be assigned to the recently established regional centers of party work. This poses before the apparatus of the voivodship committee the task of providing these centers with far-reaching personnel and emergency assistance.

All political activities waged by all party elements should be subordinated to the paramount goal of achieving a national consensus favorable to the full implementation of the socialist program for the renewal of life and rescue of the

country from its crisis. Party echelons and organizations should actively participate in the formation of Civic Committees of National Salvation [OKONs], which should arise in labor establishments, institutions, cities, gminas and villages. Persons enjoying great authority with in their occupational milieus as well as deputies, councilors, reserve officers and the aktiv of sociopolitical organizations should be recruited for the work of these committees. In their everyday activities, the party echelons and organizations should organize broad public support for the WRON's program, participate in the fulfillment of the tasks posed by the WRON and closely cooperate with plenipotentiaries and commissioners of committees for national defense.

The current year confronts us with great, responsible and difficult tasks of political work. In implementing these tasks, let us always bear in mind the public comments of Comrade Wojciech Jaruzelski, uttered on 13 December last year:

"Despite the mistakes made and bitter defeats, the party continues to be an active and creative force in the process of historical changes. In order to exercise its leadership mission effectively and cooperate fruitfully with its allied forces, it must base itself on righteous, modest and courageous people--on those who in any community would serve the name of soldiers for social justice, for national welfare. This will primarily decide the party's authority among the nation. Such are the party's prospects."

Discussions by Delegates

Kielce SLOWO LUDU in Polish 18 Jan 82 p 4

[Text] Tadeusz Kowalski, PZPR Voivodship Committee secretary

The exercise of its leading role by the Marxist-Leninist party is directly linked to its cadre policy. This is precisely why our cadre and the party's presence in plants had been attacked so ferociously. Many directors and managers repulsed these attacks with a resoluteness worthy of esteem, the more so considering that they had no one to rely on for assistance. But also some had submitted for self-serving purposes, as well as--worse even--some serving our enemies. Then different party-organization bosses displayed different attitudes, including an unresisting abandonment of cadre policy. But sometimes cadre policy could be implemented with our participation in accordance with the provisions of the decree of the enterprise and workers' self-government. These latter party organizations enjoy authentic authority.

We must learn to select cadres through competition. Here a proper evaluation system is important.

We have been devoting great attention to the issue of workers' self-government, viewing it as a pillar of the social and economic reform underway. We regard workers' self-government as a complement of democratic rule, whereas the creators of the self-governing "Polish Commonwealth" had viewed it as a tool for their political machinations.

The trade union movement has been suspended, but we must be conscious of its future--which we will begin to shape even now. One thing is certain: It shall not be utilized for political purposes and it may not take a position hostile to our party.

We should attach tremendous importance to the work of the social [welfare] commissions, which offer room for action by genuine trade unionists and civic leaders regardless of the association to which they belonged, but which decisively excludes political mischiefmakers.

The engineer and economist intelligentsia stands at a crossroads. Its views influence the entire work force. We must pose to the intelligentsia the tasks of popularizing the reform and the activities relating to streamlining production. It may become necessary to alter the nomenclature of production and relocate the work force on a large scale. All these matters should be known to the plant directors and party organizations as well as to the economic agencies of local authorities.

The fundamental behest of the party is to work with the working class. This is the healthiest class in our society and, if party work is committed and consistent, we can gain the confidence of that class much more rapidly than that of other strata of society.

The immediate future will be decisive to us. The regulation of retail prices and the introduction of new economic principles are not creating a favorable atmosphere. Rescuing the country from the crisis will be done at a certain cost. We do care as to who will bear that cost and that is why we protect the lower wage-earners. We will introduce the reform in spite of martial law and in spite of the West's economic restrictions--there is no road back.

Wladyslaw Pigarski, superintendent of education and upbringing

More than 14,000 teachers work in the Kielce Voivodship. Of these, 38 percent are party members. Seventy-five percent belonged to the Polish Teachers Union [ZNP] and 25 percent to Solidarity; further, 59 percent of the teachers have a higher educational background. However, nearly 300 persons were hired without formal teaching qualifications. They are chiefly teaching in rural schools.

During martial law, the schools operate normally. In the Kielce area there have been earlier instances of participation by young people in protest actions. The educational authorities face two basic tasks: evaluating the performance and attitudes of the administrators and teachers and evaluating the quality of teaching, both now and in the future.

No major objections can be raised regarding the school administrators, but according to an evaluation by the office of the superintendent of education, certain school directors, as well as teachers, have adopted a wait-and-see attitude. Talks with these people are underway. Together with the party organizations we are considering their further professional suitability. We are attempting to win the largest possible number of persons whose knowledge and experience suit

them for the difficult work of teaching, the more so as the nature of this work must be somewhat altered. So far it has been dominated by excessive formalism. Chats, appeal and meetings were offered to the youth. This must be changed. The attitude of the teachers must begin to count above all, because this primarily affects and orients work with the youth in the classroom.

Irsula Krzyszton, member of the WRN [Voivodship People's Council] Presidium, chairperson of the Municipal Board of the League of Polish Women (LKP) in Wloszczow

The introduction of martial law in this country has produced many changes. Destructive phenomena are being halted, and order and discipline are returning. The difficult battle to regain the party's authority is in progress. Of tremendous importance to the conduct of this battle are the attitudes of both rank-and-file PZPR members and the aktiv, or leadership. There can be no place within the party for dishonest people who are indifferent to injustice and evil. Nothing demoralizes society as much as the feeling of injustice.

In every milieu in our country we meet many wise and valuable individuals, who want to, and can, work well. Our society displays a high moral level and increasingly higher professional and vocational as well as general qualifications; hence, in our party work we should devote more attention to improving the leadership cadre and strengthening the prestige of the authorities, because this affects to a large extent the success of social undertakings. The authorities may not be loved, but they must be respected. In order to be respected, they must act on the basis of justice and wisdom.

Stanislaw Borowiec, First Plant Party Committee secretary at the NOWINY ZCW [Cement-Limestone Works]

At the NOWINY Cement Works, the PZPR Committee has always attempted to adhere to the position of an honest partner. Hence we had no strikes at our plant. But distressing things also took place; among other things, the plant management was more willing to parley with Solidarity than with the party organization. Four directors now declared that they are resigning from the union, but one director did not make this declaration. Before and now, the party organization has always attempted to care for the entire plant crew. Attention was also paid to improving economic performance and protecting property. The Plant Committee for National Salvation (ZKON) was formed. In addition, 80,000 zlotys was collected for flood victims.

For the third time, the association wanted to shut down the plant, although cement is needed. But the party organization did not agree. KZ [Plant Party Committee] members intervened in every place. As a result, production continues. In the last days of December 1981, improper trade in cement began to be suspected. Large quantities were sold not to those needing this building material but to those who aim to enrich themselves. This matter must be rapidly investigated and cleared up.

Zbigniew Dukowicz, head of the Department of Science, Education and Culture, PZPR Gdansk Committee

In the scientific, educational and cultural communities are attitudes and emotions deriving from Messianic myths that order in the world begins with Poland. Our intelligentsia must get rid of this notion and repair what it has damaged. Besides, the intelligentsia does not have to foot the bill for what happened before 13 December. We will not emerge from this situation unless teachers, scientists and cultural workers do their part. We must analyze the cadres to identify those on whom we can rely, those who are certain and those who are against us. Political action must be individualized, conducted from the inside; this is a moral and political problem. There are no easy solutions in the party; we must find solutions to these matters, above all, through persuasion.

As for the education of youth, since the late 1940's and early 1950's, we have not had an explicit educational program. The secularism of schools, the principle of tolerance, has been violated; religious instruction has been introduced in some schools. This is a sensitive issue.

As for student strikes, the faculty failed to protect young people from a handful of activists from the Independent Association of Students (NZS). A resolute attitude was lacking. To retain popularity with students, they preferred to be silent. The most important thing is to devote a great deal of attention to the student youth movement. This is most important at higher educational institutions.

Eugeniusz Wiejas, first secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee at the Truck Plant (FSC) in Starachowice

The work of the party organization at FSC during martial law is focused on fulfilling the resolution adopted 5 January at the plenary session of the PZPR Plant Committee. This resolution mentions, among other things, strengthening the power and activity of the basic elements of the organization and the need for a declaration of attitude by the comrades who perform party functions; tightening contacts with the department ZSMP [Union of Polish Socialist Youth] circles; the need for political accountability of those who contributed to the crisis of credibility and loss of the authority of the party. All sector party organizations continue to hold meetings at which honest and to-the-point discussions take place. The meetings adopting decisions to resign from Solidarity on the grounds that it was an organization aiming to become a political party. Only at certain departments, e.g., those of the chief technician, chief metallurgist, service--and at the Repair and Construction Plant, the need for self-declaration of attitude was underlined and discussion of this topic has been avoided.

A social [welfare] commission appointed on the initiative of the Plant Party Committee has been active for the last 10 days. It attends to, among other things, extending payments to the most needy persons as well as allocations of work clothing and objects of personal hygiene.

In the plant an appropriate pace of work and a high discipline are noted. Thirty changes in managerial positions have been performed. A 35-person Plant Committee

of National Salvation was been formed. Its members include leading workers showing an appropriate civic attitude. The plant has been purified of hostile flyer propaganda. Between August 1980 and the end of 1981, 10 members and candidate members have been expelled from the party and 430 have been deleted.

Mieczyslaw Lisowski, first secretary of the PZPR Municipal-Gmina Committee in Busko-Zdroj

During the current meetings at basic party organizations (POP), we are observing a rising level of activity by PZPR members. These meetings also produce answers to the difficult questions of what is to be done now and how the credibility and trust in our party should be rebuilt.

The evaluation of the attitudes and behavior of PZPR members hinges on their position respecting the program implemented by POP. The degree of the commitment of, say, every farmer can be evaluated in measurable terms according to his fulfillment of procurement contracts for farm produce. Unfortunately not all party members in the countryside cope satisfactorily with this task. In our gmina we have started to evaluate the party members among farmers according to this criterion. We wish to evaluate similarly all party members who work in plants and operate farms.

In party and social work a well-directed and well-implemented cadre policy is extremely important. The principal decisions hinge on the cadres, and they should be made by honest individuals who are thoroughly familiar with their milieus.

Bolesław Bobak, first secretary of the Plant Party Committee at the M. NOWOTKO Steel Plant

The strike at our plant following the declaration of martial law has been clouded with many rumors, many of them inaccurate. Actually our continuous-operation departments never stopped. They continued working 13 December last year. At 4 o'clock in the morning, though, the leaders of Solidarity arrived at our plant from the city. They not only found shelter there but began to organize a strike at the open-hearth department. Until 10 o'clock in the morning the workers several times stopped work but at the same time refused to strike. The situation was worse at the new plant section, where a protest was undertaken by some 2,000 young people. Monday afternoon, the forces of public order arrived at the plant. The strikers presented their demands. Soon afterward the old section of the plant was abandoned by 400 strikers, and at 2 o'clock in the morning the 2,000 workers in the new section discontinued their strike. Nothing happened to anyone. Party activists persuaded the workers of the pointlessness of the strike. At the new section of the plant, where the situation was much more threatening, a victory was scored by the common-sensical and resolute attitude of officers of the Polish People's Army (LWP) and the forces of public order.

On 14 December last year all workers reported for work. Those who had organized the strike were expelled from the party's ranks. We administered penalties and reprimands to many other comrades. Five OOP [Department Party Organization] secretaries were replaced, and the Plant Party Committee gained 21 new members. In

addition, 20 persons had to be removed from supervisory positions. Moreover, 13 persons resigned from the party and we accepted into our ranks 5 new comrades, ZSMP members. Broadly attended meetings are underway, devoted to good, specific discussions. I propose that the consultations be extended in connection with the proposed increases in the prices of food, fuel and energy.

Wladyslaw Bysiak, farmer from Gorno Gmina

Martial law was a necessity. The inhabitants of my gmina feared to return home in the evening--people were uncertain of tomorrow. A sentence from the speech by General Jaruzelski is worth remembering: "A soldier always has clean hands." Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of certain party members who had contributed greatly to the chaos and disorder that until recently reigned in Poland. The difficult and responsible work of rebuilding confidence in the party is awaiting us. We may not repeat those mistakes. It is only a pity that our many years of work, all those civic deeds that we have performed in the gmina--electrification, the building of a road, a school and a garage--are no longer remembered, although much of this work had been accomplished by party members.

Regarding agriculture, high production is the duty of the farmer, but it is the duty of every Pole to contribute to that production. A contract must be fulfilled by both parties. The plants must supply us with equipment and fertilizers, because good harvests are inconceivable without the basic means of production. It is disgraceful when manure has to be shoveled instead of raked. Poland can feed itself, but astute decisions are needed. It has recently been said that Poland was importing cabbage! But in Gorno Gmina cabbage is being used to feed cows. Such instances are extremely irksome. Let us trust and help the farmers, and the results will not be long in coming.

Janusz Sommerowski, first secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee at CHEMAR Chemical Equipment and Industrial Fixtures Plant

Things are better, but the extremist spirit of Solidarity is still making itself felt. Among the aktiv the mood is that of humility and self-searching; there is no need to urge it on. Prior to December there was apathy and fear and resignation. Now people are learning, regarding reforms; in the final analysis, respect for human labor is emerging.

Solidarity has shaken [socialized] structures. But its second stage was counter-revolution. It is being said that when Solidarity was recruiting members we supported this, but now that we are against it, they [the workers] are resigning from it. So they [the workers] say that they will not join any trade union whatsoever. But public resignation is not the point.

The most important thing is smooth production, the ordering of the economy. What we had not been able to accomplish for 16 months we have accomplished in 20 days.

The removing of prominent persons is the chief order of the day. These people acted like weathervanes while occupying managerial posts. They wore one face before August [1980], another after August, yet another even before 13 December

[illegible] still [illegible]. [illegible] must be examined and appropriate decisions must be made.

[illegible], but decisions made by single individuals are a little [illegible]. Every mistake will be held against the party. Decisions should be [illegible], not just the information about them. The party is rectifying various negative matters and remedying acute problems, but we cannot allow people wearing [illegible] to take part in this renewal. We must convince the people that there is no return to the pre-August situation. We expect from the plenary session of the Central Committee (KC) an answer as to how the party should operate during martial law. It is not good to place the party aside from the decisions being made, because any bad decisions will be blamed on it anyway.

[illegible] Cibor, director of Elementary School 1 in Skarzysko-Kamienna

The general crisis that has gripped the educational community was primarily due to shortcomings of an economic nature, deficiencies in the work of the school administration and the deepening differences between the pay of teachers and that of other professional groups. Many teachers were discouraged by the awareness that the program for introducing the reform of the educational system was not [illegible] based on increasing the outlays on school construction and on the [illegible] educational-upbringing institutions.

[illegible] such negative factors, the teachers and the Union of Polish Teachers (ZNP) emerged satisfactorily from the difficult period and are capable of conducting educational-upbringing work properly.

The resolutions of the Ninth Party Congress mention as a main social goal the for[illegible] [illegible] problem. In the new form of the schools' work, a great role is to be played by school party organizations, whose tasks include the restoration of proper significance to the program contents and slogans of socialist education. Another important issue is to restore the vigor and militancy of the work of such organizations, especially ZHP [Union of Polish Boy and Girl Scouts] and [illegible].

[illegible] should become the center of socialist education. We must perpetuate in the consciousness of children and youth the conviction of the supreme value of good education and honest work. All these objectives can be fulfilled by the teacher only if he is devoted to the cause of socialism.

[illegible] draft of the 1982 Socioeconomic Plan and Budget of the Voivodship [illegible] to the problem commissions of the PZPR Voivodship Committee re[illegible], that the expenditures on education this year seem to be greater, but actually are largely based on the wage fund. It is necessary to reanalyze this plan and, insofar as possible, to allot more funds on the equipping and construction of educational institutions.

[illegible], first secretary of the PZPR Plant Committee at the ZEBIEC Zabiec Metal-Mining (Z-ZM) Plant

The time for self-declaration of attitude by party members has arrived. At our recent [illegible] attempted to bring many issues into order. However, a situation in which the party would be starved out should not be permitted. The [illegible] must be a party fighting for the best interests of working people.

It is good that social (welfare) commissions are being formed. They have filled the gap left by Solidarity and branch trade unions. Young people are being more watchful, their consciousness is changing. On the other hand, the proposed high price increases are generating anxiety.

[illegible] Chernyuk, director, Mother and Child Health Care Group

The problem of uniting the nation, which is so deeply split, is a priority to the party. That unity, and the explanatory activities associated with it, must be focused on the program for emergence from the crisis. This program is contained in the resolutions of the Ninth Congress. It is a good program and it is only a pity that it has not been fulfilled with sufficient speed. The attitude of certain party members is highly objectionable. It is a mistake to assert that the party must be defended, since it is defended by the image of our country and of the socialist fatherland; this is how the party is gaining credibility. Credibility of the party is also promoted by our behavior as party members. Our propaganda has not passed its test. We must take greater use of psychology. There are many people to whom we can relate. Certain representatives of the intelligentsia are always competent and adapt themselves to any situation.

The trade unions should be autonomous and independent but they should not engage in [illegible] We are and all of us should attend to such trade unions. At the meeting level we should discuss what we hear from the grassroots level. Solidarity must be retained. It is advisable to retain the word "solidarity" from the psychological point of view, because it is linked to the spirit of the [illegible] Local self-governments must exist, in order to assist administration.

[illegible], first secretary, PZPR Plant Committee at State Motor Transport [illegible]

The most important questions that must be answered today are: What is the [illegible] of the party? How can the party be guided through martial law? What should be passed to party groups and sector party organizations in order to attain trade with partiality following the abolition of martial law? One can [illegible] be drawn from talks with people and from numerous encounters and [illegible] tranquility exists and work is being done. There is no resistance in the sphere of production. But we have yet to overcome the passive resistance encountered in the human psyche. As yet only the forefront has been [illegible]; long and arduous labor is facing us. Above all, we must work to assure the unity of party ranks, because a disunited party will not be able to unite the [illegible]. It is necessary to demonstrate explicitly the unity of political goals,

increase the importance of the PZPR charter and verify [the loyalty of] party rank and file. So far we have beaten the political enemy, but he has not yet been disarmed in terms of argumentation; we must be aware that he will want to exploit this advantage.

The following conclusions suggest themselves: A thorough analysis of the attitudes of members of the party authorities should be performed, and their performance should be evaluated. Conscientious ideological and political verification [of the loyalty] of the rank and file is needed. Let the statistics lose and the party win. A precise definition of the forms of the party's intervention into cadre issues is needed. On the other hand, it is necessary to withdraw recommendations for those party members in managerial positions who violated the party charter. The settlement of accounts must be expedited. Many loyal sons of the party were kept in the night between 12 and 13 December. Such people are like weathervanes and they should not belong in our ranks.

Tomasz Sawala, secretary of the PZPR Gmina Committee in Baltow

Party work among the rural community has markedly improved after 13 December. A revival of the small POP is evident; PZPR members are gaining confidence that their efforts are being supported. Certainly, this situation is influenced by the activities of the military commissioners, whose intervention results in a rapid and often unbureaucratic settlement of the grievances and problems of the gmina's inhabitants.

Owing to the cooperation between the PZPR gmina organization and the military [illegible], the activities of many party-member farmers are increasing. This cooperation has resulted in an increase in livestock procurements in the Baltow Gmina. In the first 3 weeks of January these procurements included 190 hogs and 30 head of cattle. These results could have been still better had the farmers been able to purchase a percentage--e.g., 3 to 5 percent--of the meat delivered. Similarly, despite the intense frosts, the procurements of the potatoes needed for Ostrowiec Swietokrzyski were organized at a rapid rate.

Another important problem to the gmina community is obtaining supplies of fertilizers and pesticides for the farmers. Limiting these supplies is tantamount to limiting crop production and indirectly also livestock production.

The gmina party echelon held its plenary session on 10 January this year. At that session the concept of the formation and action of the Civic Committee for National Salvation was worked out. The activities of this committee already are starting to produce results; among other things, it has organized assistance for flood victims.

During ongoing POP meetings, considerable attention is paid to the problems of youth. We are alarmed by the attitude of certain teachers, especially the young ones lacking teaching and political experience and indifferent to what is happening in Poland. We shall conduct individual talks with these persons, because indifference in the upbringing and education of the youth cannot be tolerated.

Stanislaw Kwiecien, first secretary, PZPR Gmina Committee in Kunow

Party work is only beginning. Silence is more harmful than open, critical discussion. The information reaching the farmer is fragmentary. The institutions serving agriculture and the agricultural service continue to perform poorly. Some decisions are still awaited. There is a need for the coordination and limitation of directives reaching the gminas from various superior authorities and institutions. Often there is no way of fulfilling all these directives.

Karol Kadomski, quality controller at PREDOM-MESKO [Metal Works]

The forms of self-declaration of attitude by party members are various. This process is different than before 13 December. Sometimes the declarations are submitted in a calculated or formalist spirit. At this stage, resignation from Solidarity is of no importance.

Wladyslaw Knitowski, KZPR Voivodship Committee secretary

Until 13 December there was a certain social movement termed trade union. But even its leaders doubted whether it was a trade union and spoke of it as a social movement. But it is not the name that matters. The properties of a phenomenon decide its nature. The manner of organization, scope and operating methods of that movement demonstrated that a political party had been forming.

Analysis of the documents and activities of that organization demonstrates clearly that it was built on the basis of values antagonistic to the values represented by Lenin's party. Membership in two organizations differing in their systems of values may indicate that neither of these systems is completely accepted or that only one of them is meeting with approval. In such a situation, activities in behalf of the other political organization may be of a destructive nature.

In the party there must remain courageous individuals whose hands are clean. This concerns not the party in general but Lenin's party of a new kind.

Address by Marian Orzechowski

[illegible] NOWE LUDY in Polish 18 Jan 82 p 3

[illegible] A strategic consequence of the introduction of martial law in our country was that it had foiled a seizure of power. The destruction of the economy had not been stopped. The seized materials indicate that the Hungarian variant of the takeover of power in 1956 was to be repeated in Poland. It was to begin with driving masses of the people into the streets, seizure of facilities, etc. Further events would merely have constituted a repetition of the Hungarian scenario.

The tactical and emergency objectives of the introduction of martial law have outlined as an increase in labor discipline and in the well-being of society as well as the initiation of ordering the economy. To employ military language, we have already won the first battle in the war. We are facing many years of war for peace and socialism.

Following 13 December of last year, the antisocialist forces in our country were paralyzed but not completely eliminated. There is a real threat of conspiratory underground action. We should respond to even the most innocuous actions of this kind in a ruthless and resolute manner.

The declaration of martial law in our country is a blow dealt not only to antisocialist forces in Poland but also to American imperialism, which is not so readily relinquishing its plans. Imperialist politicians in the United States had already been regarding our country as a broken link of socialism. They had believed that no Polish force could resist Solidarity. It was thought that the authorities in our state could count only on the support of the Security Forces (SB), the Citizen Militia (MO) and certain officers of the Polish Army (WP). The truth proved to be different. The membership of Solidarity was a little more than 6 million--it was neither as large nor as strong an organization as pictured in the propaganda drive.

Through its takeover of power, the army has saved socialism and provided the conditions for economic reconstruction, but it cannot solve such problems as the consolidation of the nation and the construction of a lasting consensus.

Our goal is a socialist Poland, whose real vision has been outlined at the Ninth Extraordinary Party Congress. In translating into reality the line of that congress, we should bear in mind the experiences that we gained after it. On the basis of that experience as well as of the documents of the Ninth Congress, we should concretize the goals and tasks essential to us under martial law.

Our current action should be focused on building a socialist society that is free of exploitation and injustice, respects the legitimacy of the law and is self-governing. As the Central Committee (KC) secretary, chairman of the Military Council of National Salvation, Wojciech Jaruzelski has declared that the PZPR must be the party of struggle for social justice. We must always base any such programs on the universal principles of Marxism-Leninism. We must also enrich the party's ideological-educational work with fundamental national values.

To win the war for socialism, we must be well prepared. Not one of us party members will or can avoid responsibility for what happened in this country. As for what will happen, our party alone will be accountable for it. It is important, though, that in waging this struggle, we should be convinced that socialism cannot be built exclusively with the hands of communists. This should be done in cooperation with the entire society. Upon us--the party aktiv--falls the duty of persuading people and correcting erroneous views. This is why it is a pity that Comrade J. Komorowski cited certain opinions without declaring his own attitude. After all, the views of the secretary of the plant party echelon are important--he is supposed to enlighten the plant party organizations.

Today more than ever we need a party that is united in action, aggressive, cohesive and speaking a single language. Its guiding and leading role should ensue from its function of serving the working class and the nation rather than from constitutional provisions.

The guiding role of the party in the nation cannot, however, be interpreted as meaning that it bears responsibility for everything in the country. The party must serve as the arbiter and the conscience in the solution of social issues. It is precisely to such a concept of the party's role that the new style of work of every party organization and echelon, every secretary, must be subordinated.

Considerable deliberation and wisdom are needed by the party in conducting its self-purification process. All PZPR members belonging to Solidarity should be given to understand that their voice could not be heard at the congresses and in the activities of that union. Believing that Solidarity struggles for just problems of the workers, these individuals actually became a tool of the leaders of Solidarity in achieving definite goals. Every party member must realize what he has done in Solidarity, in order to lead that union from the anti-socialist road. Those who have consciously acted against the state and party cannot today be treated indulgently. We should, however, oppose tendencies for revenge. We also must censure those who, under the army's protection, have suddenly gained courage and want to settle accounts with others.

In the party we need fighters for social justice, because they can help the party organizations to regain credibility and build up strength. It is just such people that I wish the Kielce voivodship party organizations to have.

Biographic Sketch of Jaroslaw Motyka

Kielce STUDIA in Polish 18 Jan 87 p 3

[Text] Jaroslaw Motyka, secretary for socioagricultural affairs at the PZPR [Polish United Workers' Party] Voivodship Committee, was born in 1944 in Kielce, in a worker family. In 1967 he completed agricultural studies at the Agricultural University of Warsaw (SGGW). In 1977 he received the degree of doctor of economic sciences at the Academy of Social Sciences in Moscow.

He started professional work in 1967 at the CENTRALA NASIENNA (Seed Center) enterprise in Kielce. During 1971-1977 he worked for the Agricultural Department of the Kielce Voivodship Committee and subsequently for 2 years he was an adjunct professor at the Institute of Social Sciences of the Swietokrzyska [Holy Cross] Technical University. In 1978 he was appointed deputy chief of the Agricultural Department of the PZPR Kielce Voivodship Committee, and in 1979, director of the Department of Agriculture, Food Economy and Forestry of the voivodship office.

He has been a member of PZPR since 1967. He has been elected to carry out many party functions, including membership in the University Committee at the Swietokrzyska Technical University and the post of first secretary of POP at the PZPR Kielce Voivodship Committee.

JAA
CSO: 2600/634

DETAILS OF LCY FINANCING OUTLINED

Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian 22 Feb 82 p 6

[Article by Branislav Kovacic: "How Much the Party Costs"]

[Text] At the very end of last year, the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Serbia decided to reduce party membership dues. This was the second such decision in 1981--the dues were reduced for the first time in July.

Recently other republican central committees of the LCY have also set new rates for party membership dues. They have been reduced for all members with lower incomes.

In the Serbian LC, which has about 910,000 members, the surpluses at the end of 1980 were 140 million dinars. It is estimated that last year, since the financial reports are not yet ready, the surplus was about 100 million dinars.

The public has been well acquainted for years now with the bitter discussions of the federal budget, but it has never become accustomed to public discussion of party finances. Because of this, a conviction has been created that the finances and budget of the LCY are subjects to be avoided. Although reports on material and financial activities are written every year, neither the newspapers nor Yugoslav political science have given much serious attention to this.

What are the most important elements regarding the party treasury?

Ninety Percent--Membership Dues

These days not one important communist party makes public its financial balance.

The LCY's income for 1980 (the new data are not yet available) was over 4 billion dinars. The figures show that the money was acquired as follows: 89.7 percent from membership dues, 7.2 percent from subsidies from sociopolitical communities, SIZs [self-managing interest communities], and OURs [organizations of associated labor], and 3.1 percent from "miscellaneous income."

[illegible] funds from the budgets of metropolitan communities, SIZs, and OCKs were reduced by [illegible] percent in comparison with 1979.

The LCY's income was 941 million dinars greater than its expenditures; 662 million dinars were distributed to funds and 279 million dinars were carried over to the following year.

Next to the "chamber" through which party membership dues are collected and distributed [illegible] like today?

The membership dues are collected in the basic organizations of the LCY, and the money flows into the common organizations. Part of the funds of the common organization, according to a previous decision by the republican Central Committee, are retained in its treasury, while the rest belongs to the central committees of the republics. The money is then sent from the republican level to the party bodies in the federation.

In the LC organizations in the republics and provinces, the membership dues are distributed among the common and municipal organizations, as well as [being used] to provide the party organizations of the republics and provinces. This [illegible] membership dues is dependent upon inequalities between the developed and undeveloped communes and regions, differences in the number of members and the defined organization of the leadership.

[illegible] LC, for example, [illegible] percent of the membership dues paid [illegible] the central party bodies. The membership dues collected in 1980 [illegible] 1.[illegible] billion dinars, and it is estimated that last year 1.65 billion [illegible]. Under the Serbian LC Central Committee there is also a fund [illegible] funds for the LC organizations operating at a financial loss. [illegible] from this fund is received by the LC organizations in Kosovo and [illegible] in Serbia proper.

[illegible] Central Committee, the Montenegro LC Central Committee, and the Montenegro Central Committee receive the most "party subsidies" in the LCY. In 1980, [illegible] Central Committee received [illegible] million dinars from the total membership [illegible] subsidy.

[illegible] is seen, the [illegible] of the party that membership dues are [illegible] income of the LCY is clearly observed.

[illegible]

[illegible] communists remember that in the first two years after the war the membership dues were comparatively larger than today. Then, however, the CPS (Communist Party of Yugoslavia) only had a half million members in its ranks. [illegible], when the CPS was renamed the LCY and was formally disassociated from the role of a financial political party, the number of members had climbed to [illegible].

In 1979, the LCY embraced 3,[illegible] officials and workers, while 1,033,000 [illegible] had [illegible] (party membership) booklets. At the end of 1980, the situation was as follows: the LCY was paying 1,[illegible] officials and 4,358 workers, and more than 2 million communists were paying membership dues.

It is interesting that 520 officials and 2,076 workers are employed in the Serbian LC.

The highest salary in the LCY, without [compensation for] past labor, is 31,000 dinars. This is received by the members of the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee. Party officials in the communes nominally receive the average salary in their commune. Naturally, they multiply it by a certain coefficient. A similar thing occurs at the republican and provincial level.

Analysts have observed that the number of members not paying membership dues regularly is decreasing from year to year. Two years ago 101,000 communists in the LCY did not pay their membership dues.

Here is another interesting fact: 8 years ago only 65 percent of the communists in the Serbian LC paid membership dues, as opposed to 92 percent in 1980.

The irregular payment of membership dues can be partially explained by the ordinary movements of the membership: long business trips, seasonal work outside the place of permanent residence, "disassociation and association"....

To date not one communist party in the world has abolished membership dues as an important source of finances. It is interesting that some European countries (Sweden and Norway) have passed laws according to which each year the parliaments regulate the size of the amount from the state budget set aside to finance all of the important political parties. Certain parties, even though they are fighting against the system, are receiving assistance from their state. The reason is quite simple--these countries want to avoid at any cost having national political forces receive financial assistance from abroad.

Nevertheless, the strongest umbilical cord is the one linking the ruling communist parties in the countries of real socialism with the state's budget.

How the Party Spend Money

The LCY's main orientation is to have the party finance itself. This rule has been in effect since 1937, when Tito, who had come to head the party, refused financial assistance from the Comintern. This was a step toward the political independence of the CPY. Since then the policy of self-financing has never been abandoned, although its outlines have changed from time to time.

This was particularly pronounced between the eighth (1964) and ninth (1969) congresses of the LCY. During this period many members of the LCY did not meet their financial obligations regularly, and some demanded that all communists pay identical membership dues, regardless of the size of their income. Also heard were views that the membership dues should not be paid, because they were only a euphemism for a "membership tax." The Ninth Congress, therefore, reined the self-financing policy once more. Until the Ninth Congress, when the LCY sharply disassociated itself from an etatist orientation, the party treasury was substantially supplemented from the state budget.

In accordance with a basic valid decision by the Presidium of the LCY Central Committee in 1976, membership dues are also used to pay for the basic activity of the LCY: ideological-political activity, "functional activities" (congresses, conferences, meetings, consultations, seminars, symposiums), the work of officials and workers in LC organizations, and material expenditures.

For example, 2 million dinars were spent on preparations for the 10th LCY Congress, and almost 21 million for holding the 11th Congress.

It is a political position that the funds from sociopolitical communities received by the party treasury are to be used to finance LCY activities of broader social significance: international ties, publishing activity, scientific research....

From the funds received from the federation budget, the LCY Central Committee subsidizes the Josip Broz Tito LCY Political School in Kumrovac, the NIRO [Newspaper Publishing Company] publication KOMUNIST, and the program for scientific documentation from the international workers movement.

We also note the information that the building of the Political School in Kumrovec, which was opened last year at the end of September, cost 430 million dinars. A total of 170 million dinars was collected by voluntary contributions from LCY members and other workers and citizens.

[illegible]
CSO: 2800/324

EDITORIALIST EXPLORES CAUSES FOR VETERANS' RESENTMENTS

Belgrade MLADOST in Serbo-Croatian 8 Mar 82 p 2

[Article by Momir Tomic: "Mutual (Lack of) Understanding"]

[Text] Several days ago, while walking through Kraljevo, I witnessed a little scene that made me wonder if my hearing were functioning properly. Two young children, barely old enough to be in school, were walking down the street arm in arm, singing in unison, "Sprem'te se, sprem'te, cetnici" (Prepare yourselves, Chetniks). Was this a scene being shot for some new film? Of course, only the most naive person would ask himself that question. Nor is it much of a surprise that the jargon of the young has suddenly been enriched with a couple of new salutations, "Pomoz'bog, brate," and "Bog ti pomog'o" (God be with you). They are like echoes of those mumbled Ljubljana sayings of "Ceturtom rajhu," reverberations of the "revolutionary," irredentist salutations of the Albanian youths in Kosovo.

After the initial confusion, one might ask a rather simple question: Where are all these things coming from now, after 4 decades of revolution, 40 years of socialistic education, after so many victories and so much progress, of which, however trite it may sound, we can all be quite proud? Is only the simple, unconscious repetition of information driven into the unformed, [illegible]ly moulded consciousness, a necessary sacrifice which is placed on the [illegible] to appease the spiritual idol of the "world community," a temporary [illegible]tom of the acute illness of contemporary society, the overloading, poisoning and drugging of people with information? We are drowning in a [illegible] of Coca-Cola, we are being blinded by a sky full of diamonds.

[illegible] judgement tells us that we should not let our passions cool. But the [illegible]ories of the recent past are strong again, the wounds are still open and it would be very dangerous to throw salt on them. The stormy and emotional reactions of the soldiers, heard frequently these days in various articles, [illegible], newspaper columns, interviews, letters and films, correctly demonstrate that we should not deny their precious experiences in life and in the revolution; their vital, emotional words, their advice and their opinions, [illegible] if they are a bit old-fashioned. The society that does not believe in its own past does not have much of a future. Finally, these same soldiers, [illegible] fathers, mothers, grandfathers, relatives, friends and contemporaries, are our living textbooks, while at the same time they are affected just as [illegible] are by common, everyday misfortunes.

"Veterans' organizations must be aware and understand," said Ivica Racan, member of the presidency of the Central Committee of the Croatia LCY, "that we are concerned with an emotional connection with wartime events and the fate of the revolution. One must have some understanding, even when demands go too far, because the examples cited (Dedijer's book, "Novi prilozi za biografiju druga Tita" ["New Contributions to Tito's Biography"], the film "Pad Italije" ["Fall of Italy"] of Lordan Zafranovic, the album "Mrtva priroda," "Riblje corbe"--author's note) are often only used as an excuse to express discontent and to point to the broader phenomenon of the "erosion" of the revolution...."

"We fought for the unification of Yugoslavia," said Kazimir Mihanivic, president of the Split Veterans' Organization, "and not so that the dollar or the mark would become the means of payment between republic and province."

We understand the soldiers, but we ask that they also try to understand us. It is not easy to understand us, we have much further go to than they do in defining our ideals, ideals that they are slowly, very slowly achieving, that we have much work to do and rarely, very rarely have the means to do it, that we have not achieved the desired responsibility and influence in the schools, which the obedient bureaucrats created with our help. We are certainly not among those who want to pay off the battles of our revolution with dollars and marks. Fortunately, we are those "fools and idiots" who will rebel and die for our ideals; we still have our dreams, our songs will be just as beautiful and we will sing them with a clear conscience.

There is something is us that is strange even to us. We are not afraid of it. We have power, knowledge, bravery and the will to take over the controls of the revolution that is in progress, only without the pyrotechnics and "Kluz" uniforms, thank you. We are for reality because we are real.

And what about the youth organization? It wisely keeps quiet. "If you are wise and you are silent, you act foolishly" (Theophrastus, Greek philosopher). And the reverse is also true.

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DAVICO SCORES PEN CLUB, OTHERS AT SARAJEVO WRITERS MEETING

Zagreb VJESNIK in Serbo-Croatian 27 Mar 82 SEDAM DANA supplement p 13

[Article by Stjepan Kljuic]

[Text] A disturbing meeting took place at the Sarajevo Writers Club, with many harsh words, quarrels and threats.

This week a serious writers forum was the site of numerous disagreements and academic conversations. The LCY cell of the Writers Society of the city of Sarajevo arranged a discussion of creative freedom, with the keynote address by author Oskar Davico.

Davico noted that Yugoslavia is one of the countries where creative freedom is at the highest level. The only thing that is not allowed is agitation for a return to the former order to the historical scene, or inflammation of national, racial or religious hatred. Yet if you look at our book displays, you will see, Davico continued, that some insignificant authors are better represented than Marx, Engels, Gorky or Mayakovsky.

Davico said that we have many publication errors, largely because of publishers' shortcomings. In his opinion the editorial council only formally performs a social function: "How else can you explain that such works or better, non works--as Gojko Djogo's book can be offered to the public? For Djogo can write whatever he wants, but PROSVETA cannot publish it," concluded Davico.

During this part of the presentation, Rajko Petrov Nogo interrupted Davico several times; this was the beginning of the incident that will mark this meeting.

The False Humanism of the PEN Club

Davico said, "Most frequently the publishers try to publish things that will sell well, that will titillate the public with content at odds with official policy and socialism"

He continued, "Despite our freedoms, today we are witnesses of the PEN Club's concern for the fate of such Yugoslav writers as Vlado Gotovac, Marko Veselica, Franjo Tudman, Gojko Djogo, Sabedin Haliti and Sabit Rusteme. That is false

humanism and a trend that appears only in relationships with our country. When a PEN Club congress was held in Dubrovnik before the war, a group of our writers appealed for the release of a large number of writers from prison. However, the president of the Pen Club at that time said that it could not do so, since it respected the sovereignty of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Those same thoughtful and concerned people now worried about Djogo and Gotovac sat in silence while in Chile one of the giants of world literature, Pablo Neruda, was being killed."

Should We Try Writers?

At one point the discussion considered whether writers should be tried in court for their works. Oskar Davico supported the viewpoint that a good editorial policy would create a social preventative that would make it unnecessary to try writers. In contrast to Davico, Mladen Oljaca demanded that writers, like all other citizens, should go before the court for works that oppose our positive laws. In his opinion, the writer's responsibility is even greater; and as an example of abuse he cited Gojko Djogo.

During the discussion Rajko Nogo interrupted, and at one point the following dialogue took place.

[Davico] You see an example of Djogo's negative impact on some of his friends, such as Rajko Nogo, who is present here.

[Nogo] I have no friends, I am entirely alone.

[Davico] You are not alone; I know that very well. You have many friends.

Since Rajko Nogo's interruptions threatened to break up the meeting, after a short pause Miro Jancic asked the LCY cell secretary to prevent such interruptions, in accordance with the rules and regulations governing behavior at such meetings. Upon several warnings by Mirko Marjanovic, Rajko Nogo merely responded: "In any case you, Marjanovic, do not understand anything about what's going on."

Again a dialoge began between Davico and Nogo. After several unprintable interruptions, Davico got up and said, "I am an old revolutionary, and I will not allow anyone to mistreat me! If we have to fight, then let's fight!"

Naturally, the writers present did not allow it to come to actual blows.

With Principle and Concretely

The great majority of those present held a common viewpoint about creative freedom, when speaking about it in principle only. When they began to evaluate concrete incidents, disagreements appeared.

When Slobodan Blagojevic's "Anthology of Bosnia and Hercegovina Poetry of the 20th Century" was suggested as an example of our freedoms, Davico was opposed by Nogo, Orahovac and Bogicevic. He responded to each of them with complete calm, but no common viewpoint was found.

Miodrag Bogicevic asked Davico whether he could accept an anthology of Croatian or Yugoslav poetry that did not contain Ivan Goran Kovacic's "The Pit," alluding to Blagojevic's anthology that does not contain Skender Kulenovic's "Stojanka, Knjezopoljka Mother."

Davico answered that he would not accept it, but if some had a different opinion, he would try to talk to them.

Then the famous collector of folklore, Sait Orahovac, sharply attacked the anthology as clerical, particularly because of the large amount of space given to Nikola Sop. Davico said that the SVJETLOST Publishing House also publishes Sop, and therefore he does not see any error in his inclusion. Rajko Nogo's question was whether there was any difference between Miodrag Pavlovic's anthology of Servian poetry and this one by Slobodan Blagojevic. Davico responded that Pavlovic's anthology was exclusively "Saint Sava Serbian," while Balgojevic's was something entirely different, with his own individual esthetic view of literature.

This disturbing meeting ended in a difficult atmosphere. After everything that happened at the Writers Club, it is well known that the Sarajevo literary scene is burdened by shortcomings that must soon be overcome.

The recent appearance of the "Anthology of Bosnia and Hercegovina Poetry of the 20th Century" and the project program for "Modern Bosnia and Hercegovina Literature," to include 50 volumes, has brought to the fore those writers who heckle at discussions, offering little work but much criticism, according to Davico.

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